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SUMMARY
This paper i s  a s tudy o f  the  h i s to r y  o f  the  U krainian 
n a t i o n a l i s t  movement which a rose  in  Western Ukraine in  th e  1920's  and 
reached th e  peak of i t s  development during  the  German-Soviet war 
o f  1941-45. Emphasis i s  given to  the  War p e r io d  when t h i s  movement 
was ab le  to  p e n e t r a te  th e  U krain ian  SSR in  the  wake o f  the  German 
advance and occupation  o f S o v ie t  t e r r i t o r i e s .  The s tudy  focuses 
on th e  development of the  p o l i t i c s  o f  the  O rg an isa t io n  o f  U krainian 
N a t io n a l i s t s  (O rh an iza ts iy a  U krayins’ykh Nat'sionalistiv--GUN) and th e  
U krainian In su rg en t  Army (U krayins’ka P o v s tan s 'k a  Armiya--UPAl 
which were th e  p r in c i p a l  n a t i o n a l i s t  p a r t i e s  during  the  p e r io d ,  and 
examines t h e i r  r o le s  in  th e  l i g h t  o f  the  changing ba lance  o f  m i l i t a r y  
fo rce s  and the  a t t i t u d e s  o f  E as te rn  and Western U krain ians to 
the  German occupation .
The OUN was formed in  1929 as a fu s ion  o f s e v e ra l  n a t i o n a l i s t  
groups in  Western Ukraine and in  E as t European U krain ian  communities. 
The programme adopted by the  OUN a t  i t s  founding Congress c a l l e d  fo r  
th e  e s tab lish m en t o f  an independent c o r p o r a t i s t  s t a t e  to  in c lu d e  a l l  
e th n o g ra p h ica l ly  U krain ian  t e r r i t o r i e s - - S o v i e t  U kraine ,B ukovin ia  and 
B essarab ia  in  N orthern  Rumania, T ran sc a rp a th ia  in  Czechoslovakia and 
the  U krainian p rov inces  o f  Poland. In th e  course of i t s  a c t i v i t y  
during  the  decade b e fo re  the  outbreak  o f th e  Second World War, the  
n a t i o n a l i s t  movement succeeded in  becoming th e  p r in c ip a l  spokesman 
f o r  n a t io n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  w ith  i t s  own p a r t i c u l a r  proposed s o lu t io n s .
- 1 -
The ascendancy o f  the  OUN concurred w ith the  demise o f  th e  Communist 
P a rty  o f  Western Ukraine (CPWU), the  o rg a n is a t io n  which had 
championed n a t io n a l  a s p i r a t io n s  o f  the  Western U krain ian  populace in  
the  1920 's .  The s o c ia l  co n d it io n s  o f  Western Ukraine, th e  d e c l in e  of 
the  communist movement th e re  and th e  emergence o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  
OUN are  examined in  Chapter One,
The German campaign a g a in s t  Poland in  September, 1939 r e s u l te d  
in  the  d iv i s io n  o f  Western Ukraine between the  S ov ie t  occupation  to  
the  e a s t  o f  the  S ia n - - V is tu la  l in e  and the  e s tab l ish m e n t  o f  Nazi 
occupancy r u le  to  the  w est. The m a jo r i ty  of OUN c e l l s  were in  the  
S ov ie t  t e r r i t o r y  between 1939 and 1941 bu t c a r r ie d  on l i t t l e  a c t i v i t y .  
In the  Generalgouvemement, the  OUN lead e rsh ip  had succeeded in  p la c in g  
i t s  membership in  the  Gestapo u n i t s  and in  the  a d m in is t ra t io n s  of 
the  occupied U krain ian  t e r r i t o r i e s .  I t  a lso  a s s i s t e d  in  the  form ation 
o f two German-Ukrainian le g io n s , N ach t ig a l l  and. Roland, In the  course 
of the  two years  b e fo re  th e  German a t t a c k  on the  S ov ie t  Union, t a c t i c a l  
d i f f e r e n c e s  in  the  leading  organs o f  the  OUN, r e l a t e d  la rg e ly  to  the  
n a tu re  o f  the  movement's co -o p e ra t io n  with the  Third  Reich led  to  an 
o rg a n is a t io n a l  s p l i t  c re a t in g  two fa c t io n s  under th e  le ad e rsh ip  of 
S , Bandera (OUN-B) and R. Mel'nyk (pUN-M), The l a t t e r  group was to  p lay  
a more c o n s i s te n t  r o le  o f  c o l la b o ra t io n  w ith th e  German occupation 
during the  War than  d id  the  OUN-B.
When Germany invaded th e  USSR in  June 1941, bo th  fa c t io n s  
of the  OUN attem pted  to  extend t h e i r  in f lu en ce  in to  E as te rn  Ukraine. 
Both s e n t  e x p ed it io n a ry  fo rce s  (pokhidni hrupy) th e r e ,  whose ta sk  i t  
was to  b u i ld  up an o rg a n is a t io n a l  network of lo c a l  p e rso n s .  T he ir  
p r in c ip a l  opponents in  t h i s  ven tu re  were the  communist underground and 
p a r t i s a n  movement. While the  Red P a r t i s a n s  were a weak fo rce  from 
June 1941 to  the  summer of the  fo llow ing y e a r ,  t h e i r  support  w ith in  
the populace grew as Nazi r e p re s s io n s  in  th e  occupied East i n t e n s i f i e d ,
- i i  -
The n a t i o n a l i s t s  were unable to  p rov ide  a c le a r  p o l i t i c a l  a l t e r n a t iv e  
to  the  E as te rn  U krainians and thereby  d e fa u l te d  to  the  communist move­
ment which the  U krainian masses in  1942 saw as th e  l e s s e r  o f  two e v i l s .  
Chapter I I  o f  t h i s  paper examines the ro le  o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement 
from the German in v as io n  o f  June , 1941 up to  the  beg inn ing  o f  the  
S o v ie t  o f fen s iv e  in  e a r ly  1943, S ec tions  on the  communist underground 
and p a r t i s a n  movement and on the  p o l i t i c a l  views o f workers and peasan ts  
in  E as te rn  Ukraine p rov ide  a p re l im in a ry  in s ig h t  in to  the  reasons fo r  
the  f a i l u r e  o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  to  c re a te  a mass base in  Sovie t 
Ukraine during  the  War,
Both f a c t io n s  of the  OUN were unable to  d i s a s s o c ia te  themselves 
from the  German occupation  o r  to  p re s e n t  a coherent p o l i t i c a l  
programme to  t h e i r  aud iences. In the  f i r s t  months o f  1943, when the  
Sov ie t  o f fe n s iv e  was underway, the  p re s su re  o f  an t i -N a z i  sen tim ent in  
Ukraine and the  extreme s o c i a l  d i s lo c a t io n  th e re  r e s u l t e d  in  the  
form ation o f  an anti-German and a n t i -S o v ie t  g u e r r i l l a  army in  the  North 
Western U k ra in e -- th e  U kray ins 'ka  P o v s tan s 'k a  Armiya-Ukrainian In su rgen t 
Army (UPA) . The UPA, which came to  be linked  w i th  the  OUN-B a f t e r  the  
l a t t e r  g roup’s adoption of an anti-German o r i e n t a t i o n ,  c o n s t i tu t e s  the  
h ig h e s t  p o in t  o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement’s h i s to r y .  Chapter I I I  
examines the  form ation  o f  the  UPA, i t s  programme, s o c ia l  composition
and a c t i v i t y  in  1943. The form ation  of the  SS D iv is io n  G a l i c i a ,
examined here  a l s o ,  i l l u s t r a t e s  the  c o n tin u a tio n  of the  t r a d i t i o n a l  
o r i e n t a t i o n  by the  OUN-M, a p o l ic y  which th i s  group d id  no t abandon f o r  
the  d u ra t io n  o f  the  War. At th e  T h ird  E xtra-O rd inary  Congress o f  the  
OUN-B in  August, 1943, th e  Bandera group de fined  i t s  new anti-German
p o s i t io n  and adopted a p ro g re s s iv e  dem ocratic  programme. The new
p e rs p e c t iv e s  o f  th e  OUN-B and the  UPA appear to  have been due to  the  
massive p o p u la r  p re s s u re  in  Ukraine which was opposing the  occupation 
a lready  in  1942 and the  f a c t  t h a t  Germany was lo s in g  the  War.
- i i i  -
As th e  Red Army c rossed  in to  Western Ukraine in  1944, the  UPA 
remained th e  only  n a t i o n a l i s t  fo rce  o f any p o l i t i c a l  o r  m i l i t a r y  
s ig n i f ic a n c e .  By the  end of 1943, i t  had grown to  a s t r e n g th  of
40,000 and c o n t ro l le d  s iz e a b le  r u r a l  t e r r i t o r i e s  in  North Western 
Ukraine. From i t s  b a se s ,  th e  g u e r r i l l a s  o rgan ised  ra id s  in to  C en tra l  
Ukraine and G a l ic ia .  The Red Army and p a r t i s a n  movement encountered 
conside rab le  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  th e  course o f  the  S o v ie t  advance from the  
UPA u n i t s .  As th e  German armies were pushed out o f  Ukraine through 
the  C arpath ian  M ountains, the  S ovie t m i l i t a r y  and p o l ic e  fo rce s  tu rn ed  
t h e i r  a t t e n t io n  to  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  in s u rg e n ts .
While the  UPA was f ig h t in g  th e se  fo r c e s ,  th e  re-emergence of 
P o lish -U k ra in ian  h o s t i l i t i e s  in  Western Ukraine fo rced  i t  to  tu rn  i t s  
a t t e n t io n  in  t h i s  d i r e c t io n  a lso .  The c o n f l i c t ,  amounting to  a 
bloody n a t io n a l  war in  1943 and 1944 in  which th e  Red P a r t i s a n s ,  the  
communist underground, P o l ish  n a t i o n a l i s t  and communist f o r c e s ,  the 
UPA and remaining OUN-B groups p a r t i c i p a t e d ,  i s  d e a l t  w ith  in  Chapter 
IV. The c h a ra c te r  o f  the  S ov ie t  o ffen s iv e  in  1944 and th e  UPA’s 
response to  i t ,  mentioned above, are  th e  su b je c ts  of o th e r  s e c t io n s  
in  t h i s  c h ap te r .
The mass p easan t  base t h a t  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  in su rg e n ts  had 
developed com plicated pos t-w ar  S ov ie t  e f f o r t s  to  d e fe a t  them. More­
over, the  absence of bo rder  c o n tro ls  between the  S o v ie t  Union, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland prov ided  th e  UPA w ith  an easy e x i t  from 
Western Ukraine when m i l i t a r y  campaigns a g a in s t  them th e re  i n t e n s i f i e d .  
A g re a t  p a r t  o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  fo rces  moved to  Southern Poland a t  
the  end o f  the  War in  o rd e r  to  p r o te c t  Ukrainian v i l l a g e s  from P o lish  
n a t i o n a l i s t  and government u n i t s .  I t  was no t u n t i l  1947 when a com­
bined  campaign o f  S o v ie t ,  P o l ish  and Czechoslovak armies blockaded the  
bo rder  reg ions  t h a t  th e  UPA was destroyed . Chapter V t r a c e s  the 
n a t i o n a l i s t  movement's d e c l in e  and d e f e a t ,  from th e  c o n so l id a t io n  o f
- i v  -
Sov ie t power in  Western Ukraine to  the  1947 campaign.
The a u th o r 's  conclusion  ev a lu a te s  the  p o l i t i c s  o f  both  OUN 
fa c t io n s  and the  UPA throughout the  War and analyses  the  fa c to r s  
behind i t s  i n a b i l i t y  to  achieve a mass fo llow ing in  any p a r t  o f  
Ukraine o th e r  than the  Western U krainian p e a s a n t r y - - i t s  id e o lo g ic a l  
h e r i t a g e ,  the  absence o f  a sc ien ce  o f  an a ly s is  and p r a c t i c e ,  the  OUN's 
a s s o c ia t io n  w ith  Nazi r u le  and the  c o n tra d ic to ry  c h a r a c te r  o f  the  
change o f  o r i e n t a t i o n  in  1943.
-  V -
ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLITERATION 
A bbrev ia tions  in  th e  Text 
AK: Armija Krajowa (Home Army)
CPWU; Communist P a r ty  o f  Western Ukraine (Komunistychna P a r t iy a  
Zakhidnoyi U kray iny ).
NKVD: Narodnyy Kommissariat Vnutrennikh D el ' (P eo p le 's  Commissariat 
o f  I n te r n a l  A f f a i r s ) .
OUN: O rg an isa t io n  of U krain ian  N a t io n a l i s t s  (O rh an iza ts iy a
U krayins 'kykh N a t s i o n a l i s t i v ) ,
OUN-B: Bandera f a c t io n  o f  the  OUN.
OUN-M: Mel'nyk f a c t io n  of the  OUN,
UHVR: U kray ins 'ka  Holovna Vyzvol'na Rada [Ukrainian Supreme
L ib e ra t io n  C o unc il) .
UNDO: U kray ins 'ke  N a t io n a l 'ne Demokratychne Obyednannya (Ukrainian
N ationa l Democratic U nion).
UPA: U kray ins 'ka  P o v s ta n s 'k a  Armiya (U krainian In su rg en t  Army).
UVO: U kray ins 'ka  V iys 'kova  O rh a n iza ts iy a  (U krain ian  M il i ta ry
O r g a n is a t io n ) .
A bbrev ia tions  in  Footnotes
( i )  Reference to  numbered documents appearing in  th e  Documents 
s e c t io n  o f  the  B ib liography are  given as 'P . D oc . ' followed by 
the  a p p ro p r ia te  number. Example: P.Doc. 86.
( i i )  Reference to  documents and o th e r  m a te r ia ls  of th e  Archive o f  
the  U krain ian  Supreme L ib e ra t io n  Council in  New York a re  given 
as 'UHVR' followed by a t r a n s l i t e r a t e d  l i s t i n g  o f  th e  o r ig in a l  
ca ta logue  l i s t i n g  o f  the  A rch iv e 's  c o l l e c t io n .  Examples: a 
document l i s t e d  in  th e  Archive as A4-1 becomes UHVR A4-1; Bl-1 
becomes UHVR V4-1; Cl-2 becomes UHVR S l-2 ;  e t c .
-  V I  -
T r a n s l i  t e r a t i  on
T r a n s l i t e r a t i o n  from th e  U krainian o f  t i t l e s ,  p u b l i s h e r s ,  
p ro p e r  names, e t c .  observes th e  fo llow ing method:
( i )  th e  m u lt ip le  vowels a re  t r a n s l i t e r a t e d  thus:
e :ye , Ï  : y i ,  a : y a ,  lo :yu;
( i i )  th e  mute appears as an apostrophe ( ' ) .
( i i i )  w ith  the  ex cep tio n  o f  p roper  names, 'k S* becomes 'y y ' .  
In p ro p e r  names i t  i s  rendered  simply as * y ' .
( iv )  the  c a p i t a l  c i t y  o f  Ukraine appears in  the. most
p opu la r  English  s p e l l in g  'K iev ' r a t h e r  than  the  accu ra te  
t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n  'K y y iv ',
-  V I 1
INTRODUCTION
The ro o ts  o f  th e  U krainian n a t i o n a l i s t  movement a re  to  be 
found in  th e  P o l ish  s t a t e  e s ta b l i s h e d  a f t e r  th e  F i r s t  World War and 
in  th e  c o n d i t io n  o f  th e  Ukrainian m in o r i ty  l iv in g  in  i t s  e a s te rn  
t e r r i t o r i e s .  An in t r o d u c t io n  to  the  r o le  o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement 
during  th e  Second World War, which i s  th e  su b jec t  o f  t h i s  paper ,  must 
th e re fo re  summarise th e  im p lic a t io n s  o f  the  P a r is  Peace Conference 
and P o lish -S o v ie t  n e g o t ia t io n s  over th e  western  S ovie t border upon th e  
U krainian q u es t io n  in  th e  in te rw ar  p e r io d .
The main o b je c t iv e  o f  th e  A l l i e s  a t  Versai l i e s  in  1919 with 
reg a rd  to  E as te rn  Europe was th e  c r e a t io n  o f  independent s t a t e s  which 
would i s o l a t e  Russia from Germany. The se t t lem e n t  a ttem pted  to  con­
s t r u c t  a cordon s a n i t a i r e  between th e se  two powers, and to  e l im in a te ,  
as much as p o s s ib le ,  t h e i r  economic and p o l i t i c a l  in f lu en c e  in  
E astern  Europe. This o b je c t iv e  was challenged  by bo th  Russia  and 
Germany, German aims in  E as te rn  Europe were a lre a d y  ev iden t in  th e  
1918 T rea ty  o f  B re s t-L i to v sk —th e  s e t t i n g  up o f  a number o f  German 
c l i e n t  s t a t e s  in  th e  B a l t ic  a re a ,  Poland and th e  Ukraine, and the  
l im i t a t i o n  o f  Russia  to  her narrow e th n ic  b o u n d arie s .^  Germany’ s 
d e s i r e  to  have markets in  th e  East remained a c e n t r a l  f a c to r  in  he r  
fo re ig n  p o l ic y  throughout th e  in te rw ar pe r io d .
R ussia  had l i t t l e  re g a rd  fo r  th e  newly e s ta b l i s h e d  s t a t e  
boundaries  immediately a f t e r  th e  War. The Bolsheviks were p repared  to
^Antony Polonsky, The L i t t l e  D ic ta to r s ;  The H is to ry  o f  
E as te rn  Europe Since 1918 (London, 1975), p. 16,
v i o l a t e  them in  th e  event of a re v o lu t io n a ry  upsurge in  Germany; the
Red Army en te red  Poland in  1920 hoping to  reach  Germany through
P o lish  t e r r i t o r y .  A fte r  1923, when the  P o l ish -S o v ie t  border was
s e t t l e d  and th e r e  was l i t t l e  p ro sp ec t  o f  a re v o lu t io n  in  Germany, the
Sovie t government recogn ised  th e  e s ta b l i s h e d  s t a t e  boundaries .
The a ttem pt by th e  A l l i e s  to  e s t a b l i s h  th e  East European s t a t e s
on uniform e thnographic  t e r r i t o r i e s  was made d i f f i c u l t  by th e  h i s t o r i c
in te rm in g l in g  o f  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  in th e se  re g io n s .  Consequently, th e
borders  o f  each s t a t e  could only  approximate the  e th n ic  boundaries  o f
each n a t io n ,  leav ing  s iz e a b le  m in o r i t i e s  w ith in  each coun try .
Hungarians comprised 89,6% o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  in  Hungary in  1920; Czechs
and Slovaks were 66,2% of Czechoslovakia in  1930; Serbs and C roats  77%
in  Yugoslavia in  1931 and Rumanians 71% of Rumania’ s popu la t io n  in  1930
The Poles in  Poland in  1921 amounted to  69% o f  th e  p o p u la t io n .  Of th e
2remaining 30%, s ix  m i l l io n  were U kra in ians.
R e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  th e  p ro te c t io n  o f  th e  r i g h t s  o f  n a t io n a l  
m in o r i t i e s  in  E as te rn  Europe was e n tru s te d  to  th e  League o f  N ations.
In th e  case o f  Poland, the  P o l i sh  M in o r i t ie s  T rea ty , signed in  1919 
a t  V e r s e i l l e s  by th e  A l l i e s  and P o lish  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s ,  provided fo r  
th e  p r o te c t io n  of c u l t u r a l ,  l i n g u i s t i c ,  le g a l  and s o c ia l  r i g h t s  o f  th e
3
U k ra in ians , Jews, B yelo russ ians  and o th e r  n a t io n a l  groups. A p ro ­
cedure fo r  p re s e n t in g  g rievances  to  th e  Council o f  th e  League was 
fo rm alised  whereby any in d iv id u a l  or n a t io n a l  group could  approach th e  
League o f Nations w ith  i t s  com pla in ts .
Antagonisms between Poland and Germany developed in  1919 over 
th e  is su e  o f  t h e i r  common b o rd e r .  Poland wanted a wide a rea  jo in in g
^ I b i d , ,  pp. 158-64.
3
League of N ations, P ro tec t io n  o f  L in g u is t i c ,  R ac ia l  and 
R elig ious  M in o r i t ie s  by th e  League of Nations (Geneva, 1927), pp. 42-45
C en tra l  Poland w ith  th e  B a l t ic  and in c lud ing  a l l  o f Poznania,
Pomerania, Danzig and th e  w estern  h a l f  o f  East P ru ss ia .  To the  south , 
Poland claimed th e  whole o f  Upper S i l e s i a .  These c laim s were based on 
grounds of economic and s t r a t e g i c  n e c e s s i ty  and q u e s t io n ab le  arguments 
o f  a P o l ish  e th n ic  m a jo r i ty  in  th e se  a re a s .  A f te r  s trong  p r o t e s t s  by 
Germany and su ccess iv e  a ttem p ts  by P o l ish  p a r t i s a n s  in  August 1919,
August 1920 and May 1921 to  l i b e r a t e  the  reg io n s  in  q u es t io n  by fo rce  
o f  arms, a s e t t le m e n t  was reached . Germany succeeded in  ga in ing  a 
g r e a te r  p a r t  o f  Upper S i l e s i a ,  but l o s t  im portant i n d u s t r i a l  a s s e t s  
in  th e  t e r r i t o r y  Poland annexed.^ G reater lo s se s  were s u f fe re d  a long 
the  e a s te rn  border when almost a l l  the  claims made by Poland were met 
by th e  A l l i e s .
The a ttem pt to  s e t t l e  th e  P o l ish -S o v ie t  bo rder  is su e  was com­
p l i c a t e d  by th e  c o n t in u a t io n  o f  A l l ie d  in te rv e n t io n  in  R ussia  and 
P o l ish  a t tem p ts  to  gain  a g r e a te r  p a r t  o f  Western U kraine, well beyond
P o lish  e thnographic  b o undaries .  In June, 1919, P i l s u d s k i  succeeded in
5occupying East G a l ic ia  w ith  th e  b le s s in g  of th e  A l l i e s .  When th e  Red 
Army began i t s  d r iv e  ac ro ss  Ukraine in to  Poland in  th e  f i r s t  months o f  
1920, P i l su d s k i  s igned an agreement w ith Simon P e t l i u r a ,  head of the  
U krain ian  P eop le ’ s Republic to  j o i n  fo rce s  w ith  th e  l a t t e r ’ s army and 
oppose th e  B olsheviks. In exchange fo r  P i l s u d s k i ’ s c o -o p e ra t io n ,
P e t l i u r a  ceded th e  Kholm reg io n  and East G a l ic ia  to  Poland ,^
A f te r  th e  d e fe a t  o f  P e t l i u r a ' s  fo rce s  and th e  c o l la p s e  o f  
th e  U krain ian  P eop le ’s Republic in  1920, the  Red Army advanced to  Warsaw. 
A fte r  i t s  r e t r e a t  in to  Western Ukraine ag a in ,  th e  two powers n e g o t ia te d  
a  se t t lem e n t  o f  b o rd e rs .  The T rea ty  o f  Riga in  1921 e s ta b l i s h e d  th e  
boundary a t  th e  r i v e r  Zbrucz, th e reb y  ceding to  Poland East G a l ic ia
^C. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer, Independent E as te rn  Europe 
(London, 1962), pp. 105-107.
^ I b i d . ,  p. 111.
^ I b i d , ,  p .  113.
and Kholm as  P e t l i u r a  had p re v io u s ly  n e g o t ia te d .
As a r e s u l t  o f  th e  postwar s e t t le m e n ts ,  U kra in ian  t e r r i t o r i e s  
became p a r t s  o f  fou r s ep a ra te  s t a t e s .  T h i r ty  m i l l io n  U krain ians  l iv e d  
in  th e  U krain ian  SSR, one m i l l io n  in  th e  n o r th e rn  t e r r i t o r y  o f  Rumania 
(B essarabia  and Bukovina); s ix  m i l l io n  l iv e d  in  Poland, and th e  
T ran scarp a th ian  reg io n  w ith  i t s  p o p u la t io n  o f  f iv e  hundred thousand 
U krain ians became p a r t  o f  Czechoslovakia .^
At f i r s t  th e  A l l ie d  powers a ttem pted  to  p rov ide  a s t a t u s  o f  
autonomy fo r  G a l ic ia  w ith in  th e  P o l i sh  s t a t e  in  o rd e r  to  p reven t the  
resum ption o f t r a d i t i o n a l  h o s t i l i t i e s  between th e  U krain ians  and P o les .  
This p ro p o s i t io n  was b lu n t ly  r e j e c t e d  by P i l s u d s k i  and G a l ic ia  was 
in co rp o ra ted  in to  Poland in  February 1923 w ith  th e  so le  guaran tee  o f  
m in o r i t ie s  p r o te c t io n  being th e  M in o r i t ie s  T rea ty  and th e  League o f
g
N ations ' a b i l i t y  to  enforce  i t .
Apart from S ovie t Ukraine, th e  s t ro n g e s t  movement fo r  
n a t io n a l  independence and u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  U krain ian  t e r r i t o r i e s  was 
amongst the  G a l ic ian  U k ra in ians . O pposition to  th e  V e r s a i l l e s  a g re e ­
ment was only  one o f  th e  s t im u la n ts  to  t h i s  movement. Austro-Hungarian 
r u le  up to  th e  F i r s t  World War had encouraged th e  development of 
re p u b l ic a n  sen tim ents  and a modern n a t io n a l  consc iousness  w ith in  th e  
Western U kra in ian  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a .  T h is ,  combined w ith  th e  experience  
of the  Western U krain ian  P eo p le 's  Republic in  1918, e s ta b l i s h e d  by a 
bloc o f  s o c ia l  dem ocrats, r a d i c a l  s o c i a l i s t s  and o th e r  su p p o rte rs  o f  
th e  in d e p en d en ce -u n if ic a t io n  movement, r e s u l t e d  in  the  U krainian 
p o p u la t io n  in  G a l ic ia  no t only  being aware of i t s  s o c ia l  and n a t io n a l  
predicam ent, but a lso  seeking p o l i t i c a l  independence as a s o lu t io n  to
^Hugh Seton-Watson, E astern  Europe Between th e  Wars 1918-1941 
(Cambridge, 1945), p .  117.
Q
Oscar I .  Janowsky, N a t io n a l i t i e s  and N ational 
M in o r i t ie s  (New York, 1945), p . 117.
th e se  problems.
The u n w ill in g n ess  o f  th e  P o l i sh  government to  p r o te c t  th e  r i g h t s  
o f  the  U krain ians  and th e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  the  League o f  Nations to  a c t  
upon g r iev an ces  (such a c t io n  was regarded  by Poland as an in t r u s io n  
upon i t s  so v ere ig n ty )  was ano ther  f a c to r  g iv ing  way to  th e  emergence 
of th e  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement. The d isc r im in a to ry  p r a c t i c e s  of the  
ed u ca tio n a l  system in  Western Ukraine and th e  im p l ic a t io n s  o f  land 
reform s upon th e  Western U krain ian  p easan try  were two o f the  problems, 
and subsequen tly  g rievances  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  which a re  d e a l t  w ith  
in  the  f i r s t  ch ap te r  of t h i s  paper .
The economic co n d it io n s  brought about by th e  Depression of 
1929 f u r th e r  aggravated  th e  s o c ia l  co n d it io n s  in  Western Ukraine, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  fo r  the  working c la s s  (unemployment and th e  drop in  
l iv in g  s tan d a rd s )  and th e  p e a sa n try  (drop in  g ra in  p r i c e s  on th e  i n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  m ark e t) .  This occurred  a t  a time when the  p e a s a n ts '  land 
was being  ex p ro p r ia te d  by P o l i sh  c o lo n is t s  in  G a l ic ia  and the  Volyn 
re g io n .
That th e  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement which a rose  in  response  to  
th e se  c o n d i t io n s  was o f  extreme r i g h t  wing c h a r a c te r  may be exp la ined  
by re fe re n c e  to  th e  genera l p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  in  Poland. On th e  one 
hand, the  c h a ra c te r  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement had much in  common w ith  
th e  growing t ren d  to  the  r i g h t  in  Poland, e s p e c ia l ly  a f t e r  P i l s u d s k i ' s  
coup a g a in s t  th e  e le c te d  government in  1926. This coup opened the  door 
to  an in c re a s in g ly  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  s t a t e  r u le  and th e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  
m i l i t a r i s t ,  a n t i -S e m i t ic  and f a s c i s t  c u r re n ts  w ith in  P o lan d 's  middle
9
c l a s s e s .  For many. Fascism appeared to  be th e  system o f  the  fu tu r e .
On the  o th e r  hand, th e  d e c l in e  o f  the  communist movement in  Western
9
Polonsky, L i t t l e  D ic t a t o r s , p . 49.
Ukraine, which had p re v io u s ly  championed th e  cause o£ U krain ian  p o l i t i c a l  
independence and t e r r i t o r i a l  u n i f i c a t i o n ,  and th e  con cu rren t emergence 
o f  S ta l in ism  in  th e  Sovie t Union le n t  c r e d i b i l i t y  to  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s '  
programme fo r  an independent, a u th o r i t a r i a n  and anti-com m unist 
U krainian s t a t e .
Germany's re-armament in  th e  1930 's under the  Nazi le ad e rsh ip  
made i t  apparen t to  many in te r n a t io n a l  observers  t h a t  she may seek to  
r e d re s s  her t e r r i t o r i a l  g r ievances  by m i l i t a r y  means. The ra p id  growth 
o f  her economy and i t s  l im i te d  access  to  markets gave co n cre te  arguments 
to  th e se  t e r r i t o r i a l  g r ie v a n ce s .  In t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  Poland became one 
t a r g e t  o f  th e  Nazi le a d e r s h ip .  I f  Poland was c ap tu red  by Germany, 
then a Soviet-German c o n f l i c t  appeared in e v i t a b le .
The U krain ian  n a t i o n a l i s t s  saw in  Nazi Germany an exemplary 
opponent o f  th e  V e r s e i l l e s  agreement and an enemy o f  th e  Soviet 
Union. Not only d id  they  emulate N ational S o c i a l i s t  d o c t r in e ,  b u t a lso  
sought to  develop r e a l  c o n ta c ts  with th e  German s t a t e .  These took the  
form o f  r e g u la r  l i a i s o n  between the  le ad e rsh ip  of th e  O rgan isa tion  o f  
U krain ian  N a t io n a l i s t s  (OUN), th e  main component o f  th e  Western 
U krain ian  movement, and German i n t e l l i g e n c e .  The OUN expected to 
c a p i t a l i s e  on such r e l a t i o n s  in  th e  event o f  a German-Soviet war by 
p lay ing  an a c t iv e  r o l e  on th e  German s id e  and extending  i t s  in f lu en ce  
in to  Sovie t Ukraine. There i t  could reach  the  g r e a te r  p a r t  o f  th e  
U krain ian  n a t io n .  These ex p ec ta t io n s  flowered in to  co n cre te  p e rs p e c t iv e s  
in  1939.
I t  was during  th e  Second World War th a t  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t  
movement reached  i t s  z e n i th .  At the  same time i t  s p l i n t e r e d ,  c r e a t in g  
an anti-German g u e r r i l l a  tendency a longside  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  group.
By th e  end o f  th e  war, t h i s  anti-German tendency had developed a 
p ro g re s s iv e  s o c ia l  programme and commanded th e  support o f  a mass 
peasan t base in  Western Ukraine. The c o n so l id a t io n  o f  S ov ie t power
in  1945 over a l l  U krain ian  t e r r i t o r i e s  p reven ted  th e  growth of t h i s  
n a t i o n a l i s t  c u r r e n t .  The g r e a te r  p a r t  o f  t h i s  paper i s  devoted to  
th e  ev o lu t io n  o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement during  th e  War, w ith 
p a r t i c u l a r  emphasis given to  i t s  programme and s t r a t e g y .
Three d i s t i n c t  schools o f  h i s t o r i c a l  a n a ly s is  have emerged 
s in ce  th e  Second World War on t h i s  s u b je c t .  The 'U kra in ian  
n a t i o n a l i s t '  schoo l,  r e p re se n te d  by Petro  Mirchuk, au thor o f  Narys 
I s t o r i y i  OUN,^^ has tended to  omit the  OUN's a s s o c ia t i o n  with Nazi 
Germany and imply t h a t  th e  movement's p o l i t i c s  were always as  p ro ­
g re s s iv e  as th o se  o f  th e  anti-German c u r re n t  o f  the  movement.
Having g re a t  d i f f i c u l t y  in  making such an a n a ly s is  appear c r e d ib le ,  t h i s  
school of thought has been unable  to  p re se n t  a s in g le  comprehensive 
h i s to r y  o f  n a t i o n a l i s t  p o l i t i c s  during  the  Second World War. Analyses 
o f  s p e c i f i c  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  OUN, such as Lev Shankowsky's h i s to r y  
o f  th e  OUN's advance in to  Sovie t Ukraine in  1941, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN^  ^
and memoirs o f  in d iv id u a l  a c t i v i s t s  a re ,  however, a v a i l a b le .
The second school o f  though t,  th e  'S o v ie t  s c h o o l ' has i n t e r ­
p re te d  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement du ring  the  war as a c o n s i s t e n t ly  p ro -
12Nazi appendage and ignores  th e  e v o lu tio n  of i t s  p o l i t i c s  a f t e r  1943.
I t s  a n a ly s i s  i s  s t r i k i n g l y  uniform from one h i s t o r i a n ' s  work to  
an o th e r ,  d i f f e r i n g  only in  minor a sp e c ts .  Moreover, t h i s  school has 
no t given due a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  movement i t s e l f ,  bu t r a th e r  u t i l i s e d  i t s  
le s s  savoury a c t i v i t i e s  in  a con tinu ing  polemic w ith  emigre
^^Petro  Mirchuk, Narys I s t o r i y i  OUN 1920-1939 (Munich,
1968).
^^Lev Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN (Munich, 1958).
12The s tan d a rd  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of the  S ovie t school i s  th e  
th re e  volume h i s to r y  o f  th e  War Ukrayins * ka RSR u Velykiy Vitchyznyaniy 
Viyni Radyans'koho Soyuzu 1941-1945 r . r . (Kiev, 1969).
n a t i o n a l i s t  groups in  the  West,
The t h i r d  " s c h o o l ' i s  not re a l ly ^ sc h o o l  because i t  has produced
13few works. John A rm strong 's  U krain ian  N ationalism  i s  th e  only  
se r io u s  s tudy  o f  th e  su b jec t  by a Western s c h o la r .  A rm strong 's  method 
o f in v e s t ig a t i o n  i s  l a r g e ly  s o c io lo g ic a l ,  a ttem p ting  to  p rov ide  an 
in s ig h t  in to  th e  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  o f  the  OUN, the  r e l a t i o n s h ip  between 
s o c ia l  c l a s s ,  r e l i g i o n ,  re g io n a l  o r ig in  and adherence to  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  
d o c t r in e .  Perhaps i t s  most s e r io u s  shortcoming i s  t h a t  i t  f a i l s  to  
ex p la in  th e  n a tu re  o f  U krainian n a tio n a lism  and i t s  e v o lu t io n  du rin g  the  
War and t r e a t s  i t  as  a c o n s ta n t ,  unchanged by s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  
fo r c e s .  Another s tudy  r e l a t i n g  to  t h i s  su b je c t  i s  German Rule in  
Russia^^ by Alexander D a l i in .  Because D a l i in  has chosen to  d e a l  w ith  
the  German p o l i c i e s  in  th e  USSR as h i s  c e n t r a l  t o p i c ,  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  
movement i s  no t analysed  in  dep th .
The p re s e n t  study has a ttem pted  to  u t i l i s e  e x i s t in g  sources 
and the  works o f  th e  above-mentioned schools o f  th o u g h t .  The su b jec t  
under study i s  of th e  very  re c e n t  p a s t ,  r e s u l t i n g  in  h ig h ly  p a r t i s a n  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  e s p e c ia l l y  by p a r t i c ip a n t s  on the  S ov ie t and n a t i o n a l i s t  
s id e s .
We have a ttem pted  to  t r e a t  a l l  m a te r i a l s ,  and e s p e c ia l l y  
i n t e r p r e t i v e  s tu d ie s  c r i t i c a l l y ;  s e r io u s  d ivergences  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
a re  noted in  th e  t e x t .
13John A. Armstrong, U krain ian  N ationalism  [New York, 1963).
^^Alexander D a l i in ,  German Rule in  Russia 1941-1945.
A Study o f  Occupation P o l i c ie s  (London, 1957).
CHAPTER I
N ational and Socia l D iv is ions  in  
Western Ukraine
However much c u l t u r a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  and h i s t o r i c a l  
memories may have c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  form ation  of 
th e  U krain ian  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement, i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  conceive how i t  could have a r i s e n  had 
i t  n o t ,  to  a la rg e  e x te n t ,  corresponded w ith  a 
b a s ic  c leavage in  th e  s o c ia l  s t r u c tu r e  o f  the  
Ukraine. There, to an unusual degree, n a t i o n a l i t y  
co - in c id ed  w ith  economic c l a s s .  The U krain ians  were, 
w ith  th e  excep tion  o f  a small i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ,  
almost e n t i r e l y  p e asan ts  . . , . ^
The w estern  p a r t  o f  e th n o g ra p h ica l ly  U krain ian  t e r r i t o r i e s  which 
came under P o l ish  s t a t e  r u l e  in  1923 were the  p rov inces  o f  G a l ic ia ,  
Volyn, P o l i s s i a ,  Podlachia  and Kholm. In G a l ic ia ,  the  n a t io n a l  
h e a r t la n d  o f  U kra in ians  in  Western Ukraine, th e re  were approxim ately  
3 ,7  m i l l io n  U krain ians  (65% of the  p o p u la t io n ) ,  in  Volyn 1,4 m i l l io n  
(68%), in  P o l i s s i a  approx im ate ly  700,000 (76%) and 2,1 m i l l io n  in  
Podlachia  and Kholm. The main secondary in d u s t r i e s  were o f  a re so u rce  
e x t r a c t io n  c h a r a c t e r —tim ber from th e  C arpath ian  re g io n ,  o i l  in  
Drohobych and S ta n is la v  (G a lic ia )  and chemical i n d u s t r i e s  throughout the  
Lviv reg ion . The c h i e f  means o f  communication was the  ra ilw ay  system, 
which had been b u i l t  to  s e rv ic e  th e se  in d u s t r i e s .  The s t ro n g e s t  
secondary s e rv ic e  in d u s t ry  in  th e  towns and c i t i e s  was th e  b u i ld in g  
in d u s t ry .^
^Armstrong, U krain ian  N ationalism , p. 10,
2Yu. H. Hoshko, Hromads' kyy Pobut R obitnykiv  Zakhidnoyi 
Ukrayiny 1920-1939 r , r ,  (Kiev, 1967), pp. 9-11.
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Among th e  i n d u s t r i a l  workers, th r e e  n a t io n a l  groups p r e ­
dominated; in  1931 th e re  were 338,900 U kra in ians, 261,000 Poles and
3
64.000 Jews. Most o f  th e  U krain ian  labour fo rce  was employed in  low 
p a id ,  u n s k i l l e d  and s e m i- s k i l le d  jobs in  the  b u i ld in g  in d u s t ry ,  o i l  
r i g s ,  b r ic k  k i ln s  and tim ber camps. The P o l ish  workers were a 
p r iv i le g e d  s tra tu m , many o f  them having m igrated from P o land 's  
i n d u s t r i a l  h e a r t la n d  to  Western Ukraine.
In o rd e r  to  o b ta in  work, Ukrainians were fo rced  to  change 
t h e i r  r e l i g i o n  from Orthodoxy to  Roman C atho lic ism , t h i s  being the  
f i r s t  s tep  towards c u l tu r a l  a s s im i la t io n  in  the  predom inantly  P o l i sh  
tow ns,
The h e a v ie s t  c o n c e n tra t io n s  of workers were in  th e  Lviv 
wojewodstwo (a d m in is t r a t iv e  reg ion )  where o i l  r e f i n e r i e s ,  chem ical, 
l e a th e r  and metal works predom inated.^  In s p i t e  o f  t h i s  geographic 
c o n c e n tra t io n ,  th e  Western U krain ian  working c la s s  was an u n s tab le  s o c ia l  
s tra tum  in  th e  1920 's ,  g iven th e  absence of a h e r e d i ta r y  nucleus of 
worker f a m i l ie s  and th e  p rev a len ce  o f  seasonal employment of 
p e a s a n t s .
The n a t io n a l  com position o f  th e  middle c l a s s e s  ( a r t i s a n s ,  small 
b u s in e s se s ,  p ro fe s s io n s )  h e a v i ly  favoured non-U kra in ians . Whereas 
th e r e  were 50,400 U krain ians in  th e se  occupa tions , Jews numbered
168.000 and those  of the  C a th o lic  f a i t h  (largely  Poles  and Armenians) 
numbered 63 ,000,^
The p o l ic y  o f  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  in  Western Ukraine was low c a p i t a l  
investm ent and high labour i n t e n s i t y  to  y ie ld  maximum p r o f i t s .  The
^ I b i d . ,  p .  12. 
"^Ibid., p .  13. 
^ I b i d . ,  p .  11.
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p re ssu re  o f  unemployment in  th e  towns and o verpopu la tion  in  th e  r u r a l  
a reas  kept wages down and enabled employers to  en fo rce  a r ig o ro u s  pace 
of work on th e  shop f l o o r .  Consequently, th e  tu rn o v e r  o f  labour was 
h ig h . In 1936, P o l i sh  o f f i c i a l ^  s t a t i s t i c s  gave th e  fo llow ing f ig u re s  
fo r  labour tu rn o v e r  in  four Western Ukraine re g io n s ;  those  who 
s tayed  on one job  fo r  under two years accounted fo r  th e  fo llow ing 
percen tage  o f  th e  employed work f o r c e —in  Lviv wojewodstwo, 45.6%; in  
T ernopil r e g io n ,  46.9%; 63% in  S ta n is la v  and 68% in  Volyn. Those who 
had remained on one job  fo r  ten  to  f i f t e e n  years  accounted fo r  the  
fo llow ing  percen tages  o f labour employed in  each r e s p e c t iv e  reg ion : 
14.1%, 3.5%, 4.4% and 3.8%.^
S k i l l s  r e q u ire d  on most i n d u s t r i a l  jobs  were minimal owing to  
the  low c a p i t a l  investment in  m echanisation . The P o l i sh  government was 
not r e q u ire d ,  th e r e f o r e ,  to  e s t a b l i s h  te c h n ic a l  t r a in in g  schools . 
Whatever s k i l l e d  labour was needed could be brought in  from c e n t r a l  
Poland. In th e  o i l  r e f in in g  p la n t  'G alic ia*  in  Drohobych in  1936, 308 
o f 507 workers were u n s k i l l e d .  S im ila r ly  in  the  nearby 'Polmin*
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fa c to ry ,  419 o f  614 were u n s k i l le d  la b o u re rs .  Where th e re  e x is te d  a
n a t io n a l ly  mixed labour fo rc e ,  r a c i a l  d iv is io n s  amongst th e  workers
were s t im u la ted  by the  payment of h igher wages to  th e  more s k i l l e d  Poles
The l o t  o f  th e  U krain ian  worker was p a r t i c u l a r l y  onerous; not
only was he s u b jec t  to  the  ardous work in  dangerous and u n san i to ry
c o n d it io n s  along w ith  the  P o l ish  workers, but in  a d d i t io n  su ffe red
n a t io n a l  d is c r im in a t io n  by h i s  employers and th e  government. The Rev.
J ,  Barr and J .  Davies re p o r te d  the  fo llow ing to  th e  B r i t i s h  House o f
Commons in  1931 a f t e r  an in q u iry  in to  the  P o lish -U k ra in ian  c o n f l i c t :
Before th e  War th e re  was an equal p o r t io n  o f  
Poles and U krain ians in  a l l  government works;
^ I b id . ,  p . 11.
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but then , now th e re  i s  a very  small number 
o f  U krain ians in  government employ . . . 
seven thousand U krain ian  railwaymen have l o s t  
t h e i r  work and Poles have been put in  t h e i r  
p la c e .
. . . They f u r th e r  m ain ta in  t h a t  when, owing to  
th e  D epression, s t a f f s  had to  be reduced,
U krain ian  workmen were the  f i r s t  to  go . . .
U krainian workmen employed by in d u s t r i e s  under 
government c o n tro l  during  A ustr ian  times a re  
not th e re  now. Thus in  th e  c i t y  o f Drohobych, which 
I v i s i t e d ,  in  th e  petroleum  r e f in e r y  c a l le d  Polmin, 
th e re  a re  s ix  hundred workmen employed of whom only 
te n  a re  U kra in ians, and even th e se  have to  be 
c a r e fu l  to  avoid t h e i r  own o rg a n is a t io n s  and 
p a r t i e s . 8
With the  i n f l a t i o n a r y  s p i r a l  o f  the  t h i r t i e s ,  the  s tandard  o f  
l iv in g  o f  workers in  Western Ukraine dec lin ed  se v e re ly .  Unemployment 
th e re  t r i p l e d  between 1923 and 1937 amounting to  approxim ate ly  22% o f  
th e  urban p o p u la t io n .^  In Lviv 50,000 persons were w ithout means of 
su b s is te n ce  in  1935. In 1938, 35% o f  w orkers’ q u a r te rs  in  the  c i t y  were
c e l l a r s  and a t t i c s .  S ix ty - f iv e  thousand persons , in  f a m il ie s  o f  between
two and twelve members l iv e d  in  one room f l a t s .
The overwhelming m a jo r i ty  o f  the  p o p u la t io n ,  however, s t i l l
l iv e d  on th e  lan d .  A g r ic u l tu ra l  p roduc tion  f ig u red  p rom inently  in  the  
economy and c o n s t i tu t e d  one o f  th e  main i n t e r e s t s  of the  P o l ish  s t a t e  
and landed a r i s to c r a c y  in  Western Ukraine. Here a g a in ,  n a t io n a l  
d iv i s io n s  corresponded to  c l a s s  d iv i s io n s .  U krain ian  p easan ts  con­
s t i t u t e d  th e  v a s t  m a jo r i ty  of th e  r u r a l  p o p u la t io n  but owned only 
twenty p e rcen t  o f  th e  land . 37.5% o f the  farmers had ho ld ings  o f  
between two and f iv e  h e c ta re s ,  while the  la rg e  landowners—P o lish  
magnates, th e  C a th o lic  Church and a rm y -o f f ic e rs—owned about 50% o f  th e
g
J .  Barr and J .  Davies, Report on the  P o l ish  Ukrainian  C o n f l ic t  
in  E as tern  G a l ic ia  (London, 1931).
Q
Hoshko, Hromads*kyy Pobut Robitnykiv, p . 39,
^ ^ I b id . ,  p . 35.
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land . The l a t t e r  group re p re se n te d  le s s  than one p e rc en t  of the
1 *• 11 p o p u la t io n .
A fte r  th e  F i r s t  World War, the  P o lish  government had 
encouraged th e  se t t lem e n t  o f  Western Ukraine by r e t i r e d  army o f f i c e r s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  along th e  P o lish -S o v ie t  bo rder.  Their  s e rv ice s  as 
guard ians  o f  law and o rder  were re q u ire d  in  r e t u r n  fo r  the  land they  
occupied. This v en tu re ,  beginning in  1922 r e s u l t e d  in  co n s id e rab le  
ex p ro p r ia t io n  o f  p e a sa n ts '  land . Between 1926 and 1929, as a  r e s u l t  o f  
th e  Land Reform Act o f  1925, 560,000 h e c ta re s  of land occupied by
Ukrainian p easan ts  were r e d i s t r i b u t e d  to  P o lish  s e t t l e r s  and m i l i t a r y
• .  12 c o lo n i s t s .
A s ig n i f i c a n t  p o r t io n  o f  th e  p easan try  became la n d le s s  and took
the  form o f  rov ing  bands o f  the  unemployed. This s tra tum  swelled in
times o f  bad h a rv e s ts  on th e  p la in s  or in  th e  f o o t h i l l s  o f  th e  C arpath ian
mountains. V iolence ensued a s  th e se  ex p ro p r ia ted  Ukrainians vent t h e i r
f r u s t r a t i o n  on th e  P o l i sh  a r i s to c r a c y  and government o f f i c i a l s :
For years  a f t e r  the  War th e re  was d is c o n te n t  and 
d i s t r e s s  among the  U krain ians of East G a l ic ia .
These were the  days when n a t i o n a l i s t  ideas made 
headlong p ro g ress  . . . When I rode through th e  
v i l l a g e s  I w itnessed  scenes and heard f i r s t  hand 
accounts  o f  lo c a l  s t r i f e  which were not p r e t t y .
Again th e  v ic io u s  c i r c l e  of ou trage  and r e p re s s io n  
formed i t s e l f .  Local e n th u s i a s t s ,  with m istaken 
id eas  o f  a d v e r t i s in g  the  j u s t i c e  of t h e i r  cause , 
would burn down haystacks  or k i l l  a policeman.
P o l i sh  a u th o r i ty  n a tu r a l l y  took s te r n  a c t io n :  
e n th u s ia s t s  promptly became m arty rs ,  and when condemned 
to  imprisonment or dea th  t h e i r  f a t e  aroused new 
d is o rd e r s ,  c a l l in g  fo r  even s te r n e r  a c t io n .  I f  
th e  re a d e r  w i l l  r e c a l l  the  unhappy days o f  th e  
Black and Tans in  I r e la n d ,  in  f a c t ,  he w i l l  have 
an exact p a r a l l e l  o f  the  p ic tu r e  in  the  P o l i sh
Stephen Horak, Poland and Her N ational M in o r i t ie s  1919-1934 
(New York, 1961), p . 152.
1 2 loc . c i t . .  See a l s o  L. Ye. Kyzya, Narodni Mesnyky (Lviv, 1960),
p. 11 -
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Ukraine in  the  f i r s t  years  a f t e r
the  World War.13
Complementing th e  s o c ia l  d is c r im in a t io n  a g a in s t  Western 
U kra in ians , a more b l a t a n t  in e q u a l i ty  developed in  the  educa tion  
system. There was a d r a s t i c  d ec l in e  in  the  number o f  schools  teach ing  
the  n a t iv e  language in  the  in tew ar p e r io d  (See Table 1). The i n t r o ­
duc tion  o f  b i l i n g u a l  schools  in  1924 served  only as a cover f o r  con­
t in u ed  d is c r im in a t io n  a g a in s t  the  U krainian m a jo r i ty .  Lectures in  
the  n a t iv e  language were confined  to  hours a l lo c a te d  f o r  r e l ig io u s  
i n s t r u c t i o n ,  s p o r t ,  a r t ,  bu t n o t fo r  l i t e r a t u r e ,  mathem atics, h i s t o r y ,  
e t c .  The s tu d en t  composition o f th e se  b i l in g u a l  schools  in  1925/26 
was 88.2% U krain ian  and only 9.5% P o l i s h . S i m i l a r l y ,  s t a t i s t i c s  
g iven in  Table 4 show the  d is c r im in a to ry  p r a c t ic e s  in  te a c h e r  t r a in in g  
a f a c to r  which r e - in f o r c e d  th e  o v e ra l l  i n e q u a l i ty  in  e d u ca tio n a l  
o p p o r tu n i t ie s  fo r  U kra in ians .
With the  d ec lin e  o f  the  U krainian school system, and p a r t i ­
c u la r ly  a f t e r  the  p a c i f i c a t i o n  measures in  1930 in  G a l ic ia ,  when 
schools  were c lo sed  because o f  the  a l le g ed  involvement o f  Ukrainian 
s tu d en ts  in  n a t i o n a l i s t  t e r r o r i s t  a c t i v i t y ,  popu la r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  
le a rn in g  gained im portance. The P r o s v i ta  movement as i t  became known, 
was o rgan ised  in  the  l a t e  19th cen tury  by r a d i c a l  s o c i a l i s t s .  I t s  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  popu la r  le a rn in g  were c o n tro l le d  by the  communities 
they se rv ic e d  and grew v ig o ro u s ly  in  times o f  n a t io n a l  su p p ress io n . 
Thus in  1914, 230,000 persons e n ro l le d  in  the  P ro sv i ta s  in  Western 
Ukraine. In 1920, the  number had grown to  260,000 and by 1935 to  
306,000.15
13Bernard Newman, The S tory  o f  Poland (London, n . d . j ,  p.  106.
l^^Horak, Poland and N ationa l M in o r i t i e s , pp. 144-45.
l^Volodymyr Kubiovyc, gen. e d . , Ukraine. A Concise Encyclopaedia 
2 v o ls .  (Toronto, 1963-71), 1; 842-43.
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TABLE 1
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS IN EASTERN GALICIA [EXCLUDING PRIVATE) 
ACCORDING TO LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION
School Year T ota l P o l ish U krainian B ilingua l
1911/12 4010 1590 2420 -
1921/22 4719 2281 2437 -
1924/25 4728 2568 2151 9
1925/26 4705 2424 1179 1102
1927/28 4709 2322 744 1635
1929/30 4667 2189 684 1794
1934/35 4725 2100 487 2138
1937/38 ? 9 452 2485
TABLE 2
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS IN VOLYN 
ACCORDING TO LANGUAGE
[EXCLUDING PRIVATE) 
OF INSTRUCTION
School Year U krain ian B ilingua l P o l i sh
1923/24 421 - 676
1926/27 40 381 708
1929/30 7 652 821
TABLE 3
PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS IN EASTERN GALICIA 
VOLHYNIA IN SCHOOL YEAR 1929/30
AND
Public P r iv a te
Voivodstvo Pol. Ukr. Pol-Ukr. Pol. Ukr. Pol-Ukr.
Lviv 37 3 28 4
S ta n is la v 10 2 9 4
Ternopil 11 1 1 6 3
Volyn 9 - 6 — -
T ota l 67 6 1 49 14
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TABLE 4 *
TEACHER TRAINING COLLEGES IN LVIV, 
STANISLAV, TERNOPIL AND VOLYN
Type o f  College 1929/30 1933/34
B il in g u a l 13 2
U krain ian  (pub lic) 2 1
U krain ian  (p r iv a te ) 8 6
P o lish  (pub lic ) 10 23
*A11 ta b le s  are  taken  from Stephen Horak, 
Poland and Her N a tiona l M in o r i t ie s  1919-1934 
%New York, 1961 ) ,  pp. 144-47.
Education being  one o f  the  p r in c ip a l  f a c to r s  determ ining s o c ia l  
m o b i l i ty ,  i t s  d e n ia l  by the a u th o r i t i e s  aroused b i t t e r  fe e l in g s  amongst 
the  U krainian p o p u la t io n .  Jo b s ,  s k i l l s ,  an improvement in  
a g r i c u l tu r a l  methods, access to  government and s o c ia l  agencies depended 
upon t h i s  ed u ca tio n .  Thus the  d is c r im in a t io n  in  the  school system 
became a major g rievance  o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement in  the  l a t e  
tw e n t ie s ,  and th e  e x i s t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  of le a rn in g  a p lace  o f  p r o te s t  
and o b je c t  o f  a t t a c k s .
The Decline o f  the  Communist P a rty  
o f  Western Ukraine
The p r in c ip a l  concern o f  the  sm a ll ,  n a t io n a l ly  conscious 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  was th e  a ttem pt to  gain  le g a l  re c o g n i t io n  o f  i t s  r ig h t s  
and to  improve th e  s o c ia l  and e d u ca tio n a l  s tan d in g  o f  th e  Ukrainian 
workers and p e a s a n ts .  Many were a c t iv e  in  th e  P r o s v i ta  movement, in  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  coopera tives  and p o l i t i c a l  o rg a n is a t io n s .  The most 
im portan t forum o f  a c t i v i t y  was p o l i t i c s ,  where th e  U krain ian  p a r t i e s  
attem pted  to  p r o t e c t  th e  m in o r i ty  r i g h t s  o f  t h e i r  su p p o r te rs  in  a 
g e n e ra l ly  h o s t i l e  environment.
17
The most im portant le g a l  p a r ty  was the  U krain ian  N a tiona l 
Democratic Union (U krayins’ke N a ts io n a l 'n e  Demokratychne Obyednannya— 
UNDO) which was formed in  1925. Most U krainians supported  UNDO in  
e l e c t i o n s ,  sending i t s  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  to  the  Sejm. The U krainian 
s o c ia l  dem ocrats, r e p re se n t in g  a small s e c t io n  of th e  urban p o p u la t io n ,  
were a lso  a c t iv e  and p a r t i c i p a t e d  in  e l e c t o r a l  p o l i t i c s .  In 1931, 
when they jo in e d  the  Second I n te r n a t io n a l  they claimed ten  thousand 
members.
The le g a l  b a t t l e  fo r  re c o g n it io n  of m in o r ity  r ig h t s  however, 
p rov ided  meagre r e s u l t s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  a f t e r  General P i l s u d s k i  came to  
power in  1926 and the  pa r l iam en ta ry  p rocess  was r e le g a te d  to  the  fu n c tio n  
of  rubber-stam ping th e  d ec is io n s  o f  h is  d i c t a t o r i a l  r u l e .  These 
cond itions  were one reason  fo r  the  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  i l l e g a l  and semi­
le g a l  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y ,  c o n t r ib u t in g  to  the  growth of the  communist 
and n a t i o n a l i s t  movements a l ik e  in  Western Ukraine. Throughout the  
1920’s ,  the  se p a ra te  groups which were l a t e r  to  form the  core o f  the  
OUN were n u r tu re d  w ith in  th e  confines of i l l e g a l  t e r r o r i s t  groups.
The main opponent of the  emerging n a t i o n a l i s t  wing was the
communist movement. The Communist P a rty  o f  Western Ukraine (CPWU)
succeeded the  Communist P a rty  o f  East G a l ic ia .  In 1925, the  CPWU
merged w ith  the  Communist P a r ty  o f  Working Poland, which in  tu rn  renamed
i t s e l f  the  Communist P a r ty  of Poland (CPP). Numbering approxim ately
6,000 a t  i t s  h e ig h t  in  the  mid 1920 's , th e  CPWU commanded conside rab le
support from c i t y  workers o f  a l l  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  and some peasan t
17communities, n o tab ly  in  Volyn.
^ ^ I b id . ,  p. 838.
17See Armstrong, U krain ian  N ationalism , p .  19; and Kyzya, 
Narodni Mesnyky, p , 16.
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The economic p l i g h t  o f  Western Ukraine in  th e  in te rw a r  
p e r io d  sparked o f f  p e r io d ic  waves o f  s t r i k e s  in  th e  towns and r u r a l  
a re a s .  In 1928-29, and again  in  1936, poor peasan ts  s t ru c k  ag a in s t
t
landowners in  th e  Lviv reg io n .  In 1926, workers in  th e  C arpath ian
tim ber camps went on s t r i k e ;  o i l  r i g  workers went out in  1932 and in  Lviv
road b u i ld in g  workers i n i t i a t e d  a widespread s t r i k e  in  1936. One
hundred thousand workers dem onstrated in  Lviv on A p ri l  14, 1936 over
the  murder o f  one o f  t h e i r  fe l lo w s . The p o l ic e  a t ta c k s  on the  march
provoked ex tens ive  s t r i k e  ac t io n s  in  Western Ukraine, w ith  dem onstrations
18in  Boryslav, S try y , S ta n is la v  and T ernop il .
The CPWU did not f a i l  to  extend i t s  in f lu en ce  on the  shop f lo o rs
in  th e se  waves o f  s t r i k e s .  This continuous o rg an is in g  was
supplemented by the  form ation o f  a mass f r o n t  o rg a n is a t io n  Se1-Rob,
enab ling  i t  to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  e le c t io n s  and c a r ry  out work of a g e n e ra l ly
p u b l ic  n a tu re .  The communists a lso  engaged in  c u l tu r a l  and ed u ca tio n a l
work, as d id  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  groups. Operating as o rgan ised  fa c t io n s
w ith in  the p o pu la r  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  s tu d en t  o rg a n is a t io n s  and o th e r
focuses o f  autonomous Ukrainian l i f e ,  they managed to  b u i ld  s tro n g
m in o r i t ie s  in  the  1920’s to  oppose the  major in f lu en c e  h e re ,  the  UNDO.
For example, a t  the  Ridna Shkola (Native School) conference in  Lviv
in  1929, o f  247 d e le g a te s ,  e ig h ty  were CPWU members and sym path isers .
At a Lviv s tu d en t  hromada meeting in  1925, 83 out of 265 were 
19communists.
18 B. K. Dudkevych, 'Kryvava Sereda’ , U kray ins’kyy Is torychnyy 
Z hum al, 1966, no. 3.
^^Ye, M. Halushko, Narysy I s t o r i y i  Ideolohichnoyi t a  
O rhan iza ts iynoy i D iy a l 'n o s ty  KP2U v 1919-1928 r . r .  (Lviv, 1965) , 
pp. 202-203.
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The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  CPWU with the  S ov ie t  U krainian 
government in  th e  1920's  p rov ided  i t  with a r a r e  o p p o r tu n i ty  to 
dem onstrate  th e  p r a c t i c a l  im p lic a t io n s  o f i t s  p o l i t i c a l  p e rs p e c t iv e s  
to  the  Western Ukrainan p o p u la t io n .  The r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  land a f t e r  
th e  C iv i l  War, U k ra in is a t io n  of government i n s t i t u t i o n s  and the  
ed u ca t io n a l  system and the  apparen t co n so l id a t io n  o f  a rep u b lican  
government in  S ov ie t  U k ra in e -- in  e f f e c t  the  beginnings o f  a s o lu t io n  
to  the  n a t io n a l  and s o c ia l  qu es tio n s  fac ing  the  U krain ian  m asses-- 
were u n r iv a l le d  in  any o th e r  country of E astern  Europe. The CPWU 
rece iv ed  s i g n i f i c a n t  p r a c t i c a l  a id  from th e  S o v ie t  U kra in ian  government 
in  the  form o f  l i t e r a t u r e .  The a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  the  p r in t e d  word in  
the  n a t iv e  language in  Sov ie t  Ukraine could n o t be compared to  the  
s i t u a t i o n  in  G a l ic ia ,  Trans Carpathian Ukraine o r  Bukovinia and 
B essarab ia  in  Rumania in  the 1920’s .
The p o l i t i c a l  l in e  o f the  Western U krain ian  p a r ty  on the
n a t io n a l  q u es t io n  c a l l e d  f o r  a s o c i a l i s t  re v o lu t io n  throughout Poland,
the  e s tab lish m en t o f  a P o l ish  w orkers’ government and th e  sim ultaneous
union o f  Western Ukraine w ith the  Ukrainian SSR, This p ro p o s i t io n
was a t t r a c t i v e  to  broad lay ers  o f  the  p o p u la t io n  f o r  as long as the
S ovie t U krain ian  example of communist government appeared workable 
20and ben ign . Indeed, i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  imagine th e  growth of 
a s t ro n g  anti-communist n a t i o n a l i s t  movement in  Western Ukraine a long­
s id e  a h e a l th y  communist movement which no t only addressed  i t s e l f  to  
the  economic p l i g h t  o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  bu t which a lso  championed i t s  
n a t io n a l  a s p i r a t i o n s .
The demise o f  th e  CPWU, which paved th e  way f o r  the  emergence 
o f  the  OUN was c lo se ly  r e l a t e d  to  the  changing s i t u a t i o n  in  Sovie t
20Armstrong, U krain ian  N ationalism , p , 19
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Ukraine. Whereas th e  programme o f  U k ra in isa t io n  had served  as a 
powerful example f o r  th e  n a t io n a l ly  oppressed i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  in  
Poland, the  end o f t h i s  p o l ic y  in  1928 and the  subsequent l iq u id a t io n  
o f  U krain ian  communists and rep u b lican  lead e rs  in  th e  t h i r t i e s  brought 
an end to  p rev ious em ula tion . The c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n  and th e  famines 
o f  1931 and 1932 in  Ukraine destroyed  whatever p r e s t i g e  th e  CPWU had 
gained from i t s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w ith the  land s e iz u re s  by poor peasan ts  
during  the  re v o lu t io n a ry  p e r io d  o f  1917-21. The s logan  fo r  the 
u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  Western Ukraine w ith Sovie t Ukraine s im i la r ly  l o s t  i t s  
power o f  a t t r a c t i o n  when news about S t a l i n ' s  c o n so l id a t io n  in  the  
CPSU, and i t s  e f f e c t s  upon p o l i t i c a l  and c u l tu r a l  l i f e  became known in  
Western Ukraine.
The immediacy o f  rep e rcu ss io n s  o f  the  ascen t o f  S t a l i n ' s  f a c t io n  
in  Sov ie t  Ukraine upon the  Western U krainian communist movement can 
be measured in  th e  pages o f  th e  jo u rn a ls  and newspapers of the  CPWU.
For example, th e  jo u rn a l  Novi Shlyakhy f a i t h f u l l y  t r a n s m i t te d  the  
major p o l i t i c a l  campaigns by Kaganovich's f a c t io n  in s id e  the  U krainian
21Bolshevik p a r ty  a g a in s t  the  various  opposit ions  throughout the 1920' s .  
When Antin K rushylnytsky, e d i t o r  of t h i s  jo u rn a l  re tu rn e d  to  Sovie t 
Ukraine in  th e  e a r ly  t h i r t i e s ,  he d isappeared . Such evidence of 
th e  S t a l i n  purges was not simply news gleaned from th e  S ov ie t  p re ss  
in  Western U kraine, bu t was o rg a n ic a l ly  connected to  th e  f a te  of the  
Western U krain ian  communist movement i t s e l f .
F a c t io n a l  l in e s  in s id e  the  CPWU emerged p a r a l l e l  w ith the  
growing f a c t io n s  w ith in  the  Communist P a rty  (Bolsheviks) o f  Ukraine. 
Corresponding to  the  Shumsky tendency, which favoured a co n t in u a t io n
21 See Antin K ru sh y l 'n y tsk y 's  a r t i c l e s  in  Novi Shlyakhy (Lviv, 
n .p . )  'Hromads'ke P rav o su d y a ', (May 1930); 'T rag ed ia  Pomylok', (A pril 
1930); and 'U H a ry a tch ts i  41o' (February 1932).
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o f U k ra in is a t io n  p o l i c i e s  and opposed S t a l i n ' s  main l ie u te n a n t  in
Sov ie t Ukraine, Kaganovich, th e  Maksymovych tendency emerged as the
dominant group in  the  CPWU. In 1926, Maksymovych' s pro-Shumsky group
had a m a jo r i ty  on a l l  lead ing  bodies of the  CPWU. The Comintern had
in te rv en ed  tw ice in to  the  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  of th e  p a r ty  on b e h a lf  o f
the  m in o r i ty ,  bu t f a i l e d  to  a l t e r  the  composition o f  the  le ad e rsh ip ,
22fe a r in g  a s p l i t .
23Ye. M. Halushko's  study of these  years  in  th e  CPWU, which 
appeared in  1965, i s  one of the  few recen t  c o n tr ib u t io n s  on th e  s u b je c t .  
The s p l i t  in  the  p a r ty ,  which took p lace  in  1928 appears to  be so 
s e n s i t i v e  to  o f f i c i a l  Sovie t h is to r io g ra p h y  as to  d iscourage any work 
on i t .  Halushko i s  to  be c o n g ra tu la ted  fo r  having chosen to  deal with 
the  s u b je c t  a t  a l l .  N ev er th e le ss ,  h is  study remains a guarded i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  main reasons fo r  th e  demise o f  the  communist movement 
in  Western Ukraine. R eferring  la rg e ly  to  the  ' n a t i o n a l i s t  d e v ia t io n '  
in  th e  C en tra l  Committee, a charge le v e l le d  a t  many o p p o s i t io n is t s  a t  
t h a t  time in  S ovie t Ukraine, and accusing the  m a jo r i ty  tendency o f  
encouraging a s p l i t  in  the  f r o n t  o rg a n isa t io n  Sel-Rob, Halushko 
a ttem pts  to  lay  the  blame upon s ev e ra l  in d iv id u a ls ,  and no tab ly ,  
Maksymovych. He does n o t  however deal with the  f a c to r s  behind the 
'n a t i o n a l i s t  d e v ia t io n '  o f  the  pro-Shumsky g ro u p -- th e  growing re p re ss io n s  
a g a in s t  rep u b lican  and c u l tu r a l  leaders  in  Soviet Ukraine, the  brakes 
ap p lied  to  U k ra in isa t io n  by the  Kaganovich group, and Shumsky's expulsion  
from the  debate in  the  S ovie t U krainian p a r ty  by h is  appointment to  a 
p o s i t io n  o u ts id e  o f th e  r e p u b l ic .  The o r ig in a l  m a te r ia l  on t h i s  d i s ­
cussion  between the  Western U krainian communists and th e  S ovie t
22Myroslav Prokop, Ukrayina i  U kray ins 'ka  P o l i ty k a  Moskvy 
(Munich, 1959), pp. 77-79.
23Halushko, op.. c i t .
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U krain ians in  th e  jo u rn a l  Budivnytstvo Radyans'koyi Ukrayiny (1927) 
prov ides  a more comprehensive and o b je c t iv e  account than  does 
Halushko. I n c id e n t ly ,  Halushko had access to  th e se  m a te r i a l s .  Recent 
a r t i c l e s  by t h i s  au tho r  and o th e r  h i s to r i a n s  have c o n tr ib u te d  l i t t l e  
towards unders tand ing  t h i s  im portan t p e r io d .
The S ix th  Plenum o f  th e  C en tra l  Committee o f  th e  CPWU, in  
January  1927 was th e  scene o f  growing fa c t io n a l ism  and in t ra n s ig e n c e  
o f  both groups. These te n s io n s  mounted fo r  a y e a r ,  cu lm inating  in  
an open s p l i t  o f  th e  p a r ty  a t  i t s  Gdansk conference in  1928. The 
Maksymovych tendency l e f t  the  o rg a n is a t io n  and o rgan ised  i t s  su p p o rte rs  
around th e  jo u rn a l  K ultura  in  Lviv .^^ The p r o - S ta l in  tendency con­
c e n t r a te d  i t s  e f f o r t s  on re b u i ld in g  the  p a r ty  and o rg an is in g  the 
f i r s t  o f  a long s e r i e s  o f  campaigns a g a in s t  P i l s u d s k i  and the  f a s c i s t  
movement. OUN was one o f  the  main o b jec ts  o f  a t ta c k  by th e  communists. 
This p o l ic y  o f  o p p o s i t io n  to  th e  P i lsu d s k i  regime was p a r t  o f  the  
CPWU's prim ary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  in  the  1930’s o f  defending th e  S ovie t 
Union by opposing th e  anti-communist wing o f th e  P o l i sh  b o u rg eo is ie  
and s t a t e  le a d e rs h ip .
The U krain ian  n a t i o n a l i s t  a n a ly s is  of th e  CPWU has tended to
o v e r s ta te  th e  support  re c e iv ed  by th e se  communists from the  Sovie t
Union, and has a ttem pted  to  c h a r a c te r i s e  i t  as an ad junc t of Sovie t
fo re ig n  p o l ic y  w ith  no indigenous b a s is  in  Western U kraine. For the
OUN, both M arx ist d o c tr in e  and i t s  c a r r i e r s  in  Western Ukraine were
25a 'fo re ign*  phenomenon. This view overlooks the  long t r a d i t i o n  of 
s o c ia l  democracy th e re  and the  co ns iderab le  support enjoyed by the  
communists in  th e  e a r ly  tw e n t ie s ,  w ell be fo re  th e  OUN even e x is t e d .
In s p i t e  o f  ample evidence p o in t in g  to  the  indigenous ro o ts  o f  the  CPWU
^ ^ i b i d . ,  p . 214.
^^Mirchuk, Narys I s t o r i y i  OUN, pp. 450-53.
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n a t i o n a l i s t  h i s t o r i a n s ,  in c lu d in g  the  more l i b e r a l  and dem ocratic  
ones l ik e  M. Prokop have i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h i s  was no t th e  case .
In 1938, the  Communist P a rty  of Poland was d is so lv e d  by the 
Comintern a l le g e d ly  because o f  the  continued presence  o f  ' t r o t s k y i t e '  
and 'bourgeo is  n a t i o n a l i s t '  members in  i t s  ranks. Many o f the  Western 
U krain ian  m i l i t a n t s  who s tay ed  in  G a l ic ia  during  the  f i r s t  occupation 
o f  the  Red Army in  1939 were l iq u id a te d  by the  S o v ie t  s e c r e t  p o l ic e .
The Emergence o f  th e  N a t io n a l i s t  
Movement ~
Severa l f a c to r s  combined to  e s t a b l i s h  th e  b a s is  f o r  the  
emergence o f  an o rgan ised  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement in  Western Ukraine.
The demise o f  the  communist movement in  the  l a t e  1920’s ,  as has been 
a lready  in d ic a te d ,  was a p re c o n d i t io n  fo r  the  emergence o f  the  OUN 
as a new advocate of n a t io n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  with a r i g h t  wing s o lu t io n  
to  the  n a t io n a l  q u e s t io n .
The p o l i t i c a l  rea lignm ent o f  the  Western U krain ian  middle 
c l a s s ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r  the  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ,  c re a te d  a m il ieu  fo r  
n a t i o n a l i s t  a g i t a t i o n .  This rea lignm ent preceded th e  p e n e t r a t io n  of 
the  GUN'S p o l i t i c s  i n to  w ider s o c ia l  la y e r s .  While most o f  the  peasan ts  
in  Western Ukraine unders tood  t h e i r  s o c ia l  predicam ent to  be the  
r e s u l t  o f a government which ex p ro p r ia te d  t h e i r  land and d i s t r i b u t e d  
i t  amongst P o l ish  c o lo n is t s  and o f  the  d is c r im in a to ry  p r a c t i c e s  in  
h i r i n g  which made town l iv in g  a n e a r  im p o s s ib i l i ty ,  no p o l i t i c a l  move­
ment grew ou t o f  the  p easan t  c la s s  as a coherent response to  t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n .  The r u r a l  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ,  made up la rg e ly  o f  the  c lergy  
looked to  th e  towns f o r  a movement in  which i t  could p a r t i c i p a t e .  The
C hris Harman, Bureaucracy and R evolution  in  E astern  Europe
(London, 1974), p . 28.
U krain ian  middle c l a s s  o f  th e  towns, though w ell  o f f  in  comparison 
to  t h e i r  country  cousins were e q u a l ly  conscious o f  th e  l im i t s  o f  
t h e i r  s o c ia l  m o b il i ty .  There were few t r a in in g  schools  to  study  to  
become te a c h e rs ,  few jobs o f  a p ro fe s s io n a l  n a tu re  to  which they could 
a sp i re  and a weak upper c la s s  to  support th e  work o f a r t i s a n s ,  a r t i s t s ,  
w r i t e r s ,  e t c .  In the  search  fo r  a new world view, a formula fo r  
s o c ia l  and n a t io n a l  em ancipation , g r e a te r  numbers o f  the  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  
tu rned  to  th e  f a s c i s t  th e o r ie s  which had gained a prominence in  
Western Europe.
The r i s e  o f  f a s c i s t  p o l i t i c s  in  Western Europe, co in c id in g  
w ith  the  c r i s i s  o f  the  T hird  I n te r n a t io n a l  p a r t i e s ,  had an im portan t 
impact upon the  emerging n a t i o n a l i s t  movement. At f i r s t  th e se  
th e o r ie s  i n t e r e s t e d  only a small group of U krain ian  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  
l iv in g  in  Western and E as te rn  Europe, n o tab le  a P a r is  group led  
by M. T s ib o rs 'k y  and D. Dontsov, a lead ing  p u b l i c i s t  in  Western 
Ukraine. But t h e i r  in f lu en ce  qu ick ly  grew and n a t io n a l  s o c i a l i s t  
and f a s c i s t  th e o r ie s  prov ided  an id e o lo g ic a l  and p h i lo s o p h ic a l  b a s is  to  
the  new n a t i o n a l i s t  school.
One o f  th e  prim ary in f lu e n c e s  in  th.e re  groupment o f  sep a ra te  
n a t i o n a l i s t  groupings in to  a s in g le  OUN in  1929 was the  p u b l i c i s t  
Dontsov, Dontsov, a s o c i a l i s t  during the  Russian R evolu tion , tu rn ed  
to  anti-communist and f a s c i s t  th e o r ie s  in  th e  e a r ly  tw en ties  a f t e r  
becoming d isenchan ted  w ith th e  course of events  in  S ov ie t  U kra ine .
His polem ical c o n tr ib u t io n s  to  jo u rn a ls  and a s e r i e s  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  
brochures s t im u la te d  a wide d iscu ss io n  in  Western Ukraine amongst the  
then wavering s tu d e n t  and i n t e l l e c t u a l  c i r c l e s .  The h i s t o r i a n  Isaac  
Mazepo no tes  in  h i s  c r i t i q u e  o f  Dontsovian p o l i t i c s  t h a t  th e  tu rn  
towards i n t e g r a l  n a t io n a l ism  coincided  w ith th e  r i s e  o f  f a s c i s t  
p o l i t i c s  in  Western Europe and th e  tran sm iss io n  o f  th e  West European 
experience  and ideas  to  Western Ukraine v ia  such p u b l i c i s t s  as Dontsov.
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Dontsov'S id e a s ,  n o te s  Maz^tpa, were based upon a generous borrowing
from Spengler (on the  c u l tu r a l  degenera tion  o f  Western c i v i l i s a t i o n ,
c r i t i q u e  o f  modem urban s o c ie ty )  and Sorel (on r u r a l  u to p ia ,  ra c e ,
human n a tu re ,  w i l l ) .  L a te r  he c o n tr ib u te d ,  in  a more d i r e c t  fa sh io n ,
on the  f a s c i s t  experience  by p ro v id ing  sketches  o f  major leaders  o f
2 7th e  f a r - r i g h t  in  Europe and t r a n s l a t i n g  H i t l e r ' s  w r i t in g s .
The in f lu en c e  o f  these  ideas  was r e in fo rc e d  by the  p r a c t i c a l
example o f f a s c i s t  government in  M u sso l in i 's  I t a l y .  In a ttem pting
to  r e f u te  th e  in f lu en c e  of I t a l y  upon the  movement, the  n a t i o n a l i s t
h i s t o r i a n  Mirchuk w r i te s :
When th e  OUN a ro s e ,  I t a l i a n  fascism  under Benito 
M u sso l in i 's  le ad e rsh ip  a lready  had s e v e ra l  y e a r s '  
e x is te n c e  and a c t i v i t y  behind i t s e l f  and was marked 
by very  se r io u s  achievements in  th e  p o l i t i c a l ,  
economic and s o c ia l  spheres o f  the  l i f e  o f  the  
I t a l i a n  peop le . In the  c r i t i c a l  years  a f t e r  the  F i r s t  
World War, th e  f a s c i s t  movement saved I t a l y  from 
communist anarchy which had begun to  e n g u lf  the  
country . Taking power in to  i t s  own hands, fascism  brought 
law and o rd e r ,  m astered the  se r io u s  pos t-w ar c r i s i s  o f  
p ro d u c t io n ,  and re tu rn e d  p a t r io t i s m  and d i s c i p l in e  
to  the  popu la r  masses . . . .  Not only i n  a 
d e c la r a t iv e  sen se ,  b u t  in  p r a c t i c e  an uncompromising 
enemy o f  s o c ia l ism  and communism, the  f a s c i s t  movement 
gained  sympathy, even from i t s  opponents. Communist 
and Bolshevik Moscow d e c la red  fascism  i t s  m ortal 
enemy. I f  i t  had n o t been f o r  fascism , then the  
communists would have hegemonised I t a l y ,  and a lready  
in  th e  f i r s t  post-W ar y e a r s ,  i t  would have become the 
Bolshevik launch base f o r  the conquest o f  Europe and 
A fr ic a .
I t  i s  no t s t ra n g e  th en , t h a t  amongst th e  Ukrainian 
n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  uncompromising opponents o f  communo- 
bolshevism t h a t  they  were, t h a t  fascism  as an 
anti-communist movement evoked sympathy, and as a new 
s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  and economic phenomenon i n t e r e s t .
However, they  considered  i t  to  be a c r e a t io n  o f  a 
fo re ig n  m e n ta l i ty ,  u n su i ta b le  f o r  a p p l ic a t io n  in  the 
U krain ian  c o n te x t .28
Mirchuk goes on to  observe t h a t  fascism  arose  in  an a lready  
e x i s t in g  n a t i o n - s t a t e  in  o rd e r  to  re ju v e n a te  i t .  And U krainian
27
Isaak  Mazepa, P ids tavy  Nashoho Vidrodzhenya, 2 v o ls .  Qduniclt, 
1948-49), 2: 85-119. _
2 8Mirchuk, Narys I s t o r i y i  OUN, pp. 112-113.
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n a t io n a l ism  could no t have followed th e  f a s c i s t  exanple because i t s
aim was to  c o n s t ru c t  a n a t i o n - s t a t e ,  not re ju v e n a te  an e x i s t in g  one!
Another f a c to r  c o n t r ib u t in g  to  the  r i s e  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t
movement, and perhaps the  most s i g n i f i c a n t  in  p ro v id in g  the  OUN w ith
i t s  i n i t i a l  body o f Western U krainian cadre , was the  r e j e c t i o n  by
many middle c la s s  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i s t s  o f  the  l e g a l i s t - p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s t
methods o f  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  p a r t i e s  such as UNDO and the  s o c ia l
dem ocra ts . This f a c to r  became an im portant c a t a ly s t  to  th e  growth
o f  the  OUN a f t e r  the  UNDO f a i l e d  to  oppose e f f e c t i v e l y  the  government's
p a c i f i c a t i o n  ac t io n s  in  Western Ukraine in  1930. In the  e a r ly  1930' s ,
the  OUN took a h o s t i l e  p o s i t io n  towards le g a l  p o l i t i c a l  U krainian 
29p a r t i e s .
A b r i e f  exam ination o f  the  groups which fused  in  1929 in to
the  s in g le  o rg a n is a t io n  i l l u s t r a t e s ,  from ano ther p e r s p e c t iv e ,  the
process  d e sc r ib ed  above. From the  o ld e r  g en era t io n  o f  p o l i t i c a l
a c t i v i s t s ,  th e  U krain ian  M il i ta ry  O rgan isa tion  (U kray ins 'ka  V iys 'kova
Orhanizatsiya-UVO) c o n tr ib u te d  the  whole body of i t s  membership,
except fo r  a sm all f r a c t i o n  which re tu rn e d  to  le g a l  p o l i t i c s .  The
UVO was made up p r im a r i ly  o f  e x - o f f i c e r s  o f  the  Sich Riflemen of the
U krain ian  P eo p le 's  Republic and o f  the  U krainian G a l ic ian  Array.
R e t rea t in g  to  Western Ukraine a f t e r  th e  re v o lu t io n a ry  p e r io d  and the
C iv i l  War, th e se  o f f i c e r s  began to  o rgan ise  t e r r o r i s t  a t ta c k s  upon
30the  P o lish  Government, i t s  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and o f f i c i a l s .  When the
UVO agreed to  jo in  the  OUN, i t  brought in to  the  o rg a n is a t io n  not only 
the  experience  o f  p rev ious  a c t i v i t y ,  a le ad e rsh ip  core (no tab ly  
K onovalets ' ,  who became th e  OUN leader)  and an o rg a n is a t io n a l  network
29 I b i d . ,  pp. 105-107.
30See Volodyrayr M artynets , U krayins 'ke  P id p i ly a  Vid UVO do 
OUN (Winnipeg, 1949), pp. 40-71.
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th roughout Western U kraine, b u t a lso  i t s  own a n a ly s is  o f  th e  reasons 
fo r  the  independence movement's f a i l u r e  in  1917-21. This a n a ly s i s ,  
s t r i k i n g l y  s im i la r  to  Dontsov 's arguments, amounted to  the  con ten tion  
th a t  th e  Ukraine had f a i l e d  to  gain  p o l i t i c a l  independence because the  
s o c i a l i s t s  had ignored  th e  is su e  of Independence and had co n cen tra ted  
t h e i r  e f f o r t s  on s o c ia l  i s s u e s .  The a n a ly s is  was th e  b a s is  fo r  the  
UVO's r e j e c t i o n  o f  a l l  s o c i a l i s t  and s o c i a l l y  o r ie n te d  p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n ;  
i t  r e - in f o r c e d  th e  OUN's i n t e g r a l  n a t i o n a l i s t  temperament.
Other groups which jo in ed  the  OUN in  1929 inc luded  th e  Union
of U krain ian  N a t io n a l i s t  Youth (S p ilka  U kray ins 'koy i N a ts io n a lis ty ch n o y i
Molodi) a fo rce  w ith in  the  Western U krainian s tu d en t  movement which
opposed th e  in f lu en c e  o f  the  CPWU. The Legion o f  Ukrainian
N a t io n a l i s t s  (Lehia U kray ins ' kykh N a ts io n a l i s t iv )  most o f  whose members
re s id e d  in  Czechoslovakia, was a fu s io n  o f  a number o f  sm a lle r
groups in c lu d in g  the  O rg an isa t io n  o f  Ukrainian F a s c i s t s  (O rh an iza ts iy a
31U kray ins ' kykh F a s h y s t iv ) . I t s  members were p re s e n t  a t  the  
n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  fu s io n  be fo re  the  OUN's founding conference .
Apart from the  UVO and the  youth  groups in  Western Ukraine, a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  number of n a t i o n a l i s t s  from
West European c o u n t r ie s ,  no tab ly  Czechoslovakia and A u s t r ia  took a 
v i t a l  r o le  in  the  regroupment. The groups from A u s t r ia  and 
Czechoslovakia had developed in  the  1920's  in s id e  th e  Ukrainian 
communities which had em igrated th e re  a t  th e  tu rn  o f  the  century  and 
a f t e r  the  F i r s t  World War.
The founding Congress o f  the  OUN was h e ld  in  Vienna from 
January 28 to  February 2, 1929. In the  programme adopted by the  
d e le g a te s ,  th e  OUN c a l l e d  f o r  the  form ation of a movement ' b u i l t  on the
^^Mirchuk, Narys I s t o r iy i  OUN, pp. 68 -88 .
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32p r in c ip l e s  o f  a l l-U k ra in ian is ra ,  su p ra -p a r ty  and one-man r u l e ' .  
They d ec la red  th e  n a t io n  to  be the  h ig h e s t  o rgan ic  form of human 
c o l l e c t i v i t y  and the  s t a t e  as the  p r o te c to r  of the  o rgan ic  
u n i ty  o f  the  n a t io n ,  i t s  form of v i s i b l e  separa tedness  from o th e r  
n a t i o n s .
Under th e  t i t l e  'S t a t e  S t r u c t u r e ' ,  th e  OUN s t a t e d  th a t :
In th e  p e r io d  o f  the l ib e r a t io n  s t ru g g le ,  only 
a n a t io n a l  d i c t a to r s h ip ,  developed in  the  course of 
the  s t ru g g le  can ensure the  i n t e r n a l  s t r e n g th  of 
the  U krainian n a t io n  and i t s  g re a te s t  r e s i l i e n c e  
to  the  o u te r  world . , . ,
Only a f t e r  the  r e b i r t h  o f  s ta tehood  w i l l  the  
time come fo r  i n t e r n a l  re c o n s t ru c t io n  and t r a n s i t i o n  to  
a m ono lith ic  s t a t e  organ. In t h i s  t r a n s i t i o n  p e r io d ,  
the  head o f  s t a t e  w i l l  be e n t ru s te d  in  p re p a r in g  fo r  
the  c re a t io n  o f  the  h ig h e s t  governing organs on the  
b a s is  o f  r e p re s e n ta t io n  o f  a l l  o rganised  s o c ia l  
lay ers  . . . .3 3
Under 'S o c ia l  P o l i c y ' :
The re g u la t io n  o f  r e l a t io n s  between s o c ia l  
groups, p a r t i c u l a r l y  the  r i g h t  o f  a r b i t r a t i o n  in  
m atte rs  o f  s o c ia l  c o n f l i c t  i s  the  domain of the  
s t a t e  (our emphasis) which w i l l  ensure the  co­
o p e ra t io n  between p roduc tive  layers  o f  the  
U krainian Nation . . . .
A ll s o c ia l  groups ' members w i l l  have th e  r i g h t  
of c o a l i t i o n  on which b a s is  they w i l l  u n i te  in  
t ra d e  unions with the  r i g h t  to  synd ica te  on a 
t e r r i t o r i a l  b a s is  . , . and w i l l  have t h e i r  
r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  in  organs o f  government.34
On a d e f i n i t i v e  n o te ,  the  OUN d ec la red  i t s  a t t i t u d e  to  o th e r
p o l i t i c a l  groups to  be the  fo llow ing:
The OUN c a te g o r ic a l ly  opposes a l l  fo rc e s ,  
our own and fo re ig n ,  who a c t iv e ly  or p a s s iv e ly  
oppose these  p o s i t io n s  o f  Ukrainian n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  
who ac t  a g a in s t  them w ith  any p o l i t i c a l  methods, o f  
in d iv id u a ls  or c o l l e c t i v i t i e s  who w i l l  appear in  
d isagreement w ith  the  ab o v e-s ta ted  p o s i t i o n s . 35
'52OUN V S v i t l i  Postanov Velykykh Zboriv , K onferen tsiy  t a  
Inshykh Dokumentiv z B oro t 'by  1929-1955 r . r .  (London, 1955), p . 6
^^loc. c i t .
^^ loc. c i t .
^^Ibid.,  p. 15.
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The programme adopted in  1929 was c l e a r ly  an a u th o r i t a r i a n
and a n t i -d e m o c ra t ic  one, c a l l in g  f o r  th e  c re a t io n  of a c o r p o r a t i s t
s t a t e . I n d e e d ,  the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  were c a l l in g  f o r  a U krainian
d ic ta to r s h ip  in  Western Ukraine to  rep lace  P i l s u d s k i ' s .  The programme
o ffe re d  no c l e a r  land p o l ic y ,  save the  assurance t h a t  the  land would
become th e  p r iv a te  p ro p e r ty  o f  U krain ian  farm ers. This a spec t o f  the
programme was l a t e r  e la b o ra te d  to  in d ic a te  p r e f e r e n t i a l  support fo r
37the  middle p e a s a n t ,  w ith  no regard  f o r  the  la n d le s s .  The s o c ia l
p o l i c i e s  o f  the  OUN in  1929 negated  the  ex is ten c e  o f  a f r e e  t ra d e
union movement, th e  r i g h t  to  independent c o l l e c t iv e  b a rg a in in g  by
workers and employers. I t  opposed the  d issem ina tion  o f any p o l i t i c a l
ideas  o th e r  than  i t s  own.
I f  th e  OUN claimed to  be s t ru g g l in g  fo r  th e  em ancipation of
th e  U krain ian  p o p u la t io n  from s o c ia l  and n a t io n a l  o p p ress io n ,  i t s
programmatic demands d id  n o t  support such a claim . The a u th o r i t a r i a n
independent s t a t e  i t  proposed could a l l e v i a t e  l i n g u i s t i c  d is c r im in a t io n
and unemployment fo r  the  middle c la s s  by o f f e r in g  government jo b s ,
teach ing  p o s i t io n s ,  e t c .  But i t s  i n d u s t r i a l  programme proposed
to  give to  U krainian p r iv a te  i n t e r e s t s  the P o l ish  and in te r n a t io n a l
f in a n c ia l  a s s e ts  in  Western Ukraine, and i t s  land p o l ic y  favoured
the  p e a sa n try  which a lread y  owned land. Isaac  Mazepa s u c c in t ly  noted
3 8th a t  t h i s  was ' a n a t io n a l ism  w ith  no n a t io n a l  c o n t e n t ' .
The communists were no t alone in  exposing the  OUN; the 
n a t i o n a l i s t s  met a r e a c t io n  o f  scorn  and denuncia tion  from p r a c t i c a l l y  
every p o l i t i c a l  group in  Western Ukraine. Those who supported  the
The s i m i l a r i t y  between th e  OUN programme and those  o f  o th e r  
f a s c i s t  o rg a n is a t io n s  o f  the  p e r io d  i s  s t r i k i n g .  See f o r  example, the  
programme o f  the  I t a l i a n  movement in  E. Weber, V a r ie t ie s  o f  Fascism 
(New York, 1964), pp. 145-147.
37M. T s ib o rs 'k y ,  'Problemy Hospodarskoyi V lasn o s ty ' in  Na 
Sluzhbu N a ts iy i  (P a r i s ,  1938), pp. 7-11.
^ ^ s s a c  Mazepa, 'N ats iona liz ra  bez N a ts io n a l 'n o h o  Z m istu ',
Nashe Slovo (Munich, 1974).
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OUN, no ted  w ith  s a t i s f a c t i o n  th a t  U krainian n a t io n a l ism  was
p r a c t i c a l l y  in d is t in g u is h a b le  from fascism :
Under th e  name U krainian n a t io n a l ism , we 
have become accustomed to  understanding  i t  as th e  
fo llow ing p a r t i c u l a r  phenomenon: i t  i s  a s o c ia l
movement which e x i s t s  today throughout the  
whole world. In one country  i t  appears as 
fasc ism , in  ano ther as H it le r ism , and in  our 
country  i t  i s  q u i te  simply n a t io n a l i s m .39
While the  whole o rg a n isa t io n  form ally  adopted the  new
programme, i t  did  n o t r e f l e c t  unanimity of views throughout the
membership. The c o r p o r a t i s t  p r o je c t  was adopted in  1929 la rg e ly  as
a r e s u l t  o f  the  in f lu en c e  of the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  who re s id e d  in  Western
Europe or in  E ast European c o u n tr ie s  o u ts id e  of Poland. This group
was an o ld e r  g e n e ra t io n ,  experienced  in  p o l i t i c s  and conscious of
the  f a s c i s t  movement a f t e r  s ev e ra l  years  of r e l a t i v e l y  c lo se  examination
As f a r  as th e  Western Ukrainian membership was concerned, the
programmatic aspec t was a secondary concern. The more y ou th fu l
membership in  Western Ukraine was more i n t e r e s t e d  in  d i r e c t  a c t io n
a g a in s t  the  P o lish  s t a t e .  This did not imply t h a t  they  were unconscious
of the  genera l  p o l i t i c a l  p e rsp ec t iv e s  o f  t h e i r  movement, but simply
th a t  they had n o t been a c e n t r a l  p a r t  o f  i t s  c r e a t io n .  A fte r  the
founding conference , th e se  members took to  a c t iv e  work.
The Provid  ( le ad e rsh ip )  under E. K o n o v a le ts ' ,  chosen a t  the
Vienna ga th er in g  re s id e d  in  Western Europe. An ex ecu tive  in  Lviv was
appointed to  oversee the  a c t i v i t i e s  of the  Western Ukrainian network.
The d i f f e r e n t  a t t i t u d e  o f  th ese  two bodies to  the  1929 programme was
bu t one aspec t o f  a deeper d iv is io n  in  the  OUN, between the  West
European and West U krainian memberships which began to  develop in  the
e a r ly  t h i r t i e s .  With the  outbreak of war, t h i s  d iv i s io n  r e s u l te d  in
Nash Klych, 9 Ju ly  1933.
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an open s p l i t  i n  th e  OUN.^^ Between the  Wars, however, the  n a t i o n a l i s t  
o rg a n is a t io n  managed to  su rv iv e  w ithout s e r io u s  ru p tu r e s ,  the  OUN in  
Western Ukraine f a i l i n g  to  p u b l ic i s e  i t s  programme and th e  Provid  in  
Western Europe seek ing  c o n tac ts  and support from governments fo r  
t h e i r  cause.
One n o ta b le  d iv e rg en t  c u rre n t  d id  develop in  Western Ukraine
around a member o f  th e  Lviv ex ec u t iv e ,  Ivan M itr in g a .  This c u rre n t
opposed t i e s  w ith  Nazi Germany and s t r e s s e d  th e  importance o f
developing a s o c ia l  programme th a t  could respond to  th e  needs o f  the
S ov ie t  Ukrainian masses. The M itr inga  group d id  n o t  break  with the
OUN u n t i l  the  Second World War, when the  p ro sp ec t  o f  independent
n a t i o n a l i s t  a c t i v i t y  in  Sov ie t  Ukraine was counterposed to  a c o l la b o ra -
41t i o n i s t  course w ith Nazi Germany.
The average member o f  the  OUN in  Western Ukraine was 
r e c r u i t e d  on th e  b a s is  o f  su b je c t iv e  ca teg o r ie s  (such as w il l in g n e ss  
to  k i l l  a policeman) and once in s id e  the  o rg a n is a t io n  re c e iv ed  l i t t l e  
p o l i t i c a l  ed uca tion  and co n sid e rab le  moral e x h o r ta t io n .  He/she 
accepted the  p o l i t i c a l  l in e  w ithout q u e s t io n ,  as was the  accepted 
p r a c t i c e  in  an a u th o r i t a r i a n  movement. A c e l l  s t r u c tu r e  e f f e c t i v e ly  
i s o l a t e d  th e  membership in to  sm all pockets  r e s u l t i n g  in  l i t t l e  d i s ­
cuss ion  between members and no avenue fo r  cha llen g in g  the  d ec is ions  
o f  the lead ing  b o d ie s .  As f a r  as Nazi Germany was concerned, th e re  
i s  genera l agreement by p a r t i c ip a n t s  o f  those  years  who a re  a l iv e  
today , t h a t  n o t only the  le ad e rsh ip  of the  OUN, b u t  a lso  the  member­
sh ip  was sym pathetic  to  the  Nazi movement. The rank and f i l e  members,
40See Chapter I I .
^^Borys Levytsky, ' Is to rychne  Znachinya Rozlamu v OUN', 
Vpered, no, 2 (11) 1950, p . 6.
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many o f  whom had never l e f t  Western Ukraine in  t h e i r  l iv e s  were 
however q u i te  ig n o ra n t  o f  th e  p re c is e  n a tu re  o f  e i t h e r  Nazi Germany 
o r I t a l y .  According to  t h e i r  unders tand ing  o f  in t e r n a t io n a l  p o l i t i c s ,  
they  were q u i te  w i l l in g  to  chose, as Mirchuk has p o in te d  o u t ,  ' a n t i ­
communist I t a l y  and Germany' over 'Bolshevik  Russia*.
N a t io n a l i s t  A c t iv i ty  Before the  
Second World War
In th e  te n  years  o f  a c t i v i t y  be fo re  th e  Second World War, th e  
OUN developed a d i s t i n c t  p o l i t i c a l  s t y l e  and succeeded in  expanding 
i t s  membership to  s e v e ra l  thousand a c t i v i s t s .  This p e r io d  of form ation 
and expansion can only be sketched  in  a genera l  way because o f  the  
shortage  o f  sources and the  absence o f any s e r io u s  s tu d ie s  pu b lish ed  
to  da te  by p a r t i c ip a n t s  in  the  movement. M irchuk's Narys I s t o r i y i  OUN 
i s  marred by i t s  d e c la r a t iv e  s t y l e  and i s  of more s e rv ic e  as a p ro ­
paganda p iece  than  as an o b je c t iv e  r e c o l l e c t io n  of th e  events  between 
the  Wars. N a t io n a l i s t  a rch ives  fo r  th e  p e r io d  1929-39 have e i t h e r  
been destroyed  or are  in  the  p o sse ss io n  o f Sov ie t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  or 
n a t i o n a l i s t  o rg a n is a t io n s  in  th e  West. N e ith e r  have p e rm it te d  open 
access to  th ese  s o u rc e s .
The OUN's d i s t i n c t i v e  f e a tu re  during  the in te rw a r  p e r io d  
was i t s  t e r r o r i s t  s t y l e  of propaganda. The movement a ttem pted  to  
m obilise  support  f o r  i t s  aims by v anguard is t  a c t io n s ,  most f r e q u e n t ly  
aimed a t  the  P o l ish  s t a t e .  This inc luded  bombings o f  s t a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  
a s s a s s in a t io n s  o f  o f f i c i a l s  and the  d e s t r u c t io n  o f  landowners' 
e s t a t e s  in  th e  c o u n try s id e .  By th e se  a c t io n s ,  th e  OUN attem pted  
to  tu rn  p u b l ic  op in ion  a g a in s t  the  p o l i c i e s  of the  government and to  
"d iscourage  the  P o l i sh  c o l o n i s t s ’ d e s i r e  fo r  e n r ic h in g  themselves a t  
the  expense o f  th e  U krain ian  p e a s a n t " . I n  a d d i t io n  to  th e se  ac t io n s
^^Mirchuk, Narys I s t o r i y i  OUN, pp. 233-34.
a g a in s t  P o l i s h  s t a t e  and p r iv a te  i n t e r e s t s ,  th e  OUN continued  to  
r a i s e  th e  is su e  o f  the  p l i g h t  o f  Ukrainians in  th e  S ov ie t  Union. This 
u s u a l ly  took th e  form o f dem onstrations o f  n a t i o n a l i s t  s tu d en ts  a t  
the  S ov ie t consu la te  in  Lviv.
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  the  OUN's s ty l e  was the  encouragement o f  
a s e r i e s  o f  c u l t s ,  such as the  c u l t  o f  ' f a l l e n  h e r o e s ' ,  commemorating 
p a s t  f i g h t e r s  f o r  independence, and the  c u l t  o f  'K r u ty ' ,  a la rg e ly  
f i c t i o n a l i s e d  episode o f  a group of s tu d en ts  defending  the  C en tra l  
Rada in  1918 a g a in s t  the  advance o f  the  Red Army. These commemorations 
were mass events  drawing in  town youth and s tu d e n ts .  I t  was from 
among th e se  p a r t i c i p a n t s  t h a t  the  o rg a n is a t io n  sought th e  m a jo r i ty  
of i t s  r e c r u i t s  in  the  e a r ly  t h i r t i e s .
In response  to  the  in c re a se  in  t e r r o r i s t  a t ta c k s  upon P o lish  
o f f i c i a l s ,  banks and p o s t  o f f i c e s ,  the  government c a r r i e d  out 
p a c i f i c a t io n  measures in  September 1930, d e ta in in g  1739 a c t i v i s t s  and 
sending 914 of t h i s  number to  t r i a l . T h e  occupations of those 
a r r e s t e d  prov ide  an in s ig h t  i n to  the  s o c ia l  com position o f  the  
n a t i o n a l i s t  movement in  i t s  e a r ly  phase. (See Table 5 ) .  High school 
and u n iv e r s i ty  s tu d en ts  made up one t h i r d  of the  a r r e s t e d .  One 
hundred and twenty were a r t i s a n s ;  th e re  were only 45 workers in  the  
group. Peasan ts  a r r e s t e d  numbered over f iv e  hundred, bu t the i n f o r ­
mation prov ided  by M. F e l in sk i  fo r  th i s  t a b le  does n o t in d ic a te  the  
k ind  o f  p easan ts  the  d e ta in ees  w ere--w hether middle p e a s a n ts ,  the  
sons and daughters  o f  r i c h  landholders  o r  poor te n a n t  fa rm ers .
I t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  deduce from t h i s  in fo rm ation , however t h a t  the  OUN 
sought i t s  p r in c ip a l  base in s id e  the  towns amongst middle layers  o f
^^Lev Shankowsky, U kray ins 'ka  Armiya v B o ro t 'b i  Za D erzhavn is t '
(Munich, 1958), p . 246. 
44M. F e l in s k i ,  U krainians in  Poland ( n .p . ,  1931), p. 158,
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TABLE 5*
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF PERSONS ARRESTED DURING 
PACIFICATION MEASURES IN WESTERN UKRAINE, 
SEPTEMBER, 1930
Occupation Number a r r e s t e d
High school s tu d en t 220
U n iv e rs i ty  s tu d en t 360
Clerk 9
Peasant 510
Merchant 6
A rtisan 120
Workman 45
Teacher 20
Government c le rk 8
J o u r n a l i s t 5
Clergy 30
S em inaris t 2
Other c l e r i c s 3
Engineer 3
Doctor 2
Lawyer 6
Law s tu d en t 6
Other p ro fe s s io n 60
Without occupation 33
Not de fined 210
*M, F e l in s k i ,  Ukrainians in  Poland ( n .p . ,  1931), p. 170
o f  the  p o p u la t io n  and amongst Ukrainian peasan ts  in  th e  countryside
In 1931, th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  a s s a s s in a te d  a P o lish  member o f  
the  Sejm, T. Motylka and a p o l ic e  agent named Byk.^^ In 1933, an 
a s s a s s in a t io n  a ttem pt was made upon th e  Sov ie t  consul in  Lviv; they
^^Mirchuk, Narys I s t o r iy i  OUN, p . 247.
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f a i l e d  to  k i l l  the  consu l,  bu t  succeeded in  a s s a s s in a t in g  a h igh 
ranking o f f i c i a l  o f  the  GPU (Soviet I n te r n a l  S e c u r i ty  p o l ic e )  who 
was v i s i t i n g  the  c o n s u l a t e . A t t a c k s  upon p o s ta l  s t a t i o n s  and banks 
continued unabated in  t h i s  p e r io d .  In  many case s ,  th e  t r i a l s  
which followed such a t ta c k s  were o f  g r e a te r  propaganda use to  the  
n a t i o n a l i s t  movement than the  p u b l i c i ty  ensuing from the  a t ta c k s  
them selves. The p r e s t ig e  o f  the  OUN as a t e r r o r i s t  form ation grew in  
p ro p o r t io n  to  th e  number o f n a t i o n a l i s t s  langu ish ing  in  P o lish  
g o a l s .
In 1933, the  Lviv execu tive  decided to  launch p u b l ic  mass 
a c t io n s ,  hoping thereby  to  show the  P o lish  government the  e x te n t  o f  
support in  th e  lo c a l  p o p u la t io n  fo r  t h e i r  cause. The 'sch o o l a c t i o n ' ,  
as i t  became known, was a mass p r o t e s t  by s tu d en ts  in  elem entary and high 
schoo ls .  I t  c o n s is te d  of a co -o rd in a ted  day o f  p r o t e s t  a g a in s t  the  
d isc r im in a to ry  language p o l ic y  of the  ed u ca tio n a l  system, tak in g  the 
form o f s t r i k e s ,  d ishonouring  P o lish  emblems and r e f u s a l  to  s ing  the 
n a t io n a l  anthem upon commencement of c la s s e s .  The anti-monopoly b o yco tt  
a g a in s t  l iq u o r  and tobbacco o u t l e t s  which were s t a t e  c o n tro l le d  
was c a r r ie d  out with a s im i la r  i n t e n t ,  the  p a r t i c ip a n t s  in  t h i s  case 
being the  o ld e r  s e c to r  of the  p o p u la t io n .
Although the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  had succeeded in  showing th e  govern­
ment th a t  t h e i r  c a l l s  to a c t io n  found a response in  wide layers  of 
the  p o p u la t io n ,  they  had no t a n t ic ip a te d  the  e f f e c t s  o f  open a c t io n  by
t h e i r  members upon the  s e c u r i ty  of t h e i r  network. The a s s a s s in a t io n
48of  the  P o lish  M in is te r  o f  the  I n t e r i o r ,  P ie r a c k i ,  soon a f t e r  the
^ ^ I b id , ,  p .  338.
4 ? I b id . ,  pp. 331, 336-37.
48P etro  Mirchuk, Stepan Bandera (New York, 1961), pp. 29 -31 .
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mass a c t io n s  p rovided  th e  p o l ic e  w ith an e x c e l le n t  oppo rtu n i ty
to  make a massive sweep, a r r e s t in g  well over a thousand n a t i o n a l i s t s .
Assuming le ad e rsh ip  of the  execu tive  in  1934, a f t e r  a s h o r t  terra by
S. Bandera, during which the  boyco tts  had been o rg an ised . Lev Rebet
attem pted  to  p u l l  to g e th e r  the  ranks of the  o rg a n is a t io n  which had
no t been deconsp ired . Rebet notes  in  h is  memoirs t h a t  i t  was not
49u n t i l  1937 th a t  the  OUN was again  a fu nc tion ing  o rg a n is a t io n .
The ex ten s iv e  s t r i k e  ac tio n s  in  Western Ukraine in  1936 
passed  almost unnoticed  by the  OUN. Although the  s t r i k e  had 
been i n i t i a t e d  by ro ad -b u i ld in g  workers in  Lviv, the  overwhelming 
m a jo r i ty  being U kra in ians , the  OUN was unable , and perhaps unw ill ing  
to  seek new converts  from amongst the  working c l a s s .  Lev Rebet 
ponders th i s  g re a t  l o s t  o pportun ity  in  h is  m e m o i r s . M .  Prokop 
a s s e r t s  th a t  the  OUN began to  o rgan ise  workers a f t e r  the  1936 s t r i k e  
th e re  i s  l i t t l e  evidence to  support such a claim in  a v a i la b le  sou rces . 
I t  i s  perhaps lo g ic a l  to  assume th a t  the OUN, which viewed the  working 
c lass  as the  domain of communist a g i t a t i o n ,  had no ap p ro p r ia te  
programmatic b a s is  to  o f f e r  to workers and th e re fo re  d id  no t even 
a ttem pt to  reach them. The f a c t  t h a t  OUN members a t ta ck ed  meetings 
o f  workers which had been o rgan ised  by the  CPWU, tends to  confirm 
such an assumption.
In th e  two years  preced ing  Nazi Germany’s invasion  o f Poland, 
the  OUN succeeded in  re b u i ld in g  i t s  network. M. Lebed ', a lead e r  of 
the  OUN during  th e  War claims th a t  by 1939, th e  o rg a n is a t io n  t o t a l l e d
^^Lev Rebet, S v i t l a  i  T in i OUN (Munich, 1964), pp. 49-54. 
S ^ Ib id . ,  pp. 70-72.
^^Prokop, Ukrayina i  P o l i ty k a  Moskvy, p . 81.
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5212,000 members and seven thousand in  i t s  youth s e c t io n .  Although
th e re  are  no o th e r  in d ic a t io n s  o f  the  OUN's num erical s t r e n g th ,  and
t h i s  i s  expected given the  c o n s p i r a to r i a l  n a tu re  o f  the  movement,
L eb ed ' 's  p o s i t io n  in  the  OUN lends c r e d i b i l i t y  to  t h i s  a s s e r t io n .
He was in  charge of the  o r g a n i s a t io n 's  i n t e r n a l  s e c u r i ty  p o l ic e
fo rc e ,  the  Sluzhba Bezpeky, whose members had c o n tac t  w ith  th e  e n t i r e
c e l l  network. No o th e r  body of the  OUN, in c lu d in g  the  Provid  was
as capable o f  making such a count o f  the  membership.
Up to  1938, r e l a t i o n s  between the  OUN and Nazi Germany had
c o n s is te d  o f  l i t t l e  more than  co n tac t  between th e  Provid  and German
i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  and K o n o v a le ts ' '  occas ional appearance as a guest  a t
53German m i l i t a r y  manoeuvres. In 1939, the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  had the  
op p o rtu n i ty  to  t e s t  the  s i n c e r i t y  o f  German support fo r  t h e i r  aims 
in  the  C arpath ian  reg io n  in h a b i te d  by U krain ians. With th e  co llap se  
o f  the  Prague government, U krainians th e re  d ec la red  an independent
54s t a t e  in  March 1939 under the  lead e rsh ip  of Rev. Augustine Voloshyn. 
The OUN, eag e r  to  lend support to  t h i s  i n i t i a t i v e  s en t  s i g n i f i c a n t  
fo rces  to  C arpath ian  Ukraine and organised  defense fo rces  fo r  the  
nascen t government. The T hird  Reich, p r e f e r r in g  to  allow Hungary 
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  i t s  t e r r i t o r i a l  demands in  r e tu r n  f o r  i t s  d ip lom atic  
su p p o rt ,  allowed Hungarian fo rces  to  e n te r  the  t e r r i t o r y  and crush 
the  government in  fou r  d ay s .
I t  should  have been c le a r  to  the  OUN a t  t h i s  p o in t  what the  
r e a l  aims o f Nazi Germany were in  E as te rn  Europe. In a fash ion  
s im i la r  to  t h e i r  d is re g a rd  f o r  th e  Molotov-Ribbentrop P a c t ,  the
S ^ ib id . ,  p . 137.
53See D a l l in ,  German Rule in  R ussia , p .  114; and U kray ins 'ka
RSR, p . 381. 
54See Micheal Winch, Republic For a Day (London, 1939).
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n a t i o n a l i s t s  continued  to  p la ce  t h e i r  hopes on a German-Soviet war 
in  which they  could be a c t i v e ,  choosing to  regard  Germany's manoeuvre 
in  the  C arpath ian  Ukraine a f f a i r  as a temporary s e tb a c k ,  borne of 
the  n e c e s s i t i e s  o f  g re a t  power com binations.^^
Konovalets '* a s s a s s in a t io n  in  Rotterdam in  1938^^ by a GPU 
agent s ig n a l le d  th e  beginning o f a f a c t io n a l  s t ru g g le  in  the  OUN 
between th e  Bandera group, whose base of support was in  Western Ukraine 
and Andrei Mel'nyk who had been d esigna ted  the  le ad e rsh ip  p o s t  by 
K onovalets ' b e fo re  he d ied . The success ion  s t r u g g le ,  which i s  the  
s u b je c t  o f  a fu tu re  s e c t io n  o f  t h i s  paper ,  proved to  be a drawn 
out one. I t  was n o t reso lved  w ithout an open o rg a n is a t io n a l  s p l i t  
in  th e  ranks in  1940.
The two p r in c ip a l  a spec ts  of the n a t i o n a l i s t  movement's 
ro le  in  the  Second World W ar-- i ts  a c t iv e  a s s o c ia t io n  with the  
German war e f f o r t  and i t s  independent work w ith in  the  S ov ie t  Ukrainian 
p o p u la t io n - - a re  examined in  th e  fo llow ing c h ap te rs .  I t  i s  im p o r tan t , 
however, to  examine th e  OUN's cap ac ity  fo r  independent a c t i v i t y  in  
Sovie t Ukraine a t  t h i s  ju n c tu re .  Severa l f e a tu re s  s tan d  out in  such 
an assessm ent.
F i r s t ,  the  OUN was e s s e n t i a l l y  a p roduct o f  P o lish  s o c ia l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  c o n d i t io n s .  I t  was w ithout any experience  o f  S ov ie t 
r e a l i t y ,  having no t even made a d e ta i le d  study o f  the  cond itions  o f  
Sov ie t  l i f e ,  i t s  i n s t i t u t i o n s  or of the h i s t o r i c a l  experience  of 
the  Sov ie t  Ukrainian masses s in ce  the  re v o lu t io n a ry  p e r io d .  Perhaps 
the  most s e r io u s  d e f ic ien c y  o f the  o rg a n is a t io n  in  t h i s  re sp e c t  was
^^Gerald R e i t l in g e r ,  The House B u il t  on Sand: The C o n f l ic ts
o f  German P o licy  in  Russia  (London, 1960), p . 164. ”
^^Mirchuk, Narys I s t o r i y i  OUN, pp. 530-31.
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i t s  i n a b i l i t y  to  c a r ry  out work amongst p r o l e t a r i a n s .  The OUN 
membership remained la r g e ly  s tu d en t  and middle c l a s s .  Whatever 
p easan ts  e x i s t e d  in  i t s  ranks were no t p o l i t i c a l l y  t r a in e d  le a d e rs ,  
bu t mere rank and f i l e  members. Consequently, th e  o rg a n is a t io n  had 
come to  unders tand  i t s  ro le  as t h a t  o f  a v an g u ard is t  fo rc e ,  s ep a ra ted  
from the mass o f  the  p o p u la t io n  i t  p ro fessed  to  le ad ,  w ith  no 
organ ic  l in k s  w ith  a mass b ase .
The i r r a t i o n a l i s t  b a s is  o f  n a t i o n a l i s t  p o l i t i c s ,  i t s  avers ion  
to  lo g ic ,  sc ien ce  and knowledge and i t s  r e l i a n c e  upon such no tions 
as w i l l ,  s p i r i t  and extreme in d iv id u a lism  made i t  even le ss  p repared  to  
handle th e  new s i t u a t i o n  where i t  would be expected  to  in tro d u ce  
i t s e l f  to  com pletely  new s o c i e t i e s .  The programme o f  1929, th e  so le  
d e c la ra t io n  o f  aims produced by the OUN in  ten  years  of a c t i v i t y ,  
with i t s  a u th o r i t a r i a n  c h a ra c te r  and h ig h ly  o b je c t io n a b le  ( to  workers 
and p easan ts )  i n d u s t r i a l  and a g ra r ia n  p o l i c i e s  se rved  l i t t l e  purpose , 
except to  i d e n t i f y  i t  with the  Nazis and t h e i r  crusade a g a in s t  the  
Sov ie t  Union.
The outbreak of war s p e l t  doom f o r  a l l  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s  whose a c t i v i t y  depended upon l e g a l i t y  and s o c ia l  peace.
The OUN was v i r t u a l l y  the  only p o l i t i c a l  fo rce  in  Western Ukraine 
to  e n te r  the  war s i t u a t i o n  i n t a c t .  I t s  p r a c t i c e  o f  consp iracy  
was th e  most im portan t a s s e t  ensu r ing  su rv iv a l  in  the  forthcoming 
p e r io d  o f  s o c ia l  upheavals and m i l i t a r y  c o n f l i c t .  With the 
c o l la p se  o f  th e  P o l ish  government, the  UNDO, the  s o c ia l  democrats 
and o th e r  le g a l  p a r t i e s  d isappeared  v i r t u a l l y  o v e rn ig h t .
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CHAPTER I I
GERMAN PERSPECTIVES IN THE EAST 
AND THE OUN
The h o s t i l i t y  o f  N ational S o c i a l i s t  d o c tr in e  towards the 
Sovie t Union cannot be regarded  as the  main reason fo r  the  outbreak 
o f  th e  German-Soviet c o n f l i c t  in  1941. Economic m otives, to  which 
the  id e o lo g ic a l  r a t io n a le  of Nazi leade rsh ip  was h a rn essed , p layed  
a key r o le .  The e s tab lish m en t of the  German economy on a war 
fo o tin g  in  th e  l a t t e r  h a l f  of the  1930*s and i t s  sim ultaneous i n a b i l i t y  
to  expand w ithou t new markets and raw m a te r ia ls  was a b a s ic  o b je c t iv e  
p rocess  t h a t  German diplomacy in  the  immediate prewar p e r io d  sought 
to  s a t i s f y  by the  annexation o f  the Sudetenland, and l a t e r  in  the  
invasion  of Poland. Once the  b a r r i e r  which d iv ided  Germany and the  
S ov ie t Union had been broken by the capture  of Poland by the  former 
and th e  annexation o f  Western Ukrainian t e r r i t o r i e s  by th e  l a t t e r ,  
Germany’s ambitions tu rned  to  the  S ov ie t Union. The S o v ie t  Union 
attem pted  to  s ta y  out o f  the  War during the  f i r s t  two years  by 
responding d i l i g e n t l y  to  German economic needs, a t  the  same time 
hoping t h a t  t h i s  would no t s t re n g th en  Germany’s confidence in  
opening up an e a s te rn  war f r o n t  a g a in s t  h e r  own t e r r i t o r i e s . ^  A 
se r io u s  m is c a lc u la t io n  by the  S ov ie t Union on th i s  i s su e  and the  
concurren t worsening o f d ip lom atic  r e l a t io n s  between th e  two powers
^R. J .  Sontag and J .  S. Beddie, N azi-Sovie t R e la tions  1939-41; 
Documents from the Archives o f  the  German Foreign I T f f iœ  (Department^ 
o f  S ta te ,  USA, 1948), pp. 83-85, 89, 334.
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over Germany's in t e r v e n t io n  in  th e  Balkans and Rumania in  1940 paved
the  way f o r  th e  German a t ta c k  in  June 1941.
Looking to  th e  E a s t ,  Nazi lead e rs  regarded  Ukraine as a
p o t e n t i a l l y  u s e fu l  p iv o t  o f  i n t e r n a t io n a l  power combinations fo r
them selves , o r  any o th e r  s t a t e  which d e s ire d  to  e x p lo i t  i t s  p o t e n t i a l .
Already in  1927, A lfred  RosenhS&g, a fu tu re  lead ing  p o l ic y  maker fo r
the  Third  Reich in  the  e a s te rn  t e r r i t o r i e s  wrote:
Germany's a t t e n t i o n  with regard  to  the  E as te rn  
q u es t io n  must tu rn  in  ano ther d i r e c t io n ;  i t  
must take  in to  account the  s tro n g  s e p a r a t i s t  
movement in  th e  Ukraine and the  C a u c u s u s . 2
The co n tac ts  between th e  OUN and th e  German in t e l l i g e n c e
s e rv ic e  in  th e  1930's  were designed by Germany to  be made p r a c t i c a l l y
u se fu l  in  th e  even t o f  Germany's expansion, e i t h e r  m i l i t a r i l y  o r
p o l i t i c a l l y  in to  the  E as t .  They were considered  sm all change in
in t e r n a t io n a l  p o l i t i c s ,  bu t of p o t e n t i a l  s h o r t  term use in  s p e c i f i c
s i t u a t i o n s .  German in t e l l i g e n c e  viewed c o l la b o ra t io n  w ith  the
Ukrainian n a t i o n a l i s t s  in  a co ld  and s t r i c t l y  c a lc u la te d  manner. I t
spoke of a fu tu re  ' a l l i a n c e  o f  Germany w ith the  Ukraine, the  Volga
Basin, Georgia . . . bu t no t as equal p a r tn e r s ;  i t  w i l l  be an a l l i a n c e
o f  v a ssa l  s t a t e s ,  w ith  no army, no s e p a ra te  p o l ic y ,  no s ep a ra te
economy'. The n a tu re  o f  such a r e la t io n s h ip  between the  U krainian
n a t i o n a l i s t s  and Germany was ev iden t in  th e  C arpath ian  Ukraine
a f f a i r  in  January , 1939. At th i s  time the  OUN ap p aren tly  d id  not
unders tand  the  a t t i t u d e  o f  Nazi Germany towards i t .
The German High Command was d iv ided  on how p r e c i s e ly  to
approach th e  U krain ian  q u es t io n  on the  eve o f  the  War, although i t
2 6A lfred  Rosenbi/rg, Pe r  Zukunftswegeiner deutschen A ussenpo lit ik  
(Munich, 1927), pp. 93, 97.
3
D a ll in ,  German Rule in  R ussia , p . 50.
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unanimously agreed  to  the  c l e a r ly  unequal r e l a t i o n s h ip  between 
Germany and minor p o l i t i c a l  p a r tn e r s .  At the  ro o t  o f  t h i s  d iv is io n ,  
a d i f f e r e n c e  e s s e n t i a l l y  in  t a c t i c s ,  lay  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  th e  knowledge 
and experience  o f  Nazi leaders  on th e  E as tern  q u e s t io n .  For some, 
the  USSR appeared as a uniform, u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  mass o f  ig n o ran t 
Russian p e asa n ts ;  f o r  o th e r s ,  th e  S ov ie t  Union was f u l l  o f  c o n tra ­
d ic t io n s ,  both  n a t io n a l  and s o c i a l ,  which could be e x p lo i te d  s u c c e s s fu l ly  
i f  they were f i r s t  understood .
A lfred  RosenbJIrg had l iv ed  in  L i th u an ia  be fo re  i t  became 
p a r t  o f the  S ovie t Union and understood the complexity o f  n a t io n a l  
and s o c ia l  d i f f e r e n c e s  amongst the  S la v ic  peo p les .  He th e re fo re  
developed h is  p e rs p e c t iv e  of Nazi ru le  in  th e  E ast as one which 
would u t i l i s e  th e se  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  i t s  a p p l ic a t io n .  Rosenburg 
envisaged a p o l ic y  o f  ' t h e  fu r th e ran c e  o f  n a t io n a l  d i s t in c t iv e n e s s  
(Eigenleben) up to  the  p o s s ib le  e s tab lish m en t o f  a s e p a ra te  s t a t e  
w ith  the  aim o f  always keeping Moscow in  check (by th e  Ukraine)
4
a lone , o r  in  an a l l i a n c e  w ith  the  Don reg ion  and th e  C aucusus '.  This
t h e s i s  a p p lied  s p e c i f i c a l l y  to  the  Ukrainian q u e s t io n ,  th e  'sym biosis
o f  Western U krainian n a t io n a l ism  a sp ir in g  to  the  c r e a t io n  o f  a
s t a t e  . . . and German i n t e r e s t s  which would s e t  up a Ukraine depen-
5dent on the  German p ro p ' was a t  f i r s t  pu t forward r a t h e r  cau t io u s ly  
by Rosenburg.
J u s t  b e fo re  the  outbreak of the  German-Soviet war, however, 
in  the  s p r in g  o f 1941, U krain ian  m i l i t a r y  u n i t s  were s e t  up by the  
Wehrmacht. The leg ion  N a c h t ig a l l  was made up of German o f f i c e r s
^ I b i d . ,  p . 52. 
^ I b i d . ,  p . 111.
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and Ukrainian s o ld i e r s .  U krainian o f f i c e r s  t r a in e d  by th e  Wehrmacht 
were a lso  added. The o th e r ,  leg ion  Roland, was formed from Ukrainian 
v o lu n tee rs  in  A u s t r ia ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r  those  belonging to  the  lo ca l  
OUN fa c t io n  th e re .  Both u n i t s  had been e s ta b l i s h e d  a f t e r  ex ten s iv e  
d iscu ss io n s  between the  Bandera f a c t io n  lead e rsh ip  and the  Wehrmacht.^ 
In ad d i t io n  to  t h i s  co -o p e ra t io n  between th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  and the  
German command b e fo re  the  outbreak o f war, the  OUN prov ided  personnel 
to be t r a in e d  as i n s t r u c to r s  fo r  fu tu re  Ukrainian p o l ic e  u n i t s  in  
occupied t e r r i t o r i e s .  OUN-M members served as t r a n s l a t o r s  fo r  the
7
Wehrmacht as the  armies c rossed  Ukraine.
Rosenberg, as Reich M in is te r  o f  Occupied E as te rn  T e r r i t o r i e s
had formal a u th o r i ty  in  s e t t i n g  p o l ic y  fo r  the  Ukraine, bu t  was no t
powerful enough to  en force  i t .  E rich  Koch, as G a u le i te r  of
Reichkommissariat Ukraine was able to  e s t a b l i s h  h is  own p o l i c i e s
once power passed  to  the  c i v i l i a n  a d m in is tra t io n  from the  Wehrmacht.
These p o l i c i e s  l im i te d  Ukrainian c u l tu r a l  l i f e  and the  work o f the
n a t i o n a l i s t s  in  the a d m in is tra t io n s  of occupied t e r r i t o r i e s  and was
a lso  aimed a t  d e s tro y in g , in  a more b r u ta l  and d i r e c t  manner, the
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  o f  the  U krainians and Poles th e re .  Erich  Koch's
a t t i t u d e  towards the  Ukrainians and the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  in  p a r t i c u l a r ,
e
was c l e a r ly  d i f f e r e n t  from Rosenberg 's prewar p ro je c t io n s  and from 
aspec ts  o f  the  Wehrmacht' s dea lings  with the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  during the 
German advance in to  U krainian t e r r i t o r i e s .  Koch's views were supported 
by Himmler as w e l l ,  whose Einsatzgruppen ( ta sk  fo rce s )  were assigned  
to  p a c i f i c a t i o n  work in  the  Ukraine.
J a r o s la v  S t e t s 'k o ,  'The Truth About the  Events in  Lviv,
Western Ukraine in  June and J u ly ,  1941 ',  Ukrainian  Review, no. 3, 1963, 
pp. 62-70.
. Hulyak, 'Polk  im, Kholodnoho Yaru v Rivnomu', V is t i  
B ra ts tv a  k o l .  Voyakiv 1 UP UNA, August-September, 1952, p . 7.
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The U krain ian  n a t i o n a l i s t s  found in  Rosenburg and th e  Wehrmacht 
t h e i r  most sym pathetic  a l l i e s ,  the  former viewing co -o p e ra t io n  between 
the  German command and the  OUN as the  b a s is  fo r  a long term s t r a te g y  
o f  keeping Russia  in  check by a n a t i o n a l i s t ,  pro-German co u n te r­
weight in  Ukraine and e lsew here , and the  l a t t e r  f in d in g  the 
n a t i o n a l i s t s  u s e fu l  immediately in  the  course of the  a t ta c k  on the  
Sov ie t  Union in  1941. Once Rosenburg had been checked by Koch’s 
power in s id e  U kraine, and the  Wehrmacht handed over a d m in is t ra t iv e  
powers to  th e  Rei chk ommi s s a r i  a t  and Himmler's p o l ic e ,  th e  OUN’s 
hopes o f  secu ring  g r e a te r  in f lu en ce  w ith  the  occupant fo rces  
d im inished . The OUN-M and th e  U krainian C en tra l  Committee, an agency 
of U krain ian  q u is l in g s  o p e ra t in g  in  G a l ic ia  during  the  War s t a f f e d  
by Mel’nyk su p p o rte rs  in c re a se d  t h e i r  ba rga in ing  power only in  1943 
when the  impending d e fe a t  o f  the  Nazis moved the  German command to  
o rgan ise  D iv is ion  G a l i c i a . This s u b je c t  i s  d e a l t  w ith  f u r th e r  in  
th i s  paper .
The D iv is ion  o f  Poland
The German armies c rossed  Poland in  th re e  weeks . By 
September 22, 1939 they were a t  the  S an -V is tu la  l i n e ,  a f t e r  having 
s o r t i e d  deeper in to  Western Ukraine and then  re tu rn e d  to  t h i s  p o s i t io n .  
At the head o f the  German advance. Colonel Sushko, a member o f  the 
OUN and a Mel’nyk adherent led  a column of s ix  hundred U krainian 
s o ld i e r s .  Sushko and h i s  fo rces  ac ted  as a l i a i s o n  between th e  
German command and the  Western U kra in ians. L a ter  he was to  serve  as
Q
W olf-D ie tr ich  Heike, U kray ins’ka Dyviziya ’Halychyna’ , 
t r a n s . Roman Kolisnyk (Toronto, 1970), p . 17.
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a h igh  ranking OUN o f f i c i a l  in  G a l ic ia  fo r  the  Mel'nyk f a c t io n .^
The Red Army occupied a l l  o f  Western Ukraine up to  the  San- 
V is tu la  l in e  and a c i v i l i a n  a d m in is tra t io n  began to  be e s ta b l i s h e d  by 
incoming S o v ie t  a u t h o r i t i e s .  On November 1, 1939, the  t e r r i t o r y  was 
in co rp o ra ted  in to  the  U krainian SSR by law in  the  Supreme S o v ie t .
Land was n a t io n a l i s e d —45% of land not belonging to  peasan ts  was 
handed over to  the  la n d le s s ,  thereby e x p ro p r ia t in g  la rg e  landowners 
and th e  Church h o ld in g s .  In d u s try  came under government c o n t ro l ,  in  
some cases th i s  r e q u ir in g  the  e x p ro p r ia t io n  o f  fo re ig n  ownership.
The Drohobych o i l  w e l ls ,  where 53% of in v es ted  c a p i t a l  was French 
c o n tro l le d  re v e r te d  to  Sovie t o w n e r s h i p . T h e s e  measures 
i n i t i a t e d  the  f i r s t  two y ea r  occupation of the  t e r r i t o r i e s  by the  
Sov ie t  regime up to  the  outbreak o f  the  German-Soviet war in  June,
1941.
This p e r io d  i s  the  l e a s t  documented as f a r  as U krainian 
n a t i o n a l i s t  a c t i v i t y  i s  concerned. Milena R udnyts 'ka , an in h a b i ta n t  
of Lviv had provided a c o l l e c t io n  of impressions by Lvovians, who 
w itnessed  the  occupation which was pub lished  in  New York in  1958 
under he r  e d i t o r s h i p . Apar t  from observations  concerning general 
a t t i t u d e s  in  Lviv a t  the  tim e, the  c o l le c t io n  o f f e r s  l i t t l e  in fo rm ation  
of va lue . M. Prokop 's  Ukrayina i  U krayins’ka P o l i ty k a  Moskvy notes  
t h a t  the  OUN’s main o b je c t iv e  was to  p ro te c t  i t s  membership and await 
an o p portun ity  fo r  open mass r e v o l t .  The only p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  th a t  
the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  c a r r ie d  out during th e  occupation was to  discourage
74.
10
^Kubiovyc, gen. e d . ,  Ukraine Concise Encyclopaedia , pp. 871-
I b i d . ,  pp. 832-33.
Milena R 
(New York, 1958) ,
^^ udnyts’ka, Zakhidna Ukrayina Pid Bol’shevykamy
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a p p l ic a t io n  by p easan ts  to  c o l l e c t iv e  farms and by th e  youth to  
12the  Komsomol.
The gen era l  mood in  Western Ukraine in  September 1939 had
been pro-German. A g re a t  p a r t  o f  the  popu la t io n  had hoped th a t  the
German armies would advance in to  Western Ukraine and occupy the
13t e r r i t o r y  r a t h e r  than  leav ing  i t  to  the  Red Army. A sm all number
o f Ukrainians (sm all indeed , given the  f a c t  t h a t  th e  CPWU had been
d is so lv ed  two years  e a r l i e r )  awaited Sovie t power. The pro-German
a t t i t u d e  by much o f the  p o p u la t io n  was, however, tempered by
t im id i ty  and ex p ec ta n cy - - th e re  was no r e v o l t  a g a in s t  th e  Red Army as
th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  may have expected .
One o f  the  more s t r i k i n g  aspec ts  o f  the  f i r s t  Sov ie t  occupation
had to  do w ith  the  meeting o f  two d i s t i n c t  c u l tu re s  in  th e  towns and
c i t i e s .  Most U k ra in ian s ,  aw aiting  the  appearance o f  t h e i r
' l i b e r a t o r s '  w ith  a good deal o f  c u r io s i t y ,  were s u rp r i s e d  to  observe
how d i f f e r e n t  th e se  'o t h e r '  U krainians from S ov ie t  Ukraine r e a l l y
were. The Red Army s o ld ie r s  and the  wives and fa m il ie s  o f  p a r ty
o f f i c i a l s  were 'd i f f e r e n t  p eo p le ,  with d i f f e r e n t  appearances ,
14d i f f e r e n t  manners and s o u l s ' :
Lvovians remember w ell those  unusual days 
and unders tand  th e  g re a t  demand then fo r  s u i tc a s e s  
which l a t e r  d isappeared  a l to g e th e r .  "R ich ' 
b u y e rs ,  to  the  amazement o f  a l l  custom ers, took 
immediately and w ithout warning, ten  to  twenty 
p a i r s  o f  ny lons , f iv e  p a i r s  o f  shoes , s u i t s  — 
and no t only one ap iece .  They u su a l ly  p a id  
w ithou t b a r t e r in g ,  paying double, t r i p l e  or 
more in  comparison to  pre-w ar p r ic e s  . . .
12 Prokop, Ukrayina i  P o l i ty k a  Moskvy, p . 145
13Rudnyts' ka, Zakhidna Ukrayina, p . 16. 
^ ^ I b id . ,  p . 19.
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The f i r s t  meeting w ith  Europe, tak in g  p lace  in  
Western Ukraine a f t e r  many years  o f  i s o l a t i o n
opened th e  eyes o f  S ov ie t  people  and c re a te d  a
sym pathetic  foundation  fo r  t h e i r  c r i t i c a l  
t h in k in g .15
While the  s o ld ie r s  and o f f i c i a l s  who e n te re d  Western Ukraine
were amazed a t  th e  r e l a t i v e  abundance o f  goods in  Lviv s to re s  and
the  decided ly  European c h a ra c te r  o f  the  c i t y  and i t s  i n h a b i t a n t s ,
th i s  d id  no t d e te r  them from proceeding with the  a d m in is t ra t iv e
and p o l i t i c a l  ta sk s  fo r  which they were r e s p o n s ib le .  And th e  Western
U kra in ians , as much as the  appearance o f  S ov ie t U krainians c rea ted
an im pression  o f fo re ig n  r u le  fo r  them, do not seem to  have opposed
th e  c o n so l id a t io n  of S ov ie t  r u le  in  the  f i r s t  y e a r  to  any n o t ic e a b le
e x te n t .  In f a c t  i t  was almost the  opposite  case . The v o tin g  which
preceded the  formal e n t ry  of t h i s  t e r r i t o r y  in to  the  USSR proceeded
smoothly. By a l l  accoun ts ,  both  n a t i o n a l i s t  and S o v ie t ,  the  tu rn o u t
fo r  the  e le c t io n s  f o r  a s in g le  l i s t  o f  cand idates  was huge.^^ The
v o ting  was accompanied by no coerc ive  m easures. The OUN d id  no t even
attem pt to  c a l l  f o r  a bo y co tt  o f  th ese  p rocedures .
The main ta sk  o f  th e  new o f f i c i a l  a d m in is t ra t io n  was to
e s t a b l i s h  the  lo c a l  p a r ty  o rg a n is a t io n s  and the  s t a t e  and economic
a p p ara tu se s .  Khrushchev no tes  in  h is  memoirs t h a t  th e  d i s t r i c t
p a r ty  committees were made up la rg e ly  o f  lo ca l  p e rso n n e l ,  w hile  the
re g io n a l  committees and o th e r  h ig h e r  bodies were s t a f f e d  by p a r ty
17o f f i c i a l s  and te c h n ic ia n s  brought in  from th e  S ov ie t  Union.
The absence o f  a s tro n g  communist t r a d i t i o n  in  th e  coun try ­
s id e  proved to  be a h inderance  to  S ov ie t  e f f o r t s  to  c o l l e c t i v i s e
l ^ I b i d . ,  p . 43.
^^See I s t o r i y a  U kray ins 'koy i RSR (Kiev, 1967), p. 451; and 
R udnyts 'ka , Zakhidna Ukrayina, p. 55.
17E. Crankshaw, e d . ,  jChrushchev Remembers (London, 1971),
p . 126.
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a g r ic u l tu r e  in  1940. The New York Times rep o r te d  on January  17,
1940 ( r e f e r r in g  to  the  occupation in  1939), t h a t  'a s  soon as th e
re p o r t  sp read  t h a t  the  Red Army had c rossed  th e  r i v e r  Zbrucz, the
p easan ts  began to  share  out amongst themselves the  la n d lo rd s '  a c re s .
Land was given f i r s t  to  sm all h o lders  and in  t h i s  way about 30% of
18a g r i c u l t u r a l  land was e x p r o p r ia te d ' .  This i s  supported  by Stepan
Mazur in  h i s  book Koly Bahryanily S v itan k y , who a t t r i b u t e s  an
im portan t ro le  to  th e  Western U krainian p easan try  in  th e  e x p ro p r ia t io n
19of land in  September, 1939, What happened to  the  p easan t  committees
which sprang up to  d i s t r i b u t e  land e q u i ta b ly  b e fo re  th e  Red Army
a r r iv e d  i s ,  however u n c le a r .  T ro tsky , in  h is  debates  w ith  American
communists in  1940 a s s e r t s  t h a t  th ese  peasan t committees were qu ick ly
suppressed  by the  incoming a d m in is tra t io n  because they  c o n s t i tu te d
an independent r a d i c a l  fo rce  capable o f  u p s e t t in g  th e  b u re a u c ra t ic
20in te n t io n s  o f the  imported o f f i c i a l s .  Mazur, l ik e  o th e r  t r a d i t i o n a l
S ov ie t h i s to r i a n s  claims th a t  such committees were in te g r a te d  in to
21the  a d m in is t ra t iv e  s t r u c t u r e .
Prokop 's  account o f  land d i s t r i b u t i o n  approaches th e  is su e
from an e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  p e r s p e c t iv e .  I t  i s  c h a r a c te r i s e d  by the
way in  which i t  h ig h l ig h ts  what the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  b e l ie v e d  to  be the
most n eg a tiv e  a spec ts  o f  land r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  f o r  t h e i r  s t r u g g le .
For Prokop, th e  p ro g re s s iv e  c h a ra c te r  of these  measures i s  h eav i ly
outweighed by the  f a c t  t h a t  e x p ro p r ia t io n  fomented q u a r re ls  between
the  r i c h  Ukrainian  landho lder and the  land less  who took away h is  
22p ro p e r ty .  The he ig h ten in g  o f  c la s s  antagonisms undermined the
18Quoted in  Leon T ro tsky , In Defense o f  Marxism (London, 1971),
p . 166.
19Stepan Mazur, Koly Bahryanily  Svitanky (Lviv, 1970), pp. 10-11 
20T ro tsky , In Defense o f  Marxism, p. 165.
21Mazur, Koly Bahryanily  S v itanky , pp. 10-11.
22 Prokop, Ukrayin& i  P o l i ty k a  Moskvy, p . 116.
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'n a t i o n a l '  u n i ty  o f  the  OUN's s t r u g g le .  Moreover, th e  land r e d i s ­
t r i b u t i o n ,  Prokop contends, was in tended  to  delude the  p easan try  
in to  sup p o rt in g  th e  new regime and to  disarm them in  th e  face of 
coming c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n  measures.
The S ov ie t  a d m in is t ra t io n  began to  in tro d u ce  c o l l e c t iv e s  in
1940. O pposition to  th ese  farm o rg a n isa t io n s  e x is t e d  in  Western
Ukraine w ell be fo re  t h i s  p e r io d - - th e  p easan try  fea red  a r e p e t i t i o n
of the  1931 even ts  in  S ovie t Ukraine. The e x is ten c e  o f  such
o p p o s it io n  and fe a rs  i s  no t only confirmed by n a t i o n a l i s t  accounts
23of the  p e r io d ,  b u t  a lso  by S ovie t w r i t e r s .
C er ta in  measures t h a t  were in troduced  in  th e  i n i t i a l  p e r io d  
o f  l i b e r a l i s a t i o n ,  such as the  in t ro d u c t io n  of th e  U krain ian  
language in to  th e  school system, were complemented by a general 
t ig h te n in g  up o f  s e c u r i ty  and o rd e r  in  1940, The S o v ie t  s e c u r i ty  
p o l ic e  began to  round up p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i s t s  whom they suspec ted  
o f  o p p o s i t io n a l  a c t i v i t y .  The t r i a l  o f  'The F i f ty  Nine* in  Lviv in  
the  f i r s t  h a l f  of 1940 marked the  beginning  of a campaign a g a in s t  the  
OUN in  Western Ukraine. The U krainian Red Army d iv is io n s  s ta t io n e d  
on th e  t e r r i t o r y  were rep laced  w ith Asian troops in  o rd e r  to  curb 
the  in f lu en c es  t h a t  f r a t e r n i s a t i o n  with th e  lo c a l  p o p u la t io n  had 
b rought.
The OUN, w hile  ap p aren tly  in a c t iv e  in  the  S ov ie t  occupied 
t e r r i t o r y ,  where th e  m a jo r i ty  of i t s  membership r e s id e d  be fo re  the  
German in v as io n  o f  Poland, was p rep a r in g  fo r  fu tu r e  developments and 
a lready  c o n so l id a t in g  i t s  bases in  German c o n t ro l le d  t e r r i t o r i e s .
O rz
V asyl ' Lozovy, V Dolyni S trypu [Kiev, 1951), p . 11 
^^Armstrong, Ukrainian N ationalism , pp. 67-69.
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The small pockets  o f  Ukrainian t e r r i t o r y  l e f t  in  German c o n t ro l le d
Poland, the  Kholm and Lemko regions^ were allowed a measure o f  s e l f
ru le  a t  the  lo c a l  l e v e l ,  in c lu d in g  the form ation of U krainian p o l ic e
u n i t s .  The Mel'nyk and Bandera fa c t io n s  played an im portan t ro le
in  the  e s tab lish m en t o f  these  i n s t i t u t i o n s  through which, in  r e a l i t y ,
Nazi p o l ic y  was to  be t r a n s m it te d .  A w elfa re  and a id  s o c ie ty ,  th e
U krainian C en tra l  Committee [Ukrainskyj T sen tra l. 'ny j Kom itetl under
the le ad e rsh ip  o f  V. Kubiovyc, a noted geographer and M el'nyk su p p o rte r
25was e s ta b l i s h e d  with the  perm ission  of the  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Although 
i t s  func tions  appeared, on a s u p e r f i c i a l  l e v e l ,  to  be n o n - p o l i t i c a l ,  
th e  Ukrainian C en tra l  Committee, l ik e  the  p o l ic e  u n i t s ,  were t r a n s ­
m ission channels o f  German r u le .  This was made s t r i k i n g l y  c l e a r  in  
1943 in  the  C en tra l  Committee's ta sk s  in  r e c r u i t in g  Ukrainians to  
D iv is ion  G a l ic ia .
In December 1940, the  OUN is su ed  i t s  f i r s t  W ar-time m an ifes to .
The e n t i r e  t e x t  i s  devoted to  an a t ta c k  on the  S ov ie t Union and
i t s  occupation  o f  Western Ukraine. No mention i s  made in  the  m anifesto
27o f  Nazi Germany, the  o th e r  occupant in  E as te rn  Europe.
The p o l i t i c a l  choice of co -opera t ion  with Nazi Germany became c le a r e r
in  A p ri l  1941 a t  th e  Second Great Gathering o f  the  OUN Bandera
su p p o rte rs  in  Cracow. In the  d e c la ra t io n  is su e d  by the  G athering ,
th e  OUN-B thus defined  i t s  a t t i t u d e  towards Nazi Germany:
The OUN s tands  a t  the  head o f  those U krain ian
re v o lu t io n a ry  c u r r e n ts ,  and co -opera tes  w ith  those
re v o lu t io n a ry  movements oppressed by Moscow,
and with those  s t a t e s  whose aim i t  i s  to
completely d e s tro y  the  USSR (our emphasis) .  The
OUN considers  a l l  s t a t e s ,  p o l i t i c a l  groupings and fo rces
25 D a l l in ,  German Rule in  R u ss ia , p . 118. The Committee was 
form ally  e s ta b l i s h e d  in  A p r i l ,  1942,
^^Heike, U kray ins 'ka  Dyviziya 'Halychyna' ,  p .  17.
2 7 OUN v S v i t l i  Postanov, pp. 21-23.
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who are  i n t e r e s t e d  in  th e  f a l l  o f  the
USSR, who lean  in  the  d i r e c t io n  o f  a Ukraine
independent o f  a l l ,  as th e  f r ie n d s  o f  Ukraine.
The r e l a t i o n s  o f  the  OUN w ith  s t a t e s  and 
p o l i t i c a l  movements a re  determined p r im a r i ly  by 
t h e i r  anti-Moscow p o s i t i o n ,  and no t  by t h e i r  
r e l a t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  sympathy w ith  th e  U krain ian  
n a t io n a l  movement,28
F u r th e r  d e c la ra t io n s  a g a in s t  th e  'Moscow occupation  of
Western Ukraine, Bukovinia and B essa rab ia ' and the  c a l l  f o r  ' a
re v o lu t io n a ry  s t ru g g le  w ith the  o ccupan ts ’ made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  the
n a t i o n a l i s t s  saw t h e i r  a l l y  a g a in s t  the  Soviet Union to  be Germany,
and t h a t  the  l a t t e r  was by no means to  be considered  an ' occupant'
as w e l l .  In th e  programme c a l l i n g  f o r  an independent U krain ian
s t a t e ,  s t r e s s  was given to  the  need f o r  's t r o n g  r u l e ,  a s tro n g
29n a t io n a l  army and one lead ing  p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n ' .
The 1941 Great Gathering was the  scene o f  the  Bandera-Mel'nyk
f a c t io n a l  s t ru g g le  coming to  a r e s o lu t io n .  This meeting had by
i t s  very occurrence in d ic a te d  th e  Bandera g roup 's  unw ill ingness  to
accep t M el 'nyk 's  le a d e r s h ip .  By naming i t  the  Second Great G athering ,
the  OUN-B thereby  r e g i s t e r e d  i t s  n o n -reco g n it io n  of the  1939
Second Great Gathering which was h e ld  in  Rome a t  which Mel'nyk was
confirmed as le a d e r .  There, S t e t s ’ko, to  become B andera 's  c lose
a s s o c ia te  in  1941 had sworn a l le g ia n c e  to  M el'nyk. In Cracow the
OUN-B, d e c la r in g  Mel'nyk to  be ' a p e t i t  bourgeois renegade ' and a bad
le a d e r ,  'e x p e l le d '  him from the  o rg a n isa t io n  and urged h i s  fo llow ers
30to  come over to  th e  Bandera camp.
M el'nyk 's  'e x p u ls io n '  by the  OUN-B merely se rv ed  to  in d ic a te  
to  the  e n t i r e  membership t h a t  the  d i f f e r e n c e s  between th e  two
2 8 I b i d . ,  pp. 31-32. See a lso  U kray ins 'ka  RSR, p .  283.
20 OUN V S v i t l i  Postanov. p .  28.
30 I b i d . ,  pp. 45-47. M el'nyk, however, con tinued  to  lead  a 
s iz e a b le  f a c t io n ,  now e n t i r e l y  s ep a ra te d  from Bandera 's  OUN.
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le ad e rs  were now i r r e c o n c i l a b l e .  The a c tu a l  s t ru g g le  f o r  le a d e r ­
sh ip  had been in  p ro g re s s  fo r  one y ea r .  Bandera, who was extremely 
popu la r  in  Western Ukraine fo r  h is  conduct a t  the  t r i a l  o f  
n a t i o n a l i s t s  accused o f  p l o t t i n g  M in is te r  of the  I n t e r i o r  P i e r a c k i 's  
a s s a s s in a t io n  in  1934 had spent f iv e  years in  p r iso n  b e fo re  being 
re le a se d  by the  Germans in  September, 1939. By th a t  tim e, Mel’nyk 
was recognised  as le ad e r  of the  OUN Provid in  Western Europe, 
a l le g e d ly  on Konovalets*' i n s t r u c t io n s  before  he d ied .  Upon Bandera 's 
r e l e a s e ,  the  antagonisms between th e  Provid and th e  Western 
U krainian n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  which had been smoldering throughout the  
1930's came to  the  fo re .
In th e  1930's  these  antagonisms were a t t r i b u t a b l e  to  the  
gen era t io n  gap between the Western U krainian n a t i o n a l i s t s  and the  
P rov id , th e  former co n s id e rin g  themselves to  be worthy o f s e l f - r u l e  
because they took most of the  r i s k s ,  and the l a t t e r  viewing the  
Western U krainians as too immature and im p a tien t  to  produce l e v e l ­
headed le ad e rs  fo r  them selves. K o n o v a le ts ' '  a u th o r i ty  and h is  
recognised  t i e s  w ith  the  1917-21 p e r io d  where he had served  as a 
le ad e r  of the  Sich Riflemen and l a t e r  led  h is  o f f i c e r s  in to  the  
t e r r o r i s t  underground in  Poland had kept the  o rg a n is a t io n  to g e th e r  
throughout the  t h i r t i e s .  Although Mel'nyk was a lso  once an o f f i c e r  
o f  the  Sich Riflemen and a member of the  UVO, h is  conservatism , deep 
r e l i g i o s i t y  and lack o f lead e rsh ip  q u a l i t i e s  d isap p o in ted  the  
n a t i o n a l i s t s  in  Western Ukraine, Bandera moved in  to  prov ide  an 
a l t e r n a t i v e .
Bandera 's  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  the  Provid were more p re c i s e  than the  
vague sen tim ents  o f  the  o th e r  members. He considered  th e  ProvW i l l -  
equipped to  lead  the  OUN in  r a d ic a l  a c t io n  in  th e  even t o f  war w ith  
the  Sov ie t  Union. His a l t e r n a t i v e  to  M el'nyk’s a t t i t u d e  o f  cau tion  
and 'w a i t  and see what the  Germans do' was f o r  th e  O rg an isa tio n  to
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prepare  f o r  an u p r is in g  i n  th e  S ov ie t occupied t e r r i t o r i e s  independent
31o f  German i n t e n t io n s .  Such an a c t io n ,  i f  su c c e ss fu l  in  p la c in g  the
OUN in  c o n tro l  over a reas  o f  Western Ukraine, would p la c e  them in
a b e t t e r  b a rg a in in g  p o s i t io n  w ith  th e  Germans when they  a r r iv e d .  The
Provid  urged  cau tio n  and p laced  more hopes on th e  German armies
than on the  Western U krain ian  membership. Because th e  Wehrmacht
had favoured th e  OUN-M group over Bandera 's and th e  f a c t  t h a t  many
o f  the  OUN-M were a lread y  se rv in g  in  the  Gestapo gave Mel'nyk good
reasons to  adv ise  cau tio n ;  he d id  n o t want to  je o p a rd ise  th e  gains
h is  group had a lready  made w ith the  German command o r  those  they
expected in  tak in g  over lo c a l  a d m in is t ra t io n s  in  th e  occupied
t e r r i t o r i e s .  Bandera chose to  n e g o t ia te  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  th e  Germans
from a p o s i t io n  o f  s t r e n g th  th a t  he a n t ic ip a te d  th e  OUN would secure
i f  i t  c o n t ro l le d  t e r r i t o r i e s  be fo re  the  Germans a r r iv e d .
The d i f f e r e n c e s  between the two f a c t io n s ,  which led  to  the
s p l i t  in  1941 were th e re fo re  e s s e n t i a l l y  t a c t i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e s .  The
p o l i t i c s  o f  th e  two groups were v i r t u a l l y  i d e n t i c a l .  Bandera 's
a b i l i t y  to  s p l i t  th e  o rg a n is a t io n  on th i s  i s s u e ,  and y e t  have
fundamental agreement with German p o l ic y  on is su e s  such as land and
s o c ia l  p o l ic y  in  th e  occupied t e r r i t o r i e s  i s  h ig h l ig h te d  by the
d e c is io n  taken a t  th e  Cracow meeting on th e  q u es t io n  o f  the  c o l le c t iv e
farm system;
The OUN i s  a g a in s t  th e  d e s t r u c t io n  of the 
c o l l e c t iv e s  in  the  p e r io d  o f  re v o lu t io n a ry  
u psu rg e .52
7  1
Stepan Bandera, 'V 10-mu Richnytsyu S tvorenya Revolyutsiynoho 
Provodu CUN', Surma no. 18-19, 1950, p . 5.
^^OUN v S v i t l i  Postanov, p. 34.
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The Germans upon e n te r in g  U kraine, had promised to  d isband
them. They then  found the  c o l l e c t i v e s  to  be convenient o rg a n is a t io n a l
s t r u c tu r e s  f o r  labour e x p lo i t a t i o n ,  g ra in  p ro duc tion  and c en tre s  o f
p o l ic e  a d m in is t r a t io n .  The p ious  s ta tem ents  o f  the  OUN ( in  c o n t ra s t
to  p a s t  d enuncia tions  o f  th e  c o l l e c t i v e  farm system) concerning t h e i r
i n v i o l a b i l i t y  u n t i l  a government had been formed which would disband
them ’in  an o rd e r ly  manner’ , n o t only in d ic a te d  i t s  s e l f -p e rc e iv e d
sepa ra tedness  from any p opu la r  mass movement f o r  independence,
bu t a lso  the  coincidence  between OUN aims and Nazi p o l ic y  in  the
occupied t e r r i t o r i e s .
N e ith e r  OUN f a c t io n  was f a r  removed from Nazi Germany’s
p o l ic y  on ano ther i s su e ;  th e  Jewish q u es t io n .  M el 'nyk 's  group had
made the  p r a c t i c a l  choice in  supporting  Nazi p lans  and was a n t ic ip a te d
33as a s t r i k i n g  fo rce  a g a in s t  Poles and Jews by the German command.
At the  Second Great G athering in  Cracow, the  OUN-B d ec la re d  t h a t  the
Jews c o n s t i tu t e d  a major th r e a t  to  the  a sp i r a t io n s  o f  U krainian
independence. They were p a r t  o f  the  ' Judeo-bo lshev ik  b lo c '  which
dominated the  h ig h e r  echelons of the  Communist P a r ty  and s t a t e  
34a p p a ra tu s .
Immediately a f t e r  th e  G athering , two months be fo re  the  o u t­
break  of the  German-Soviet war, the  OUN-B re le a s e d  i n s t r u c t i o n s  to  i t s  
ex p ed it io n a ry  fo rces  (Pokhidni Hrupy) who were to  i n f i l t r a t e  
the  Ukrainian SSR. The h i s to r y  o f  th ese  groups w i l l  be d e a l t  w ith  
in  th e  fo llow ing pages.
33D a l l in ,  German Rule in  R u ss ia , p . 115. 
^^OUN V S v i t l i  Postanov, p. 36.
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The Proclam ation o f June 30, 1941
On June 22, 1941, the  German armies a t ta c k e d  the  Sovie t
Union and r a p id ly  advanced in to  the  h e a r t la n d  of Ukraine. By June
30, they  were in  Lviv; in  Ju ly  and August, Kiev and Oddessa were
taken and by November a l l  o f  Ukraine, except fo r  V oroshilovgrad and
the  north  e a s te rn  p a r t  o f  the  Donbas reg ion  was in  t h e i r  hands. In
the f i r s t  hours o f  the  in v as io n ,  the  OUN organ ised  u p r is in g s  in  a
number o f  towns in  S ov ie t Western Ukraine: in  the  Sambir a rea ,
35P id h a i t s i  and Monastyrsky d i s t r i c t s .  U krainian m i l i t i a  began to
d ism antle  the  c o l l e c t iv e  farms almost immediately. N ach t ig a l l
took p a r t  in  t h i s  o f fen s iv e  by the  German armies and cap tured  Lviv.
By th i s  tim e, N a ch t ig a l l  was ab le  to  p lay  the  dual fu n c t io n  o f  f ig h t in g
on the  German s id e  and o rgan is ing  the  c i ty  f o r  Bandera 's  f a c t io n ,
as the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  had a n t ic ip a te d .^ ^
The f i r s t  in d ic a t io n s  of the  harsh  r e a l i t i e s  o f  occupant ru le
came in  the  a fte rm ath  o f  an attem pt by the  OUN-B to  p rocla im  an
independent U krainian s t a t e  on June 30, 1941 as soon as N a ch t ig a l l
had taken  the  c i t y .  In a small P ro sv i ta  h a l l ,  the  OUN-B, re p re sen ted
by Yaroslav S t e t s 'k o  proclaim ed the  independence o f Ukraine and c a l le d
fo r  the  form ation o f a new s t a t e  s t r u c tu r e .  They hoped thereby  to
p ress  the  German command with a f a i t  accompli and beg in  to
37e x t r a c t  t h e i r  d e s ired  autonomous r u l e .  The n a t i o n a l i s t s  then  went 
to  M etropo litan  S h ep ty ts 'k y  and asked fo r  the  Church 's b le s s in g  upon 
the p roc lam ation . S h e p ty ts 'k y ,  an a u th o r i t a t iv e  f ig u re  amongst
35Armstrong, Ukrainian  N ationalism , p. 76.
^ ^ I b id . ,  p . 86.
37Kubiovyc, gen. e d . , Ukraine Concise Encyclopaedia , p . 888. 
See a lso  U kray ins 'ka  RSR, p . 384.
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Western U kra in ians  agreed and is su e d  a P a s to ra l  L e t t e r . T h e  p ro ­
c lam ation and S h e p ty ts 'k y ’s b le s s in g  were then  read  over th e  r a d io .
In sm all towns throughout G a l ic ia ,  OUN-B members o rgan ised  p u b l ic  
m eetings, read  the  proclam ation  and began to  s e t  up a d m in is t ra t iv e  
bodies o f  r u le .
The German High Command did  n o t  take to  t h i s  a c t io n  favourab ly
and proceeded to  a r r e s t  S t e t s 'k o ,  Bandera and o th e r  le a d e rs  o f  the
June 30 ev en ts .  A f te r  the  a r r e s t  o f the  OUN le a d e r s ,  support fo r  th e
proc lam ation  q u ick ly  dim inished. But the  a t t i t u d e  o f  most OUN members
to  th e  Germans remained favourab le  in  s p i t e  of th e se  ev en ts .
M. L ebed ',  th e  new lead e r  o f  the  OUN-B a f t e r  Bandera 's  a r r e s t ,  had
g re a t  d i f f i c u l t y  in  convincing c e l l s  o f  the  o rg a n is a t io n  to  go
underground, because the membership d id  not b e l ie v e  th a t  the  Gestapo
would harm them. When ten s io n s  between the  OUN and the  Germans
became even g r e a t e r ,  some n a t i o n a l i s t s  l e f t  the  o rg a n is a t io n  because
39they d id  n o t  want to  f i g h t  the  occupants '.
The proc lam ation  in  Lviv was a minor event in  the  War, y e t  
i t  has been t r e a t e d  by the  OUN-B as a g lo r io u s  and im portan t 
occurrence , r i v a l l i n g  th a t  o f  the C en tra l  Rada o f 1917-18.^^
A more se r io u s  con troversy  about the  Jewish q u es t io n  surrounds the  
events  in  Lviv. Timofei S trokach , commander o f  the  Red P a r t i s a n  
movement during  the  War has w r i t t e n  th a t  the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  and
N a ch t ig a l l  a s s i s t e d  in  pogroms a g a in s t  Poles and Jews when the  c i t y  
was t a k e n . T h i s  charge is. rep ea ted  in  U kray ins 'ka  RSR u Velykiy 
Vitchyznyzniy Viyni Radyans'koho Soyuzu, where i t  is. p o in ted  out
3 8OUN v S v i t l i .  P ostanov , p . 51.
39Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, p . 62,
J a r o s la v  S t e t s 'k o ,  30 Chervnya 1941 [London, 1967). 
^^Timofei S trokach , Nash Pozyvnyy--Svoboda [Kiev, 1964},
p. 167.
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42t h a t  communists were p r in c ip a l  t a r g e t s  in  these  pogroms.
J a r o s la v  S t e t s ’ko denied charges th a t  n a t i o n a l i s t s  and 
N a ch t ig a l l  were invo lved  in  th e se  pogroms in  an a r t i c l e  w r i t t e n  
in  1963 in  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  emigre jo u rn a l  Ukrainian Review e n t i t l e d  
'The Truth About Events in  Lviv, Western Ukraine in  June and Ju ly  
1941 '.^^  In h is  response to  th ese  charges , made by Alexander D a ll in  
again in  1963, S t e t s 'k o  r e j e c t s  D a l l in 's  view o f th e se  events  by 
noting  t h a t  h is  p e rc ep t io n  i s  d i s to r t e d  by the  f a c t  t h a t  he i s  
le f t-w in g  and a Jew',
S t e t s 'k o  and o th e rs  have been quick to  p o in t  out t h a t  the  
m in is te r s  of the  newly proclaimed government were a r r e s t e d  
by the  Gestapo, The Gestapo u n i t  in  f a c t  was composed o f  OUN-M 
n a t i o n a l i s t s .  Furthermore, Lev Shankowsky, a Bandera su p p o rte r  
has w r i t t e n  t h a t  S t e t s 'k o ,  Bandera and o the rs  were deported  to  con­
c e n t r a t io n  camps immediately a f t e r  th e  June 1941 e v e n t s . I n  f a c t ,  
they  were only p laced  under house a r r e s t  and 'S t e t s 'k o  was even ab le  
to  go to  Cracow where he consu lted  w ith L e b e d ' T h e  imprisonment 
of S t e t s 'k o ,  Bandera and o th e r  leading  n a t i o n a l i s t s  came only on 
September 15, 1941.^^
The a d m in is t ra t iv e  organs o f  occupation ru le  began to  be 
s e t  up in  the  wake o f  the  m i l i t a r y  in v as io n .  One s e c t io n ,  e a s t  
o f  Kiev remained under m i l i t a r y  occupation  r u l e .  Bukovinia and 
B essarab ia  became p a r t  o f  the  Rumanian a d m in is tra t io n  ( T r a n s n i s t r i a ) ;
^^U kray ins 'ka  RSR, p . 383,
^U krainian Review, no, 3, 1963, pp. 62-70. 
44Ukrainian Review, no. 2, 1955, pp. 8-18. 
"^^Armstrong, U krainian N a tiona lism , p . 83. 
^^ loc . c i t .
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G a l ic ia ,  the  Kholm and Lemko a reas  were p a r t  o f  th e  G eneral^gouvemment; 
the  o b la s t s  o f  Volyn, Pod lach ia , Zhytorayr, Kiev, N ik o la è /
Dnepropetrovsk and T ouria  became Rei chkommi ss a r i a t  Ukraine under 
E rich  Koch.
The General^gouvernement, under O tto  Wechter was one o f  the
few p eace fu l  a reas  o f  Nazi occupation  in  E as te rn  Europe, a f a c to r
origin
which p reven ted  th e  e a r ly  a r i s e !  of h o s t i l i t i e s  between the  h
n a t i o n a l i s t s  and the  occupants t h e r e . O n  th e  o th e r  hand, the  
e a s te rn  reg ions under m i l i t a r y  government and the  Reichkommissariat 
w itnessed  savage re p re s s io n s ,  hunger and d e v a s ta t io n .  I t  was in to  
the  t e r r i t o r i e s  o f  the  Re i  chk ommi s s a r i a t  th a t  the  ex p ed i t io n a ry  fo rces  
t r a v e l l e d ,  b o th  from the  OUN-M and OUN-B in  the  wake o f  the  
German advance.
The Communist Underground and 
Red P a r t i s a n  Movement
The ra p id  advance of the  German armies across the  S ov ie t
Union in  1941 made many b e l ie v e  th a t  they would reach  Moscow in
se v e ra l  months. The i n a b i l i t y  of Sovie t fo rces  to  check th i s  advance
i s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  to  s e v e ra l  f a c to r s .  As a r e s u l t  o f  th e  purges in
1937-38, the  Red Army had l o s t  a whole g en era t io n  o f  experienced
g e n e ra ls .  They were rep laced  by c a r e e r i s t s  with l i t t l e  or
knowledge of m i l i t a r y  a f f a i r s .  As Strokach pu t i t ,  th e  h ig h e r  one
48went in  the  army command, the  worse the  le ad e rsh ip  became.
^^Heike, U kray ins 'ka  Dyviziya 'Halychyna' ,  p . 15. 
48Strokach, Nash Pozyvnyy, p . 46.
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From th e  te c h n ic a l  p o in t  o f  view, th e  Red Army was i n f e r i o r  
to  the  German fo rc e s ;  i t  had p r a c t i c a l l y  no a r t i l l e r y  t r a n s p o r t - -  
horses  ac ted  in  l i e u  of m o to r isa t io n ;  i t s  tank d iv i s io n s ,  c r u c ia l  
in  s teppe  w arfare  were ou tda ted . There was a lack o f p ro p e r  arms 
fo r  b o rd e r  s o l d i e r s ,  who, i n c id e n ta l l y ,  were p r o h ib i te d  by h ig h e r  
a u th o r i t i e s  to  f i r e  on German p lanes  which scou ted  over the  bo rder  
fo r  weeks b e fo re  the  in v as io n .
In s id e  the  country , c i t i z e n s  were no t  p repared  f o r  war; the  
Komsomol had no t been t r a in e d  in  c o n s p i r a to r i a l  work. In th e  f i r s t  
weeks o f  the  war, c i t i z e n s  o f  the  S ov ie t  Union l e a r n t  o f  the  c o n f l i c t  
when i t  was p r a c t i c a l l y  upon them.^^ Even where th e re  were able bodies 
to  defend th e  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  to  jo in  the  Red Army o r to  o rgan ise  them­
s e lv e s ,  th e  machinery o f bureaucracy  seemed incapab le  of responding 
e f f i c i e n t l y  to  such o f f e r s .  Khrushchev d esc rib es  such an occurrence 
in  Kiev as the  Nazis were approaching the  c i ty ;
The s i t u a t i o n  tu rned  very bad, mostly because 
th e re  was so l i t t l e  he lp  forthcoming from Moscow.
S h o r t ly  a f t e r  the  war s t a r t e d ,  during  the  German
advance on Kiev, th e re  was a g re a t  awakening o f
p a t r io t i s m  among the  peop le . The workers from
th e  'Lenin Forge' and o th e r  f a c to r i e s  around
Kiev came to  the  C en tra l  Committee in  droves asking fo r
r i f l e s  so t h a t  they could f i g h t  back a g a in s t
th e  in v a d e rs .  I phoned Moscow to  arrange fo r  a
shipment o f  weapons w ith  which to  arm th ese
c i t i z e n s  who wanted to  jo in  the  Front in  support
o f  Red Power, The only person  I could ge t
through to  was Malenkov.
" T e l l  me", I s a id  "where can we get r i f l e s ?  We've got 
fa c to ry  workers here  who want to  jo in  the  ranks 
o f  the  Red Army and f ig h t  the  Germans, and we d o n ' t  
have anything to  arm them w ith ."
"You'd b e t t e r  give up any thought of g e t t in g  r i f l e s
from u s .  The r i f l e s  in  the  c i v i l  defense o rg a n is a t io n
here  have a l l  been s e n t  to  Leningrad."
^ ^ I b i d . , p . 12.
^^Mazur, Koly Bahryanily  S v itanky , p . 38. The example here  
i s  o f  Drohobych, Western Ukraine.
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"Tken what a re  we supposed to  f ig h t  w ith?"
"I  d o n ' t  know—p ik e s ,  swords, homemade weapons, 
anyth ing  you can make in  your own f a c t o r i e s . "
"You mean we should f i g h t  tanks w ith  spears?"
"Y o u 'l l  have to  do th e  b e s t  you can. You can make 
f i r e  bombs out o f  b o t t l e s  o f  g aso line  or kerosene 
and throw them a t  the  tan k s" .
As i t  became ev id en t  t h a t  the  Red Army was being pushed
d e c is iv e ly  back out o f  the  Western regions o f the  Sov ie t  Union and
th a t  a p r o t r a c te d  war with the  Germans had to  be p repared  f o r ,  the
Sov ie t le ad e rsh ip  c a l l e d  fo r  the  form ation o f  p a r t i s a n  b r ig a d e s .
52S t a l i n ' s  speech, b ro ad cas t  on Ju ly  3, 1941 urg ing  the  o rg a n isa t io n
o f  d iv e rs io n a ry  u n i ts  and g u e r r i l l a  bands to  f i g h t  behind enemy l in e s
met a quick response from th e  S ovie t Ukrainian p a r ty  le a d e rs h ip .
Underground c e l l s  of th e  p a r ty  had been l e f t  throughout
Ukraine to  opera te  in  occupied t e r r i t o r y  a f t e r  the  Wehrmacht had
passed . In th e  Lviv reg io n ,  taken a t  the  end o f June and in  J u ly ,
these  c e l l s  e x i s t e d  in  th e  rayons o f  Brody, Rava Ruski, Krasny,
53Zolochiw and Peremysl. In Rivno i t  was d i f f i c u l t  to  o rgan ise
them because o f  the  r a p id i ty  o f  the  German advance and the  f a c t
th a t  a wide network o f U krainian n a t i o n a l i s t s  th e re  was informed
s u f f i c i e n t l y  to  deconspire  t h e i r  members as soon as the  Germans
a r r i v e d . A s  th e  Germans en te red  Kiev, th e re  were n ine  raykom
p a r ty  c e l l s  in  o p e ra t io n ,  and a t o t a l  o f  fo r ty  c o n s p i r a to r i a l  groups
55prepared  fo r  d iv e rs io n a ry  and sabotage work throughout the  c i ty .
‘'^Crankshaw, e d . ,  Khrushchev Remembers, p .  150.
^^J. V. S t a l i n ,  The Great P a t r i o t i c  War o f  the  Sov ie t  Union 
(New York, 1969), p . 15.
53S trokach , Nash Pozyvnyy, p . 167.
^^Kyzya, Narodni Mesnyky, pp. 49-50.
^^Strokach, Nash Pozyvnyy, p. 181.
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The o rg a n is a t io n  of the  Red P a r t i s a n  movement was the  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  the  Communist P a r ty  le a d e r s h ip ,  th e  d e c is iv e  ro le  
here  being  p layed  by o f f i c e r s  of the  NKVD. Strokach h im se lf ,  a 
lead ing  f ig u re  in  th e  movement, had been Deputy Commissar fo r  the  
I n t e r i o r  up to  th e  War, a p o s i t io n  re served  fo r  the  most t r u s t e d  
members of the  government's  s e c u r i ty  p o l ic e .  The o rg a n is a t io n  of 
the  p a r t i s a n  movement was conside red  to  be a h ig h ly  p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r ,  
because i t  no t only c o n s is te d  o f  te c h n ic a l  t r a i n i n g  and the  p ro ­
v i s io n  o f su p p lie s  f o r  p a r t i s a n s ,  bu t  a lso  o f en fo rc in g  th e  most 
s t r i n g e n t  r e g u la t io n  o f  groups of g u e r r i l l a s  s e t  f r e e  to  roam in  the  
marshes and f o r e s t s ,  r e l a t i v e l y  independent of the  s tan d a rd  co n tro ls  
so c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of Sov ie t  s o c ie ty  a t  t h a t  tim e. Approximately 
one t h i r d  o f  th e  o f f i c e r s  o f  the  p a r t i s a n  movement were NKVD 
o f f i c e r s
Armstrong d e l in e a te s  th re e  s tag e s  of S ov ie t  p a r t i s a n  a c t i v i t y  
during  the  War. From June to  December, 1941, th e re  was e s ta b l i s h e d  
a uniform spread  o f groups across th e  country , w ith  c lo se  t i e s  w ith  
the  p o p u la t io n .
During t h i s  f i r s t  p e r io d ,  many p a r t i s a n s  d e se r te d  or gave 
themselves up to  the  Germans when a t ta ck ed . In th e  f i r s t  few months of 
war t h i s  network p r a c t i c a l l y  d isappeared . In the  second p e r io d ,  from 
December 1941 to  the autumn o f the  fo llowing y ear ,  th e re  was 
v i r t u a l l y  no p a r t i s a n  a c t i v i t y  as a l l  fo rc e s ,  Armstrong a rg u es ,  were 
thrown i n to  th e  defense of Moscow. The only ex cep tio n  was in  North 
B ye lo russ ia .  The t h i r d  p e r io d  from Autumn, 1942 to  the  summer o f  1944 
w itnessed  th e  growth o f the  p a r t i s a n  movement anew as a r e s u l t  o f  the
e
^^John A. Armstrong, e d . ,  S ov ie t P a r t i s a n s  in  World War 
Two (Madison, W ise ., 1964), pp. 78-80.
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in f lu x  o f  Red Army s t r a g g le r s  and d e s e r t e r s ,  and th e  c o n so l id a t io n
o f  sm a lle r  fo rce s  in to  la rg e  c o n ce n tra t io n s  o f  p a r t i s a n s  which were
57prepared  f o r  e n t ry  i n to  Western Ukraine.
U n ti l  e a r ly  1943, th e re  was no Red P a r t i s a n  movement in  
Western Ukraine. Kovpak and Saburov 's  fo rces  were s p e c i a l l y  
ass igned  to  t h i s  a rea  in  l a t e  1942 in  p re p a ra t io n  fo r  th e  Red Army 
o f f e n s iv e .  Although the  voluminous h i s t o r i e s  o f  the  p a r t i s a n  movement 
a t t r i b u t e  i t s  absence in  Western Ukraine to  the  r a p i d i t y  of the  
Red Army r e t r e a t  and th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  deconspired  the  
p a r ty  underground which was ass igned  th e  ta sk  of c o n s t ru c t in g  
p a r t i s a n  b r ig a d e s ,  i t  i s  perhaps eq u a lly  c re d ib le  to  a t t r i b u t e  th i s  
absence of communist a c t i v i t y  to  th e  h o s t i l i t y  o f  th e  Western Ukrainian 
p o p u la t io n  to  S ov ie t  power, and th e  absence o f  a s t ro n g  communist 
t r a d i t i o n  th e r e ,  even in  the  m i d - t h i r t i e s .  I t  i s  u n l ik e ly  th a t  the 
b r i e f  occupation  o f 1939-41 succeeded in  b u i ld in g  a s t ro n g  indigenous 
communist movement o r  even a body . o f  s t a t e  and p a r ty  fu n c t io n a r ie s  
which was p rep a red  to  defend i t s  i n t e r e s t s  in  the  most p e s s im is t ic ,  
f o r  the  S o v ie t  Union, p e r io d  o f  th e  German-Soviet war.
In the  i n i t i a l  p e r io d  o f th e  c o n f l i c t ,  when th e  Red Army was 
in  f u l l  r e t r e a t ,  one o f the  main func tions  o f  th e  P a r t i s a n s  was to  
co -o rd in a te  t h e i r  work w ith  the  movement o f  Sovie t t ro o p s ,  to  ac t  as 
d iv e rs io n a ry  fo rces  and as a cover fo r  the  r e t r e a t .  The second, 
and more im portan t long term fu n c t io n  was to  embed themselves in  
enemy t e r r i t o r y  and ca rry  out sabotage a g a in s t  communications, 
t e r r o r i s e  c o l la b o ra to r s  and where p o s s ib le ,  engage Gestapo and p o l ic e  
u n i t s .
S ^ Ib id . ,  pp. 21-25.
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Membership in  th e  p a r t i s a n  movement was v o lu n ta ry ,  according 
to  S trokach . L a te r  in  th e  war, a f t e r  the  movement had gained 
a u th o r i ty  and p r e s t i g e ,  and e s p e c ia l ly  a f t e r  the  S ov ie t  fo rces  were 
on the  o f fen s iv e  aga in , th e  vo lun ta r ism  was accompanied by th e  s u b t le  
coercion  o f  c i rcu m stan ce-- th e  impending re tu rn  o f  S ov ie t  a u th o r i ty .  
The n a t io n a l  composition o f  th e  p a r t i s a n  movement was roughly p ro ­
p o r t io n a te  to  the  n a t io n a l  composition of th e  p o p u la t io n  in  E as te rn  
Ukraine as a whole: 54.4% U krain ian , 23.4% R ussian, 5.8%
B yelo russ ian , 1.2% Jew ish , 2.1% P o l i sh ,  5.8% Armenian, .5% T a ta r s ,
5 8.3% Georgians and th e  remaining 11.7% from o th e r  n a t i o n a l i t i e s .
N a t io n a l i ty  does no t seem to  have p layed an im portan t r o l e ,
th e re fo re  in  th e  p rocess  o f  form ation of the p a r t i s a n  b r ig a d e s .
O ther more im portan t f a c to r s  determ ining membership in  the
p a r t i s a n  movement had to  do w ith the  predicam ent o f  d i f f e r e n t  s o c ia l
c la s s e s  during occupation  r u l e ,  and t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  in  m ain ta in ing
th e  S ov ie t  system in  Ukraine. For example, Kovpak's f i r s t  band of
p a r t i s a n s ,  which he o rgan ised  in  P u t iv ly a ,  E as te rn  Ukraine as the
Nazis approached, was made up o f  th re e  g enera tions  o f  communists:
'o ld  f ig h t e r s  of th e  R evolu tion , taugh t by the  g re a t  lessons  o f l i f e ,
middle aged peo p le ,  hardened by i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  and th e  s t ru g g le
a g a in s t  th e  k u lak s ,  and f i n a l l y  th e  youth , Red Army s o ld ie r s  who
escaped th e  enc losu res  o f  the  enemy and p rese rv ed  t h e i r  m i l i t a r y
59honour and d i g n i t y ' . I t  appears from th i s  example, t h a t  the  
m o tiva tion  to  f i g h t ,  in  the  f i r s t  in s ta n ce  came from those  whose 
measure o f  commitment to  and p e rso n a l  i n t e r e s t  in  th e  S ov ie t
^^M. K oval ',  I s t o r i y a  Pamyatayel (Kiev, 1965), p . 27. 
^^Sydir A. Kovpak, So lda ty  Maloyi Zemli (Kiev, 1964), p . 53,
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system was g r e a t e s t —members o f  th.e Communist P a r ty  o r  th e  NKVD 
eche lons . A la rg e  p a r t  o f  th e  p a r t i s a n  movement in  i t s  e a r ly  
s tag es  was communist i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ,  whose l iv e l ih o o d  depended upon 
such a system and whose predicam ent was perhaps th e  w orst o f  any 
s o c ia l  group during  th e  Nazi occupation . Workers and peasan ts  in  
Ukraine who had borne the  b ru n t  o f  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  and 'd e -  
k u la k i s a t io n '  adopted a le s s  committed s tance  and decided to  w ait 
and see what the  fu tu re  would b r in g .  T heir  p o l i t i c a l  views and 
assessment o f  the  S ov ie t  system are  d e a l t  with in  a fu tu re  s e c t io n  
o f  t h i s  ch ap te r .  L a te r ,  when th e  occupa tiona l p o l i c i e s  pu t many 
workers out of jobs  and attem pted  to  deport them and peasan ts  to  
Germany, the  p ro p o r t io n  o f  working c la s s  in  th e  p a r t i s a n  movement 
grew co n s id e rab ly .  The p ro p o r t io n  o f middle s t r a t a  S ov ie t  c i t i z e n s  
in  the  movement d ec lin ed  as w e ll  as a r e s u l t  o f  th e  in f lu x  of Red 
Army s t r a g g le r s  and d e s e r te r s  in  1942 when th e  h o r ro rs  o f  in ternm ent 
camps became widely known in  U k r a i n e . A r m s t r o n g ' s  co n ten tion  
th a t  th e  r e b i r t h  o f  the  p a r t i s a n  movement came only in  l a t e  1942 
is  p o s s ib ly  m is lead ing  because i t  ignores  the  growing momentum in  
1942 a g a in s t  th e  German a u th o r i t i e s  on the  p a r t  o f  th e  p o p u la tion  
which a lready  was c o n tr ib u t in g  to  the  a r i s a l  o f  new groups o f  
g u e r r i l l a s  and urban underground c e l l s  of the Communist P a r ty .  The 
c e n t r a l  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  th e  P a r t i s a n  Command under S tro k a c h 's  le ad e rsh ip  
to  b r in g  th ese  d is p a r a te  groups to g e th e r  and s e rv ic e  them w ith arms 
and food su p p lie s  was preceded by th i s  spontaneous p rocess  o f  r e v iv a l .
The tu rn  o f  fo r tu n es  on the  E as te rn  f r o n t  and th e  s tepped  up 
re p re ss io n s  and d e p o r ta t io n s  a t  the  end o f  1942 c re a te d  a new c lim ate
^^E arl Ziemke, 'Composition and Morale o f  the  P a r t i s a n  
Movement' in  Armstrong, e d . ,  Sovie t P a r t i s a n s , pp. 142-44.
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o f  confidence amongst th e  p o p u la t io n  of E as tern  Ukraine, and e s p e c ia l ly  
amongst those  a lre ad y  r e s i s t i n g  Nazi a u th o r i ty .  For t h e i r  p a r t ,  
the  Red P a r t i s a n s  began to  a t ta c k  in d iv id u a ls  and groups which were 
openly c o l la b o ra t in g  w ith  the  G e r m a n s . L e a f l e t s  addressed  to  
im portan t c o l la b o ra to r s  were c i r c u la t e d  in  towns th re a te n in g  r e p r i s a l s .  
As a r u l e ,  th e  p a r t i s a n s  d id  no t  engage in  in d is c r im in a te  v io len ce  
a g a in s t  th e  p o p u la t io n .  Violence was almost always d i r e c te d  a g a in s t  
c o l la b o r a to r s ,  and in  1943-44 a g a in s t  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  sym path isers  
and a c t i v i s t s  in  Western Ukraine, whom the  p a r t i s a n s  were led  to
b e l ie v e  were a l l  d i r e c t  agents o f  Nazi Germany.
The changing mood in  Ukraine, tu rn in g  d e c is iv e ly  a g a in s t  
German a u th o r i ty  and th e  r e v e r s a ls  in  th e  Soviet-Germany m i l i t a r y  
c o n f l i c t  were a major tu rn in g  p o in t  in  the  Red P a r t i s a n  movement's 
h i s to r y .  An e x c e l le n t  i l l u s t r a t i o n  of the  newfound leg it im acy  of 
th e  movement was th e  d e fe c t io n  o f  two thousand s o ld ie r s  in  th e  SS 
D iv is ion  B yelo russ ia  to  the  p a r t i s a n s  in  the  summer o f  1942 led  by a 
former Red Army co lo n e l .  Seven hundred T a te rs  in  a German u n i t  a lso  
d e fec ted  to  the  p a r t i s a n s  in  e a r ly  1943.^^ By 1944, S ov ie t  sources 
e s t im a te  t h a t  up to  20% of th e  p a r t i s a n  movement was made up of
former c o l la b o r a to r s .^ ^  These events  were accompanied by a genera l
re c o g n i t io n  by the  E as te rn  U krain ian  p o p u la t io n  th a t  th e  Red P a r t i s a n s  
were small n u c le i  of the  a u th o r i ty  which would l a t e r  r e tu r n  in  
i t s  e n t i r e t y .  The presence  of the  p a r t i s a n s  and the  communist under­
ground, combined w ith  th e  h o s t i l i t y  towards the  Nazi occupation  
p rovided  a b a s is  f o r  the  m a jo r i ty  of the  p o p u la t io n  choosing to  support
^^Lystivky Partiynoho  P id p i ly a  i  P a r ty z a n s 'kykh Zahoniv u 
roky Velykoyi Vitchyznyanoyi Viyny (Kiev" 1969), p p . 146-47.~
^^Zeimke 'Composition and M o ra le ',  p . 146-47.
63,loc . c i t . .
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the  S ov ie t  s id e  from th e  end o f  1942.
The Pokhidni Hrupy
I f  the  U krainian n a t i o n a l i s t s  were a t  a l l  known in  E as te rn  
Ukraine b e fo re  June 1941, then i t  i s  h ig h ly  improbable t h a t  they  were 
considered  as a t h i r d  a l t e r n a t i v e  in  the  c o n f l i c t .  The formal 
independence o f  th e  Bandera and Mel'nyk o rg a n is a t io n s  was h eav i ly  
overshadowed by t h e i r  co -o p e ra t io n  w ith  the  German fo rc e s .
In th e  1930' s ,  th e  OUN vaguely understood the  c r u c ia l  importance 
of Sov ie t  Ukraine in  any s t ru g g le  fo r  independence. The over­
whelming m a jo r i ty  o f  th e  n a t io n  l iv ed  h e re ,  i t  was the  h i s t o r i c  
cen tre  o f  U krain ian  c u l tu re  and the  most developed economic reg ion  
th a t  U krainians in h a b i te d .  The f i r s t  years  o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t s ’ 
a c t i v i t y  were confined to  Poland and s e v e ra l  West European emigre 
communities, making i t  a p roduc t of P o lish  s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  
cond itions  and no t o f  the  Ukrainian r e a l i t y .  The movement, simply 
s t a t e d ,  was a m ino r ity  movement and no t a n a t io n a l  one in  th e  p re c is e  
sense of the  word. K onovalets*’ co n tac ts  with n a t i o n a l i s t s  in  Sov ie t  
Ukraine, fo r  which th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  claim the  GPU a s s a s s in a te d  him, 
do n o t appear to  have been o f  any importance in  shaping th e  p o l i t i c s  
or s t r a te g y  o f  the  OUN.
By n a tu re  o f  th i s  ex c lus ion  from the  cen tre  o f  Ukrainian l i f e  
and th e  d ear th  o f  any se r io u s  re sea rch  on th e  p a r t  o f  the  o rg a n is a t io n  
in to  th e  r e a l i t y  o f  S ov ie t  co n d itio n s  in  Ukraine, th e  OUN approached 
th e  t e s t  o f  p e n e t r a t io n  in to  the  e a s te rn  t e r r i t o r i e s  w ith  se r io u s  
hand icaps. They had no experience  of p o l i t i c a l  a g i t a t i o n  amongst 
workers, and no s o c ia l  programme developed beyond th e  q u a s i - f a s c i s t  
d e c la ra t io n  of 1929, Moreover, they  n a tu r a l ly  viewed th e  E as te rn  
Ukrainians as f o r e ig n e r s ,  and converse ly  expected th e  same trea tm en t
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from them. A ll o f  th ese  f a c to r s  however d id  no t r i v a l  th e  s e r io u s
im p l ic a t io n s  o f  the  OUN's a s s o c ia t io n  w ith  the  p o l i c i e s  o f  the
T hird  Reich and t h e i r  c lose  p r a c t i c a l  co -o p e ra t io n  w ith  th e  Wehrmacht’s
advance. The d e c la r a t io n  o f  independence in  Lviv in  June 1941
in d ic a te d ,  t h a t  w hile  th e  Bandera fa c t io n  was p repared  to  work w ith
th e  Germans, they wished to  be t r e a t e d  as equal p a r tn e r s .  The a r r e s t
of Bandera and S t e t s ’ko exem plif ied  th e  r e a l i t y ,  t h a t  th e  Germans
had th e  power to  make such a d ec is io n  and not the  n a t i o n a l i s t s .
The pokhidni hrupy o f the  OUN-B s e t  out f o r  E as te rn  Ukraine
s im ultaneously  w ith  the  German a t ta c k  on the  Sov ie t  Union. The two
i n t e r r e l a t e d  o b je c t iv e s  o f  th e se  fo rces  are  b e s t  d e sc r ib ed  in  the
in s t r u c t io n s  r e le a s e d  by the  lead e rsh ip  of th e  o rg a n is a t io n  immediately
a f t e r  th e  conclusion  of the  Second Great Gathering in  Cracow:
Those s t a t e s  which lead  the  s t ru g g le  a g a in s t  
Moscow, who are  not h o s t i l e  to  Ukraine, we 
t r e a t  as n a tu ra l  a l l i e s  (emphasis in  o r i g i n a l ) .
S tim u la te  the  armed u p r is in g  ag a in s t  Moscow 
and beg in  to  b u i ld  our own s t a t e  from the o rgan ised  
fo rces  of the  U krain ian  p e o p le - -b u i ld  a r e a l i s t i c  
foundation  to  become p a r tn e rs  (our emphasis) and on 
th e  b a s is  of such r e a l  f a c to r s ,  norm alise  the  r e l a t i o n s  
between Ukraine and those  s t a t e s  as between a l l i e s  , . .
Try to  send some p eo p le ,  above a l l  through le g a l  
channels , to  he lp  in  a d m in is t ra t iv e  or economic 
a f f a i r s ,  and e v e n tu a l ly  in to  the  army . . , where i t  
w i l l  be necessa ry  to  o rgan ise  small lo c a ls  o f  
our o rg a n is a t io n  and re v o lu t io n a ry  ac t io n s  , . .
. . . c a r ry  on in te n s iv e  subversive  work in  the  
economy, a d m in is t r a t io n s ,  t r a n s p o r t ,  the  array , , .
S im ultaneously , w ith  the  fomenting o f  armed s t ru g g le  
a g a in s t  Moscow, we begin  the  re c o n s t ru c t io n  of 
the  U krain ian  s t a t e  . . .64
The OUN-B fo rces  p repa red  ex p ed it io n s  fo r  th re e  d e s t in a t io n s  
in  E as tern  Ukraine, The f i r s t  group, under the  le ad e rsh ip  of
^^OUN V S v i t l i  Postanov, pp. 48-57.
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M. Klyrayshyn t r a v e l l e d  towards th e  N orth -E aste rn  Ukraine; i t  numbered 
approxim ately  2 ,500. The group t r a v e l l i n g  to C en tra l  Ukraine 
had approxim ately  1,500 p a r t i c i p a n t s  and was led  by M. Lemyk. The 
e x p ed it io n a ry  fo rce  t r a v e l l i n g  south  towards Oddessa and th e  Donbas 
c o n s t i tu te d  a body o f  1,000 and was under the  d i r e c t io n  o f  Z. Matla 
and M. R ikh ta .^^  The group heading fo r  Kharkiv, the  C en tra l  Ukraine 
e x p ed it io n  d id  n o t reach  i t s  d e s t in a t io n  because i t  was broken up 
by the Germans, a la rg e  number o f  the  t r a v e l l e r s  be ing  s h o t .  The 
sou thern  group, th e  most su c c e ss fu l  of the  Bandera f a c t i o n ’s emmissaries 
managed to  e s t a b l i s h  a broad o rg a n is a t io n a l  network in  the  Donbas 
reg ion  in  the  o b la s t s  o f  Kirovograd, Donbas, D nipropetrovsk and 
S ta l in o .  Some of i t s  p o l i t i c a l  work in  th ese  cen tre s  invo lved  the  
a c t iv e  co -o p e ra t io n  of Greeks l iv in g  in  Mariopol and Russians in  the  
Donbas r e g io n .^6
The Mel'nyk f a c t io n  s e n t  out i t s  own pokhidni h rupy , bu t 
many of them were sh o t  when they  emerged in  d i f f e r e n t  cen tre s  and 
a ttem pted  to  o rgan ise  p u b l ic  c u l tu r a l  and p o l i t i c a l  work. The 
most s u c c e ss fu l  cen tre  of M el'nyk’s opera tions  was in  Kiev, where 
th e  lo c a l  a d m in is t ra t io n s  in  which the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  worked were 
c lo se ly  t i e d  to  German ru le  or were the  d i r e c t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  t h i s  
r u l e .
Immediately a f t e r  the  r e t r e a t  o f  the  Red Army and b e fo re  the  
Nazi a d m in is t ra t io n  had time to  e s t a b l i s h  i t s e l f ,  the  cond itions  
in  C en tra l  and E as te rn  Ukraine became more re la x e d ,  allow ing f o r  a 
g r e a te r  scope o f p o l i t i c a l  work by the  ex p ed it io n a ry  fo rces  as they
^^Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, pp, 12,30.
^ ^ Ib id ,  pp. 11-13.
^^G, Po likarpenko , OUN Pidchas Druhoyi Sv itovoyi Viyny
( n .p . ,  1951), p . 57.
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a r r iv e d  in  t h e i r  d e s ig n a ted  c e n t r e s .  They qu ick ly  e s t a b l i s h e d  con­
t a c t  w ith  the  lo c a l  popula tion .^®  In o r ie n t in g  them selves to  th e  
new c o n d i t io n s ,  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  began to  r e c o n s t r u c t  a h i s t o r y  o f  
the  S ov ie t p e r io d  o f  r u le  and the  a t t i t u d e  of the  U krainians towards 
i t  during  the  in te rw a r  p e r io d .  Two fa c to r s  s tood out in  t h i s  h i s to r y .  
F i r s t ,  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  l e a m t  o f  the  long p e r io d  o f o p p o s it io n  by 
the  p e a san try  to  c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n ,  con tinu ing  w ell a f t e r  th e  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  the  c o l l e c t iv e  farm system. The peasan ts  
d id  no t co n s id e r  th e  c o l le c t iv e s  to  be t h e i r  own p ro p e r ty  under t h e i r  
c o n t ro l ,  b u t  the  means whereby the  s t a t e  e x t r a c te d  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p roduct 
from th e  coun trys ide  f o r  the  c i t i e s .  The E as te rn  U krain ian  p easan try
g re e ted  th e  Germans in  1941 because they b e l ie v ed  t h a t  they would
69dism antle  th e  c o l l e c t iv e  farms.
Second, th e  OUN a c t i v i s t s  found out th a t  the  workers in  
Western Ukraine were more n a t io n a l ly  conscious than c u r re n t  Western 
U krainian opinion made them out to  be. One of the  main reasons  fo r  
th i s  h igh degree o f  consciousness was a t t r i b u t a b l e  to  the  f a c t  th a t  
a g re a t  p a r t  o f  the  working c l a s s ,  formed in  th e  p e r io d  o f  
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n ,  had come from the  v i l l a g e s .  Although they  had 
in te g ra te d  in to  urban l i f e ,  t h e i r  t i e s  with th e  coun trys ide  remained 
s tro n g .  This became c le a r  in  the  course o f  d is c u s s io n s  between the 
n a t i o n a l i s t s  and w o rk e rs .
In beginning to  c o n s t ru c t  a network o f cadre groups amongst 
workers and th e  c i t y  p o p u la t io n  in  g e n e ra l ,  t h i s  c o n s t i tu t in g  the  
c e n t r a l  ta sk  o f  the  pokhidni h rupy , the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  a t  f i r s t  worked
^®Yevhen Pavlyuk, 'B o r o t ’ba Ukrayins'koho Narodu na Skhidno- 
U krayins ' kykh Zemlyakh 1941-44’ , K alendar. 1947, pp. 37-57.
^^Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, pp, 75-76. See a l s o  UHVR
PH-1.
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q u i te  openly. They rev ived  th e  Prosv i t a o rg a n is a t io n s  and c a r r ie d
70out c u l tu r a l  and e d u ca tio n a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  The a b i l i t y  to  work
openly l a s t e d  fo r  as long as i t  took the German a d m in is t ra t io n  to  be
e s ta b l i s h e d .  T h e re a f te r ,  cond itions  began to  change r a p id ly .
The r e f u s a l  by the  Germans to  d ism antle  th e  c o l l e c t iv e  farms
aroused h o s t i l i t y  from th e  p e a s a n ts ,  not only  towards the  Nazi
a d m in is tra t io n  i t s e l f ,  b u t a lso  those working f o r  the  Germans, which
inc luded  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s .  The e s ta b l i s h e d  fa c to ry  regime and the
d e p o r ta t io n s  to  labour camps in  Germany qu ick ly  made c le a r  the
r e a l  in te n t io n s  o f  the new o rd e r .  Sabotage in  the  f a c t o r i e s ,  o f ten
organ ised  by the  communist underground began in  an e f f o r t  to  d is ru p t  
71p roduc tion . In th e  course o f  the  War years  approxim ately one
m il l io n  Donbas workers were to  leave t h e i r  c i t i e s  and move west in
72search  o f  work or be deported  to  Germany by the  a u th o r i t i e s .
The b r u t a l i t y  o f  Nazi ru le  f e l l  so qu ick ly  upon the  popu la t io n
th a t  the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  them selves, to  a degree favoured in  th e  eyes
of the  a d m in is tra t io n  and p o l i c e ,  were fo rced  to  take  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l
work underground. Many t r a n s l a t o r s  who had accompanied th e  army
or became p a r t  o f  th e  Reichkommissariat i n s t i t u t i o n s  were sho t when the
Gestapo l e a m t  t h a t  they were a lso  under the  d i s c i p l in e  o f  the  OUN
73and expected to  carry  out independent a c t i v i t y .  On th e  one hand, 
the  ex p ed it io n a ry  fo rces  were a ttem pting  to a g i t a t e  f o r  an independent 
Ukraine while s tan d in g  on the  s id e  of the  Germans; on the  o th e r ,  
the  Germans now re fu sed  to  t o l e r a t e  any measure o f  independent 
p o l i t i c a l  work by th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  and proceeded to  rep re ss  them.
^^Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, p . 17.
^^Strokach, Nash Pozyvnyy, pp. 183-89,
72Yevhen Paklyuk, Donbas u B oro t’b i  z Nimtsyamy (Munich, 1947). 
^^Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, p . 13.
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Not only was th e  s i t u a t i o n  f o r  the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  becoming em barrassing
( in  f r o n t  o f  the  E as te rn  U krain ian  p o pu la tion )  b u t  a l s o  dangerous
to  t r y  to  remain on bo th  s id e s  of th e  growing c o n f l i c t .  Shankowsky
a l lu d e s  to  t h i s  developing s i t u a t i o n  when he w r i te s  t h a t :
In the  ha rsh  co n d itio n s  o f  the German occupa tion , 
the  U krain ian  popu la r  masses gave support to  
th a t  o rg a n is a t io n  which no t only was ab le  to  
shout a b s t r a c t  s lo g an s ,  no m a tte r  how good or con­
v inc ing  they sounded, bu t which could s tan d  fo r  
the  l iv in g  i n t e r e s t s  o f  the  p e o p le .74
I t  r a p id ly  became c le a r  in  the  course o f  th e  l a t t e r  h a l f  of 
1941 th a t  th e  ' l i v i n g  i n t e r e s t s  o f  the  p e o p le ’ d id  n o t  c o - in c id e  with 
the  ex ecu tion  o f German occupa tiona l r u le .
An eq u a l ly  em barrassing  problem fo r  the  ex p ed i t io n a ry  fo rces  
arose in  connection w ith  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  ex p la in  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  
programme to  th e  U krain ian  masses, They could no t  match the  high 
le v e l  o f  p o l i t i c a l  awareness o f  the  peop le . Unlike the  s tu d en ts  
and o th e r  audiences o f  the  OUN in  the  1930's  in  Western Ukraine, the  
S o v ie t  Ukrainians were competent to  d iscuss  is su e s  of economy, 
p o l i t i c s ,  s t a t e  s t r u c tu r e s  and above a l l ,  democracy, on a high l e v e l .
A g re a t  number of the  a c t i v i s t s  s en t  e a s t  by the  OUN were no t t r a in e d  
as p ro p ag an d is ts  and had l i t t l e  p o l i t i c a l  s k i l l .  Many d i d n ' t  even 
have a formal secondary school ed u ca tio n ,  whereas th e  E as te rn  U krainian 
average in  ed uca tion  was q u i te  h ig h .  A g re a t  many o f  th e  e n th u s ia s ts  
became dem oralised when they  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  a read ing  o f  th e  OUN
decalogue (The Ten Commandments o f  a n a t i o n a l i s t )  d id  n o t  have th e  
d e s ir e d  e f f e c t  on the  audience.^® The audiences r e j e c t e d  out o f  hand 
th e  n o t io n  o f  the  OUN as the  s in g le  lead ing  o rg a n is a t io n  in  c iv ic  and
^^Tbid., p.  58. 
^^Ibid.,  p. 71.
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p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  (A t y p i c a l  response was ’We've had enough, o f  one p a r ty  
s t a t e s ’) .  M. Chubay, a member o f  the  ex p ed i t io n a ry  fo rc e s  notes  t h a t  
" in c re a s in g ly  th e re  appeared be fo re  us such and s im i l a r ,  deeper 
problems . . . such t h a t  ’o u r ’ boys no longer had the  confidence to  
appear be fo re  m eetings" .
Following two months o f p u b l ic  work in  s e m i - l e g a l i t y ,  th e  OUN-B
groups had s u c c e s s fu l ly  in troduced  themselves to  wide s e c t io n s  of
E as te rn  U kra in ians . The i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of re p re s s io n s  by the  German
ad m in is t ra t io n  a g a in s t  them and the  popu la t io n  as a whole n e c e s s i ta te d
a r a d ic a l  change in  methods of work. At a meeting o f  the  lead e rsh ip s
of the  ex p ed it io n a ry  fo rces  of the  Bandera f a c t io n ,  on September 3,
1941, i t  was decided to  go underground and form a c o n s p i r a to r i a l  
77o rg a n is a t io n .
The OUN-M groups fa red  worse in  the  s t ru g g le  f o r  s u rv iv a l ,  
perhaps because they  were too  confiden t about t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  with 
the  Germans. They l o s t  a g re a t  number of a c t i v i s t s  to  the  f i r i n g  
squads, no t so much because they opposed Nazi r u l e ,  b u t  because they 
t r u s te d  i t  too  much. As p a r t  o f  the  Gestapo, th e  army u n i t s ,  and 
l a t e r  the  s t a f f s  o f  town a d m in is t r a t io n s ,  Mel’nyk’a... fo llow ers  thought 
t h a t  they  had gained  a measure o f  independence from th e  Germans. On 
Nov. 21, one month a f t e r  an a ttem pt to  e s t a b l i s h  a M e l 'n y k -co n tro lled  
Rada, s im i la r  to  S t e t s 'k o ’s p r o je c t  in  Lviv e a r l i e r ,  had been suppressed , 
th e  OUN-M again overstepped  the  mark o f  a c c e p ta b i l i ty  in  Kiev. The 
s o -c a l le d  Bazar i n c id en t  began with a dem onstration o f  n a t i o n a l i s t s  
and Kievans marching to  a symbolic grave o u ts id e  the  c i t y  where they
 ^^ M. Chub ay , Reyd O rh an iza to r iv  OUN v id  Poprad po Chôme More
(Munich, 1952), p . 44. 
77Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, p. 59.
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in tended  to  ho ld  a m eeting, U krainian p o l ic e  s tood  by and ensured
passage f o r  the  m archers. The German p o l ic e  q u ick ly  re a c te d  to  th e
7 8in c id e n t ,  a r r e s t i n g  the  o rg a n ise rs  and execu ting  them, A wave o f 
re p re s s io n s  a g a in s t  M el'nyk’s adheren ts  then began, which a lso
re s u l t e d  in  the  d e s t r u c t io n  o f  e x p ed it io n a ry  fo rces  in  Mikolayev,
79Kamenets-Podilsk, C hem ih iv  and P o ltav a . A f te r  t h i s  in c id e n t  th e
p r e s t ig e  o f  the  OUN-M amongst n a t i o n a l i s t  U krainians waned considerab ly ,
The p o p u la t io n  of Kiev was by no means e n t i r e l y  sym pathetic  to  the
n a t i o n a l i s t s  in s id e  o r  o u ts id e  the  c i t y  a d m in is t ra t io n .  The communist
underground, c o n t in u a l ly  a t  work h e re ,  c o n s i s te n t ly  exposed the
80c o l la b o ra t io n  of the  OUN-M and lo c a l  f ig u re s  w ith  th e  N azis .
From such in d ic a to r s  as low th e a t r e  a ttendances  and audiences a t
a r t i s t i c  g a th e r in g s  o rgan ised  by the  new c i ty  a u t h o r i t i e s  in  1942,
M. Koval’ , a S o v ie t  U krain ian  h i s t o r i a n  has shown th a t  th e  popu la t io n
81of Kiev d id  not a p p re c ia te  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  e f f o r t s .
The P o l i t i c a l  Views o f Workers
and Peasants
An im portan t q u es t io n  o f  t h i s  p e r io d  r e l a t e s  to  those  who did 
no t have the  oppo rtu n i ty  to  express  t h e i r  views, bu t were n e v e r th e le s s  
deeply a f f e c te d  by th e  War and had c e r ta in  p o s i t io n s  o f  t h e i r  own 
concerning the  s o lu t io n  to  the Ukrainian q u es t io n .  These were the  
working people of E as te rn  Ukraine who wanted n e i th e r  German occupation 
nor S o v ie t  ru le  o f  the  pre-War v a r i e ty .
78Mykola Lebed’ , U kray ins’ka P ovs tans’ka Armiya [Munich, 1946),
pp. 20-21.
79Armstrong, U krain ian  N ationalism , p . 106. 
80Lystivky Partiynoho  P id p i ly a , p. 39.
81 Koval’ , I s t o r iy a  Pamyataye’ . p. 25.
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Without any encouragement o r  guidance, workers and p ro fe s s io n a l  
groups o f the  c i ty  of K riv ij  Rih in  the  Donbas had begun to  r e ­
o rgan ise  the  economy, school system and s o c ia l  s e rv ic e s  as soon as the  
Sovie t a u th o r i t i e s  l e f t .  Mines and f a c to r ie s  were opened, schools 
were running, newspapers appeared and c u l tu r a l  a c t i v i t i e s  were 
o rgan ised . A f te r  m astering  the  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  o f  the  c i t y ,  an 
e f f o r t  was made to  d u p l ic a te  t h i s  scheme of s e l f - a d m in i s t r a t io n  in  
surrounding a re a s .  I t  was s u c c e s s fu l ly  i n i t i a t e d  in  Dniproderzhinsk 
when i t s  c i t i z e n s  were f r e e  o f  the  o ld  a d m in is t ra t io n .  The Red 
P a r t i s a n s  who had remained nearby to  await the  Germans were driven  
out when they attem pted to  e n te r  K riv ij  Rih. This spontaneous 
process o f  s e l f - o r g a n i s a t io n  and s e l f - r u l e  l a s t e d  f o r  a sh o r t  time; 
when the  Nazis en te red  th e  c i t y ,  the  o rg an ise rs  o f  the  p r o je c t  
were k i l l e d .
Many would d iscoun t t h i s  s h o r t  l ived  phenomenon as too b r i e f  
to  mention or to  serve  as a noteworthy in d ic a t io n  o f  deeper 
p rocesses  a t  work in  s o c ie ty .  But even th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  in  the  
pokhidni h rupy , who had l i t t l e  id e a  of the  models o f  dem ocratic  s e l f ­
a d m in is tra t io n  on the  lo c a l  le v e l  as a b a s ic  u n i t  f o r  an independent 
s t a t e  throughout Ukraine, p ra is e d  the  attem pt of the  K riv ij  Rih 
in h a b i ta n ts  and po in ted  to  these  e f f o r t s  as p ro o f  t h a t  the  Ukrainian 
people were e n t i r e l y  competent to  run t h e i r  own a f f a i r s . The lack 
of sources on the  s h o r t  in te rv e n in g  p e riod  between Sov ie t  r e t r e a t  
and German occupation  which occurred in  some areas of S ovie t Ukraine 
makes i t  im possib le  to  guage th e  e x ten t  of such s e l f  a c t i v i t y  by 
workers and o th e r  s o c ia l  groups. The example prov ided  does however
82Yu. Semenko, 'Pamyati M. Pronchenka’ , Novi Dni, no. 39, 
A pril  1953, pp. 10-13.
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in d ic a te  the  c a p a b i l i ty  o f  th e se  people in  responding to  th e  war
s i t u a t i o n  in  an e n t i r e l y  unique way.
The e x p ed i t io n a ry  fo rce s  c a r r ie d  on e x ten s iv e  d iscu ss io n s
with th e  people  they  encountered  and recorded th e  views o f workers
and p easan ts  a t  th e  numerous meetings they o rgan ised . The r e a c t io n  to
the  read ing  o f th e  OUN decalogue has been mentioned. I t  i s  a lso
im portant to  no te  t h a t  the  p o s i t io n  o f  the  OUN a g a in s t  th e  d ism an tling
o f  the  c o l l e c t iv e  farm system ' i n  the  p e r io d  o f re v o lu t io n a ry  u p s u rg e ',
as recorded  in  the  1941 Cracow Gathering aroused g re a t  su sp ic io n
on the  p a r t  o f  the  E as tern  U krain ian  p easan try  th a t  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s
were no more than German ag en ts .  Some peasan ts  argued convincingly
th a t  i t  was no t  p o s s ib le  to  have a re v o lu t io n  w ithout the  c o l le c t iv e
83farms being  d ism an tled . A fte r  conside rab le  avoidance of th e  i s s u e ,
the  ex p ed i t io n a ry  fo rces  changed t h e i r  p o s i t io n :
In r e l a t i o n  to  in d iv id u a l  o r  c o l l e c t iv e  
land u se ,  we d i d n ' t  take  the  p o s i t io n  th a t  
the  c o l l e c t iv e  farms had to  be subdiv ided .
We l e f t  the  d e c is io n  up to  the  p e a s a n t s .
I d o n ' t  know of an in c id e n t  in  a l l  of
Southern Ukraine where the  peasan ts  wanted 
to  leave th e  c o l l e c t iv e  farm system as i t  was, 
although  we ex p la ined  to  them th a t  i t  could be 
governed by the  peasan ts  them selves, on a 
c o -o p e ra t iv e  b a s i s ,  and n o t by a fo re ig n  p a r ty  or 
s t a t e .^4
On the  b a s is  of th ese  d is c u s s io n s ,  a land programme was 
worked ou t .  I t  was r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  from the  land p o l ic y  of the  
OUN in  the  1 930 's ,  and fo r  the  f i r s t  tim e, roo ted  in  th e  r e a l i t y  o f  
l a r g e - s c a le  o rgan ised  a g r i c u l tu r e  as e x is te d  in  E as te rn  Ukraine. The 
programme c a l l e d  fo r  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f land and farming implements 
according to  th e  dem ocratic  d e c is io n  of the  p e a s a n ts .  S o c ia l i s e d
83Chubay, Reyd O rh an iza to r iv  OUN, pp. 53-55,
84Zenoviy Matla quoted in  Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN,
p. 79.
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land use in  th e  form o f  co -o p e ra t iv es  or o therw ise  was adm itted . The
s t a t e  would keep 5% o f  land f o r  experim ental use and as b u i ld in g  s i t e s
f o r  te c h n ic a l  f a c i l i t i e s .  The s t a t e  would a lso  be re sp o n s ib le  fo r
p rov id ing  c r e d i t  and t e c h n i c a l / s c i e n t i f i c  a id  to  lan d h o ld e rs .  The
machine t r a c t o r  s t a t i o n s  (MTS) would be used on a c o -o p e ra t iv e
b a s i s ;  la rg e  machines would, th e r e f o r e ,  not be d i s t r i b u t e d  to
in d iv id u a l  households. The form ation of t ra d e  unions and p o l i t i c a l
85o rg a n is a t io n s  was to  be encouraged.
Not only was t h i s  programme adopted in  th e  a b s t r a c t ,  but
i t  a lso  became the  b a s is  fo r  land d i s t r i b u t i o n  in  th e  zones l ib e r a te d
by the  U krain ian  In su rg en t  Army in  1943 in  North Western Ukraine.®^
The q u e s t io n  o f  an independent Ukraine was w idely  d iscu ssed
a lso  with workers and p ro f e s s io n a l  groups. Shankowsky summarises the
m a jo r i ty  views of the  E as tern  Ukrainians in  th e  fo llow ing  
87way: they  wanted a dem ocratic  o rd e r ,  no t only v ia  th e  b a l l o t  box,
bu t in  th e  f a c t o r i e s ,  ed u ca tio n a l  system and o th e r  s o c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
The government should be e n t i r e l y  independent o f  R ussia . Freedom of 
r e l ig io u s  b e l i e f ,  speech, the  p re ss  and independent t ra d e  unions 
should be ensured . A ll c i t i z e n s  to  be equal b e fo re  the  law, th e re  
be ing  no p r iv i l e g e d  c la s se s  o r  c l iq u es  to  usurp t h i s  e q u a l i ty .
They c a l le d  f o r  a m u l t i - p a r ty  system and th e  p r o te c t io n  o f  a l l  
n a t io n a l  m in o r i t i e s .  The workers r e j e c te d  the  system o f  p r iv a te  
c a p i ta l ism ,  both  the  p re - re v o lu t io n a ry  type and th e  one in troduced  
by th e  German occupa tion . Heavy in d u s t ry ,  t r a n s p o r t ,  communication 
and eng ineering  should be n a t io n a l i s e d  and p ro duc tion  o rgan ised  by a 
s t a t e  p la n .  Secondary in d u s t r i e s  could be run by m u n ic ip a l i t ie s  or
85Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, p . 58.
®^ UHVR T-2. 1,500 su b d iv is io n s  o f  land r e s u l t e d  from the
enactment o f  t h i s  programme in  Volyn in  October 1943. See a lso  Za 
Samostiynu Ukrayinu, no. 3-8 , October 1943, p . 43.
87Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, pp. 107-17.
77
c o l l e c t i v e s ;  the  banking system could only be c o -o p e ra t iv e ly  or
s t a t e  adm in is te red . There was genera l agreement t h a t  the  e q u a l i ty
o f  women had no t been achieved , and th a t  th i s  had to  be c o rre c ted .
Most b e l ie v e d  t h a t  the  fam ily  and the  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  m arriage ,
however, should be s tren g th en ed  and t h a t  a major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f
women was to  r a i s e  c h i ld re n .  Education should be u n iv e r s a l ly
a c c e s s ib le  and w ithou t c o s t .
M. K ova l ',  in  a fash ion  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  S o v ie t  accounts , claims
t h a t  the  p e a sa n try  in  S ov ie t Ukraine was opposed to  the  d ism an tling
o f  th e  c o l l e c t iv e  farm system by the  German a d m in is t r a t io n .  On th e
one hand, th e  German a d m in is t ra t io n  would n o t  d ism an tle  c o l le c t iv e s  in
most re g io n s ,  and where they d id ,  they exacted a quo ta  o f  deportees
to  Germany. On the  o th e r ,  as has been mentioned, th e  OUN-B forces
documented a h i s to r y  o f continuous o p pos ition  to  th e  farm system,
no t  only during  the  War, b u t  ever s in ce  the c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n  d rive
began in  the e a r ly  t h i r t i e s .
A more se r io u s  d i f f e r e n c e  between h i s to r i a n s  a r i s e s  on the
is su e  o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t s '  a b i l i t y  to  provide a land programme in
E as te rn  Ukraine and ga in  a sym pathetic  h ea r in g  f o r  th e  views o f the
pokhidni h ru p y . Armstrong argues t h a t :
th e  i n i t i a l  f a i l u r e  o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  
groups . . .  to  grasp the  o v e rr id in g  importance 
o f  the  land q u e s t io n ,  and th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  making 
t h i s  a prime means by which the  r u r a l  
p o p u la t io n  could be won to  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  cause , 
must c e r t a in l y  be ranked as one of th e  g re a t  
l o s t  o p p o r tu n i t ie s  of t h i s  p e r io d .  I f  th e  
n a t i o n a l i s t s  had, from th e  beginning used a l l  
t h e i r  en erg ies  to  p re s e n t  a p o s i t iv e  programme 
f o r  a g ra r ia n  reform as the  h e a r t  of 
t h e i r  message . . . they  might have l e f t  behind
8 8 K oval',  I s t o r iy a  Pamyataye'. p . 64.
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a conception o f the  U krainian n a t i o n a l i s t  
movement as a defender o f  the  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  the p e a s a n t r y .89
. . . The f a i l u r e  o f  th e  OUN to  p re s e n t  a c o n s t ru c t iv e  
programme adapted to  the  needs o f  East Ukraine makes 
i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  approach the  major q u es t io n  posed 
in  t h i s  ( i . e .  Armstrong’s) s tudy: How s tro n g
was n a t io n a l ism  in  E as t Ukraine? To a co n s id e rab le  
e x te n t ,  the  i n i t i a l  experience  o f  the  E ast Ukrainians 
with p ropaga to rs  o f  n a t i o n a l i s t  d o c tr in e s
was n e g a t i v e .90
Shankowsky responds to  Armstrong’s views by p o in t in g  out th a t
the  ex p ed i t io n a ry  fo rces  developed a land programme in  l a t e  1941
a f t e r  the  p o s i t io n  o f  the  OUN-B meeting in  Cracow in  A p ri l  o f  th a t
91yea r  became an e n t i r e l y  un tenab le  p o s i t io n  to  p ro p ag a te .  He goes 
on to  e la b o ra te  th e  e s s e n t i a l  elements o f  t h i s  program m e-abolition  o f  
a l l  compulsory forms o f  land u se ,  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  land according 
to  fam ily s iz e  and the  r i g h t  to  f r e e ly  form c o -o p e ra t iv e s .
An o b je c t iv e  assessment o f  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s '  success on the  
land i s s u e  appears to  f a l l  between these  two i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s .  The 
OUN-B was c e r t a in l y  l a t e  in  fo rm ula ting  a p o l ic y  on th e  land q u e s t io n ,  b u t 
i t s  f a i l u r e  to  leave behind a l a s t i n g  im pression  as ' a defender of 
the  i n t e r e s t s  o f  the  p e a s a n t ry '  i s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  to  o th e r  reasons as 
w e l l .  One o f the  prime fa c to r s  here  was the  confusion  sown by the 
e x is ten c e  o f  two OUN fa c t io n s  and both  groups' a s s o c ia t io n  w ith  the  
Nazi occupa tion . As w e l l ,  the  inexper ience  of the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  in  
working w ith  S ov ie t  c i t i z e n s ,  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  im m aturity , slowed 
t h e i r  work co nside rab ly  and i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  expect t h a t  any 
p o l i t i c a l  o rg a n is a t io n  o f  t h e i r  type could have l e f t  any l a s t i n g  
im pressions behind a f t e r  one y e a r 's  work. By the  end of 1942 when 
the  S ov ie t  r e -o f f e n s iv e  was about to  beg in , a t  which time Nazi
89Armstrong, U krain ian  N a tionalism , p .  254.
9 0 lb id . ,  p . 282.
91 Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, p. 89.
r e p re s s io n s  were a l s o  a t  t h e i r  h e ig h t ,  thé  pokhidni hrupy had 
l i t t l e  chance o f  ca r ry in g  out any more work in  E as te rn  Ukraine.
Both au th o rs  appear to  have missed the  main p o in t  in  t h i s  
i s s u e .  Arm strong 's q u e s t io n  'How s tro n g  was n a t io n a l ism  in  East 
U kra ine ' can perhaps be answered by two o th e r  questions--how  s tro n g  
was th e  OUN's s o c i a l  awareness and how did  E as te rn  Ukrainian n a t io n a l  
consciousness d i f f e r  from OUN n a tiona lism ?  N ationalism  does no t 
appear to  m an ife s t  i t s e l f  as a c o n s ta n t ,  u n a l te r a b le  by o b je c t iv e  
p rocesses  and conscious d ec is io n s  e i t h e r  in  Ukraine, o r  in  o th e r  
c o u n t r ie s .  The n a t io n a l ism  o f  the  OUN was based on a p a r t i c u l a r  
ideology and p o l i t i c s  as was d iscu ssed  in  Chapter I ,  This was a 
d i f f e r e n t  phenomenon from th e  n a t io n a l  awareness which led  many East 
Ukrainians to  be in  favour o f  a Ukrainian  government independent o f  
R ussia . In th e  l a t t e r  case , the  s o c ia l  con ten t o f  t h i s  consciousness 
was d ia m e t r ic a l ly  counterposed to  th e  s o c ia l  con ten t o f  the  OUN 
programme.
Shankowsky's response to  Armstrong 's c r i t i c i s m s  o f the  OUN 
not fo rm u la ting  a c l e a r  programmatic response on the  a g ra r ia n  q u es t io n  
in  time appears to  be u n s a t i s f a c to r y  because, l ik e  Armstrong,
Shankowsky does n o t cons ider  th e  OUN's ac tio n s  in  th e  con tex t of the  
events  and th e  consciousness of the  E as te rn  U kra in ians . The E as te rn e rs  
d id  no t  e v a lu a te  th e  OUN on the  b a s is  o f  the  l a t t e r ' s  programme 
a lone, bu t on the  b a s is  o f  i t s  t o t a l  approach; i n  Shankowsky's 
own words, ' the  U krain ian  popu la r  masses gave support  to  t h a t  
o rg a n is a t io n  which no t only was ab le  to  shout a b s t r a c t  s lo g an s ,  no 
m a tte r  how good o r  convincing they sounded, bu t which could s tan d  f o r  
th e  l iv in g  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e se  p e o p le ' .  These i n t e r e s t s ,  during the  
occupation , demanded o u t r ig h t  o p p o s it io n  to  Nazi r u l e .  And i t  was on 
t h i s  b a s is  above a l l ,  t h a t  th e  Ukrainians e v en tu a l ly  came to  judge 
the  va lue  o f  the  OUN. The f a c t  t h a t  a new land p o l ic y  was worked out
au
towards th e  end o f  1941 could only have been to  the  advantage of the  
OUN, and i t  appears to  have a f f e c t e d  s e r io u s ly  the  course o f  l a t e r  
ev en ts .  But th e  most im portan t p o in t  o f  the  experience  o f the  
pokhidni hrupy was t h a t  th e  U krain ian  masses were th e  p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t r u c to r s  and the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  were p u p i l s ,  and n o t  th e  expected 
rev e rse  s i t u a t i o n .
Changes in  th e  N a t io n a l i s t  S tra teg y
While the  in te n t io n s  o f  the  OUN-B and OUN-M e x p ed it io n a ry  
fo rces  who headed i n to  E as te rn  Ukraine appear to  have been q u i te  
s im i l a r ,  th e  degree to  which they u t i l i s e d  t h e i r  o p p o r tu n i t ie s  
fo r  independent p o l i t i c a l  work amongst the  labouring  c la s se s  and the 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  were d i f f e r e n t .  The p o l i t i c a l  views o f  the  E as te rn  
U kra in ians , t h e i r  id ea l ism  and high degree of n a t io n a l  awareness p ro ­
foundly a f f e c t e d  the  OUN-B over the  course o f  th e  war. This 
in f lu en c e  was e v id e n t ,  no t only from th e  in f lu x  o f  E as te rn  Ukrainians 
in to  th e  o rg a n is a t io n ,  many of them p lay in g  im portan t ro le s  
in  th e  g u e r r i l l a  war of th e  Ukrainian Insu rgen t Army from 1943 
onwards, bu t a lso  from the  s h i f t  o f  the  OUN-B away from the  Germans. 
The p o l i t i c a l  le ssons  o f  th e  pokhidni hrupy were only w r i t t e n  in to  
the  n a t i o n a l i s t s '  programme in  August 1943.
At the  Second Conference o f  the  Bandera group in  A pril  1942,
the  f i r s t  re fe re n c e  in  n a t i o n a l i s t  documents to  the  War as being  ' a
92g re a t  im p e r i a l i s t  war' i s  made. In the  B yule ten , an o f f i c i a l  
organ o f  the  OUN-B re le a s e d  immediately a f t e r  th e  conference , the  
n a t i o n a l i s t s  s t a t e d  th a t  the  s t r a t e g y  of the  Nazi occupation  was to  
d e p o l i t i c i z e  and l iq u id a te  the  a c t iv e  U krainian i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ,  to  
carry  out an ex ten s iv e  e x p lo i t a t io n  of the  economy in  th e  country
and to  ensure  th e  c u l tu r a l  degenera tion  o f  the  p o p u la t io n  as a whole.
Q9OUN V S v i t l i  Postanov, p. 61.
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At the  same tim e, however, th e  Byuleten o f fe re d  no p o l i t i c a l  s t r a te g y
o f  o p p o s i t io n ,  bu t  r a t h e r  c a l l e d  f o r  the  ' r a c i a l  s o l i d a r i t y '  o f  the
93Ukrainian people as the  b e s t  defense o f  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .
The OUN-B de fined  i t s  s t r a t e g y  in  the  coming months in  an 
a l to g e th e r  u n c le a r  manner. The fo llow ing ex ce rp t  i s  an in d ic a t io n  
of the  c r i s i s  o f  p e rs p e c t iv e s  which gripped the  o rg a n is a t io n  a t  the  
time:
We are  e f f e c t in g  a p o l i t i c a l  course . . . which 
takes  in to  account v a rious  e v e n tu a l i t i e s  o f  t h i s  
w a r 's  conclus ion . At th e  same time we are  counting 
on an armed s t ru g g le  in  th e  n e a r  f u tu r e ,  to  be 
launched a t  the  opportune moment ( the  d e s t r u c t io n  
o f  Moscow, g e n e ra l is e d  ex haus tion , an outward and 
i n t e r n a l  c r i s i s  f o r  Germany). T he re fo re , so 
t h a t  the  energy o f  th e  people no t be wasted away 
in  p a r t i s a n  w arfa re ,  bu t be o rgan ised  in to  a 
b road , p o pu la r  movement, we are  now o rg an is in g  
and m ob il is in g  planned fo rces  fo r  a l l  a spec ts  
o f  our s t r u g g l e .94
The Second Conference f a i l e d  to  make any s ta tem en ts  concerning
a land p o l ic y ,  and was con ten t to  a s s e r t  t h a t  the  land q u e s t io n  was
p a r t  o f  th e  s t ru g g le  'a g a in s t  fo re ig n  e x p lo i ta t io n  and c o n t ro l ,
a g a in s t  a l l  i m p e r i a l i s t  economic s y s t e m s - - c a p i t a l i s t ,  Muscovite
95communist, t o t a l i t a r i a n  and n a t io n a l  s o c i a l i s t ' .
The re fe re n ce  to  p a r t i s a n  w arfare  in  th e  documents appears 
to  have been aimed a t  th e  P o l l s 'k a  S ic h , a small t e r r i t o r y  in  
P o l i s s i a  c o n t ro l le d  by the ataman Taras B u l 'ba  B o ro v e ts ' ,  which had 
been o rgan ised  by independent n a t i o n a l i s t  p a r t i s a n  fo rm ations . B u l 'ba  
B orovets ' was no t a h ig h ly  developed p o l i t i c a l  s t r a t e g i s t ,  having 
n e g o t ia te d  s in ce  1941 w ith  n a t i o n a l i s t ,  S ov ie t and German emmissaries 
w ith  the s in g u la r  concern of p re se rv in g  the  t e r r i t o r y  f o r  h im se lf .
9 3UHVR V I-I :  B yule ten , no. 4, A pril  1942, pp. 2-4,
94OUN V S v i t l i  Postanov, p . 62.
95 I b id . ,  p . 65.
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He d id ,  however, welcome p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i s a n s  opposed to  the  occupation
and the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  a l i k e .  Ivan M itr in g a  and a sm all group o f
OUN-B members had l e f t  the  o rg a n is a t io n  in  1941 a t  the  beginning  o f
the  march o f the  e x p ed i t io n a ry  fo rces  and, in  1942 were encamped
in  the  S ic h . There they is su e d  t h e i r  a n t i - f a s c i s t  newspaper
Oborona Ukrayiny and founded t h e i r  own p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty ,  th e  Ukrainian
P eo p le 's  R evolu tionary  Army [U kray ins 'ka  Narodna R evolyutsiyna 
96Armiya-UNRA). The main p o l i t i c a l  l in e  of the  UNRA was the  demand
fo r  an independent U krainian government o f  workers and p e a s a n ts .  The
membership was q u i te  small in  the  UNRA, although i t s  programme was
d i s t i n c t l y  p ro g re s s iv e .  D is s id en t  members o f  the  OUN-B in  P o l i s s i a
and Volyn had begun t h e i r  own g u e r r i l l a  ope ra tions  in  the  beginning 
97of 1942. The re fe re n ce  to  p a r t i s a n  groups mentioned above appears 
a lso  to  have been in tended  as a n ega tive  re p ly  to  th e se  d i s s id e n t  
i n i t i a t i v e s .
The T hird  Conference o f  the OUN-B was convened immediately
a f t e r  th e  tu rn  a t  the  S ta l in g ra d  f r o n t  on February 17, 1943. The
conference began w ith  an a t ta c k  on 'c o l l a b o r a to r s  in  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t
movement'. For the  f i r s t  tim e, Bandera supporte rs  r e j e c te d  both
b e l l i g e r e n t  powers, and contended t h a t  the  s t ru g g le  f o r  n a t io n a l
independence demanded o p p o s it io n  to  both  Nazi and S ov ie t  p resence
in  Ukraine. The c h a r a c te r i s a t i o n  of Nazi Germany in  the  conference
documents was s t r i k i n g l y  d i f f e r e n t  from the  in s t r u c t i o n s  to  the
pokhidni hrupy to  co n s id e r  h e r  as ' a n a tu ra l  a l ly * :
Germany, by h e r  im p e r i a l i s t  p o l i c i e s  a g a in s t  
the  European p eo p les ,  by h e r  t e r r o r  and ravage 
in  the  occupied t e r r i t o r i e s  has s t im u la te d  th e
96Qborona Ukrayiny. A s in g le  is su e  o f  t h i s  p u b l ic a t io n  
g iv ing  the  programme o f  the  UNRA i s  in  the  p o sse ss io n  o f  P ro f .  B. 
Levytsky in  Munich. See a lso  Armstrong, U krainian N a tio n a l ism , 
pp. 154-55.
97Armstrong, Ukrainian N ationalism , p . 149.
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m o b il is a t io n  o f  contemporary Europe 
a g a in s t  h e r  and h e r  s o -c a l le d  a l l i e s .  In 
t h i s  way, she has c re a te d  th e  id e o lo g ic a l -  
p o l i t i c a l  and m a te r ia l  cond itions  fo r  h e r  own down­
f a l l ,  and i s  a lre ad y  te e t e r i n g  from th e  blows 
o f m i l l io n s  o f  h e r  enemies and from the  growth 
of re v o lu t io n a ry  fo rce s  o f  oppressed 
European p e o p l e s . 9 8
The S ov ie t  Union, on the  o th e r  hand, appeared to  the  OUN to
be e x p lo i t in g  the  war a g a in s t  fascism  in  o rder to  sub juga te  th e
people o f  th e  USSR and to  'c a p tu r e '  the  West. The n a t i o n a l i s t s
saw no recou rse  on the  in te r n a t io n a l  p o l i t i c a l  a rena  o th e r  than
99an o r i e n ta t io n  'towards the  Anglo-American b l o c ' .  How th i s  
o r i e n ta t io n  was to  be p u t  in to  p r a c t i c e  was n o t ,  however, exp la ined  
in  the  conference records  and r e s o lu t io n s .
The most concre te  example of the  s h i f t  in  n a t i o n a l i s t  
s t r a te g y  e v id en t  in  th e  documents o f  the Third  Conference which 
are  a v a i la b le  was t h e i r  o p p o s it io n  to  the  form ation o f  D iv is ion  G a l i c i a . 
The a ttem pt on th e  p a r t  o f  the  Mel'nyk fa c t io n  and Kubiovyc's 
Ukrainian C en tra l  Committee in  G a l ic ia  to  come to  th e  a s s i s ta n c e  of 
the  f a l t e r i n g  German war e f f o r t  was denounced as c o l l a b o r a t i o n i s t  and 
a response to  ' German im p e r i a l i s t  demands fo r  cannon fodder from the  
U krainian peop le , so t h a t  they  may win the  war and be able to  
sub juga te  th e  U krain ian  people even m ore '.^^^
While the  OUN-B was making up i t s  mind about which course to  
take throughout 1942, the  mass of the  p o p u la t io n ,  which faced the 
harsh  r e a l i t y  o f  occupation  ru le  had f a r  o u ts t r ip p e d  i t .  O pposition to  
German r u le  was u n iv e r s a l ,  except in  some p a r t s  o f  G a l ic ia ,
D eporta tions  and th e  imprisonment o f  Red Army s o ld ie r s  in  camps
^®QUN V S v i t l i  Postanov, p . 75. 
99 I b i d . ,  p . 76.
^^^Ibid., p . 87.
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where hundreds o f  thousands had d ied  a f fe c te d  p r a c t i c a l l y  every 
U krain ian  fam ily . Grain r e q u i s i t i o n s  c re a te d  co n d it io n s  o f  s t a r v a t io n  
in  the  co u n try s id e ,  and in  the  towns and c i t i e s  many workers and 
g r e a t e r  numbers, o f  middle c la s s  persons were unemployed.
In th e se  c o n d i t io n s ,  i t  appears t h a t  the  communist underground 
was ga in ing  g r o u n d . T h o s e  b i t t e r l y  opposed to  Nazi r u le  saw in  
the  communist underground and th e  p a r t i s a n  b rig ad es  an i d e n t i f i a b l e  
and unambiguous a l l y .  As much as they may have d i s l ik e d  th e  p rospec t 
o f  even tua l Sov ie t  re-o-ccupation, the  n a t i o n a l i s t  o rg a n is a t io n s  
c o n s t i tu te d  no r e a l  a l t e r n a t i v e  to  the  communists because they were 
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  the  occupants them selves. U n ti l  they  opposed Germany 
in  a p r a c t i c a l  way (conference re s o lu t io n s  se rv in g  l i t t l e  purpose 
in  the  eyes o f  th e  p o pu la tion )  support fo r  the  communist underground 
and p a r t i s a n  movement would grow.
The OUN-M, a t  th i s  p o in t  in  the  war, chose to  s t e e r  the  
t r a d i t i o n a l  course . The Bandera group, reco g n is in g  the  l a t e  hour, 
t h a t  the  mood o f  the  p o p u la t io n  whom they had hoped to  lead  in  
th e  s t ru g g le  was f a r  in  advance o f t h e i r  o rg a n is a t io n ,  and above 
a l l ,  t h a t  Germany would probably  lose  the  War, a ttem pted  to  catch up 
w ith  mass sen tim en t.
^^^N im e ts 'k o - - fa sh y s ts 'k y y  Okupatsiynyy Rezhym na U k ray in i . 
Zbirnyk Dokumentiv i  M a te ry a l iy  (Kiev, 1963), p . 62.
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CHAPTER I I I  
THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY
Throughout the  y ea r  1942, the  German m i l i t a r y  e f f o r t  f a l t e r e d .  
By December, w ith  the  c r i s i s  a t  S ta l in g ra d ,  the  ba lance  o f  fo rces  
on the  e a s te rn  f r o n t  s h i f t e d  in  favour o f  the S ov ie t Union. In an 
e f f o r t  to  b o l s t e r  th e  c o l la p s in g  f r o n t ,  th e  German a u th o r i t i e s  
began an in te n s iv e  e x p lo i t a t io n  o f  the  t e r r i t o r i e s  o f  th e  E a s t - -  
e s c a la t i n g  d e p o r ta t io n s  o f  labou r, r u th le s s  measures to  in c re a se  
p ro d u c t iv i ty  in  in d u s t ry ,  g r e a te r  r e q u i s i t io n s  o f  g ra in  and p o l i t i c a l  
p e rs ec u t io n  o f  a c t iv e  opponents o f  the  occupant regime.
By th e  end o f  January , 1943, S ov ie t fo rces  were in  a p o s i t io n
to  begin  the  c o u n te r -o f fe n s iv e .  The re tu rn  of S o v ie t  troops across
the  t e r r i t o r i e s  o f  the  USSR was almost as ra p id  as had been th e  German 
advance of 1941. From February 2 to  August 22, a l l  the  t e r r i t o r y  
between S ta l in g ra d  and Kharkiv in  E as tern  Ukraine was re ta k en .  In 
e a r ly  November, Kiev was l i b e r a t e d .  I t  took approxim ately  one y ea r  
f o r  th e  Red Army to  cap ture  a l l  o f  C e n t ra l ,  Western and C arpathian 
Ukraine. From November 1944, th e  S ovie t advance made f o r  B e r l in .^
By th e  end o f  1942, each Red P a r t i s a n  b r ig ad e  in  Ukraine
was led  by one or more p a r t i s a n s  who had co n sid e rab le  experience  in
g u e r r i l l a  w a r fa re . The c e n t r a l  command o f  the  p a r t i s a n  movement was
^Kubiovyc, g e n .e d , ,  Ukraine Concise Encyclopaedia , pp. 885-90
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now equipped w ith  t r a n s p o r t  p la n e s ,  enab ling  i t  to  i n s e r t  b rigades  
and d iv e rs io n a ry  groups deep in s id e  enemy t e r r i t o r y  w ithou t 
n e c e s s i t a t in g  long and exhausting  t re k s  from C en tra l  o r  E as tern  
Ukraine, The most im portan t p a r t i s a n  i n i t i a t i v e s  taken  in  1943 were 
by the  u n i te d  fo rces  o f  Kovpak and Saburov in  North Western Ukraine.
The a b i l i t y  o f  the  S ovie t m i l i t a r y  command to  deploy s i g n i f i c a n t  
fo rces  behind  enemy l in e s  not only in d ic a te d  th e  s t r e n g th  of the  
m i l i t a r y  ap p a ra tu s ,  b u t  a lso  the  confidence th a t  th e  p a r t i s a n  groups 
could s t r i k e  a responsive  chord amongst some Western U krainian 
communities.
The beginnings o f  n a t i o n a l i s t  g u e r r i l l a  a c t i v i t y  a g a in s t  
German p o l ic e  u n i t s  and a d m in is t ra t iv e  cen tres  p receded  th e  OUN-B 
i n i t i a t i v e s .  M it r in g a 's  group and o thers  encamped in  the  P o l i s 'ka  
S ic h , as was a lread y  mentioned were a c t iv e  s in ce  1941. Numerous 
o th e r  groups found re fuge  in  th e  deep f o r e s t s  and marshes o f  North 
Western Ukraine--Jews f le e in g  p e r s e c u t io n .  Red Army s t r a g g le r s  and 
d e s e r te r s  and peasan ts  whose land had been taken from them or whose 
fa m il ie s  had been k i l l e d .  They formed s e l f -d e fe n c e  u n i t s  in  the  
form of g u e r r i l l a  bands. The d i s t i n c t i o n  between b a n d i t ry  and p o l i t i c a l  
g u e r r i l l a  a c t i v i t y  was o f te n  b lu r r e d  by the  cond itions  
o f  war and ex ten s iv e  s o c ia l  d i s lo c a t io n .
The OUN-B took th e  d e c is io n  to  form the  U krain ian  In su rgen t 
Army (U kray ins 'ka  P o v s ta n s 'k a  Armiya-UPA) fo r  s e v e ra l  rea so n s .  The 
most im portan t appears to  have been the  f a c t  t h a t  the  p o p u la t io n  in  
p a r t s  of Western Ukraine, in  p a r t i c u l a r  Volyn and P o l i s s i a ,  had 
tu rn ed  d e c is iv e ly  a g a in s t  the  occupation  and th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  d id  no t
2
Strokach, Nash Pozyvnyy, p . 196
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want to  be ou tf lanked  by th e  mass movement they  hoped to  lead . The 
e n try  o f  S ov ie t  p a r t i s a n s  i n to  North Western Ukraine th re a te n e d  to  
undermine t h e i r  e x i s t in g  ba se ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  Volyn [which had 
been a s tro n g h o ld  o f  CPWU a c t i v i t y  in  th e  years  o f  P o l i sh  r u l e ) . 
Second, th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  considered  the  e s tab lish m en t o f  armed 
g u e r r i l l a  u n i t s  to  be one im portan t p re p a ra t io n  f o r  th e  impending 
re tu rn  o f  the  S ov ie t  a u t h o r i t i e s .  They in tended  to  c a r ry  on t h e i r  
s t ru g g le  f o r  as long as p o s s ib le  be fo re  r e t r e a t i n g  i n to  th e  under­
ground, The s tag e  was thus s e t  f o r  the  c lash  between th e  OUN and
i t s  prim ary enemy, th e  S ov ie t Union. As in  o th e r  c r u c ia l  tu rn in g  
p o in ts  in  U krain ian  n a t i o n a l i s t  h i s to r y ,  th e  o b je c t iv e  cond itions  
demanded a change in  t h e i r  s t r a t e g y ;  the  OUN was seldom the  m aster 
of i t s  c o n d i t io n s .
The f i r s t  u n i t s  o f  th e  UPA were co n so lid a ted  from the  
remnants o f  B u l 'ba  B o ro v e ts ' '  group, sym pathisers o f  the  OUN-M f a c t io n  
who had been fo rced  to  take up arms a g a in s t  the  Germans and the  
OUN-B cadre in  Volyn, who appear to  have been ready to  f i g h t  fo r  
some tim e. Although v arious  OUN lead e rs  have s in ce  argued th a t  i t  
was t h e i r  f a c t i o n 's  i n i t i a t i v e  and n o t the  o th e r ' s  to  e s t a b l i s h  the  
UPA, th e re  seems to  be l i t t l e  reason  to  be labour such an in v e s t ig a t i o n  
in to  i t s  o r ig in s .  Above a l l ,  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  g u e r r i l l a  u n i t s  were 
a p roduct o f  a growing s o c ia l  phenomenon encompassing many p o l i t i c a l  
tendenc ies  t h a t  the  OUN-B managed to  u n i te  in to  a cohesive f ig h t in g  
f o r c e .^  This ex p la in s  th e  f a c t  t h a t ,  throughout the  h i s to r y  of the  
UPA, i t  always remained an independent o rg a n is a t io n  a c c e s s ib le  to  
a l l  who were p repa red  to  f i g h t  f o r  a sovereign  Ukraine, The UPA
^UHVR B2-1; "Vyzvol'na B o ro t 'b a  U krayins 'koho Narodu i  
P o l ' s h c h a ' , p .  6.
'^A. Osypenko, 'Vklad OUN u Spravu Tvorenya i  Rozbudovu UPA' 
in  UPA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv z B oro t 'by  za U kray ins 'ku  Samostiynu 
Sobomu Derzhavu 1942--1950 r . r .  2 v o ls .  ((London, 1957-60), I ,  
p . 27-28.
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le ad e rsh ip  always r e ta in e d  c lo se  t i e s  w ith  the  OUN-B, however and
was re p re se n te d  on th e  l a t t e r  o r g a n i s a t io n 's  lead ing  bodies  from 1943
onwards.® T aras  Chuprynka (pseudonym fo r  Roman Shukhevych) the
le ad e r  o f  the  Army a f t e r  the  end o f  the  Second World War, wrote the
fo llow ing in  1949 about the  genesis  o f  the  UPA:
The p a r t i s a n  detachments which formed a f t e r  
th e  massive movement o f  Ukrainian youth , men 
and women in to  i l l e g a l  a c t i v i t y ,  could no 
longer remain as m i l i t a r y  u n i t s  o f  the  OUN, 
because in  them, a s id e  from the  OUN members, 
th e re  were people  who sympathised w ith  o th e r  
p o l i t i c a l  views, p a s t  members o f  o th e r  groups 
and n o n -a ligned  U krain ian  p a t r i o t s .  For 
t h i s  rea so n , the  UPA was the  p roduct o f  armed 
detachments e n te r in g  in to  a s in g le ,  a l l  n a t io n a l ,  
s u p ra -p a r ty  o r g a n i s a t i o n .&
In February , 1943, UPA u n i t s  in  P o l i s s i a  launched t h e i r  
f i r s t  campaign w ith  the  twin o b je c t iv e  o f  d es tro y in g  the  German 
a d m in is t r a t io n  th e re  and then  d r iv in g  out the  Red P a r t i s a n s  who had
7
a lread y  made in c u rs io n s  from B yelo russ ia .  By March, many strongho lds  
o f  the  German occupation were destroyed  and th e  Red P a r t i s a n s  
tem pora rily  d r iven  e a s t  beyond the  r i v e r  Slush and n o r th  of the  Kovel- 
Sam  l in e  in to  the  P r ip e t  Marshes. The major b a t t l e s  occurred  
during t h i s  f i r s t  two month campaign in  P o l i s s i a  n e a r  the  towns of
g
S to lyna , Sam  and Volodymyr.
UPA bases were e s ta b l i s h e d  on th e  s i t e s  of former S ov ie t 
p a r t i s a n  encampments in  February and March. The n a t i o n a l i s t s  a lso  
began ano ther  type  of a c t i v i t y  which became a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f e a tu re  
of t h e i r  s t ru g g le  fo r  the  rem ainder o f  the  War, The p r is o n e r -o f -w a r
®I. Butkovsky, 'O rh an iza ts iy n a  S tru k tu ra  UPA’ in  UPA v S v i t l i  
Dokumentiv, I .  p .  13.
®UHVR A4-1: Taras Chuprynka, 'Do Genezy UHVR' (Lviv, 1949).
See a lso  UHVR v S v i t l i  Postanov Velykoho Zboru t a  Inshykh Dokumentiv z 
D iy a l 'n o s ty  1944-1951 r . r .  (London, 1 9 5 6 ) .  52~ ~
^Lebed' U kray ins 'ka  P o v s ta n s 'k a  Armiya, p .  25,
®See R e i t l i n g e r ,  House B u il t  on Sand, p . 247; UPA v S v i t l i  
Dokumentiv, I I ,  p . 5; and Lebed, U kray ins 'ka  P o v s ta n s 'k a  Armiya, 
p . 43,
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camp in  Lutsk was. opened by the in su rg e n ts  and p r i s o n e r s  s e t  f r e e .
P r isons  in  Kremyanets, Dubno, Kovel, Lutsk and Horokhiv (Volyn)
were destroyed  and p r i s o n e rs  r e le a s e d .  Some o f  them jo in e d  the  UPA.
By March, the  OUN-B c i v i l i a n  network in  North Western Ukraine was
s u f f i c i e n t l y  p repared  to  c o -o rd in a te  i t s  a c t io n s  w ith  th e  r u r a l
based g u e r r i l l a s .  The f i r s t  recorded  in s ta n ce  o f  such co -o p e ra t io n
in  a c tu a l  b a t t l e  o p e ra t io n s  was the  e n t ry  o f  th e  UPA u n i t s  in to  small
towns where members o f  the OUN were serv ing  in  the  p o l ic e  u n i t s  o f
the  German a d m in is t r a t io n .  T h e re a f te r ,  these  p o l ic e  u n i t s  were
in c re a s in g ly  in s t r u c t e d  to  d e s e r t  w ith  arms and j o in  nearby UPA 
9groups .
By th e  end o f  A p r i l ,  th e  reg ions  o f Mizoch, O s t r ih ,  Shumsk, 
Kremyanets and Verba in  P o l i s s i a  had been c lea re d  o f  the  Germans.
Large landed e s t a t e s ,  the  L iegenschaften  were d ism antled  in  the  
Volodymyr reg io n .  These were form erly  P o lish  landed e s t a t e s  which 
had been n a t io n a l i s e d  during  the  f i r s t  Sovie t occupation  of Western 
Ukraine. Upon the  a r r i v a l  o f  th e  German arm ies, they were handed 
over to  German landowners or were adm in is tered  by th e  s t a t e .  The 
L iegenschaften  a l s o  served  as fo ca l  p o in ts  f o r  th e  Nazi gendarm erie,^^ 
While the  Germans m ain ta ined  c o n tro l  over the  l a r g e r  towns 
in  Volyn and P o l i s s i a ,  the  UPA s t e a d i ly  dominated the  cou n try s id e .
In the  course o f  t h e i r  expansion, th e  in su rg en ts  developed s trong  
t i e s  of co -o p e ra t io n  w ith  the  lo c a l  p e a sa n try .  The l a t t e r  p rov ided  
them w ith  s h e l t e r ,  food and im portan t in fo rm ation  concerning the 
movement o f  German troops and S ovie t p a r t i s a n s .  In r e tu r n ,  they
^See Lebed, U kray ins 'ka  P o v s tan s 'k a  Armiya, pp. 25-26; and 
UPA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I I ,  pp. 6-7.
^^Lebed, U k ray in s 'k a  P o v s tan s 'k a  Armiya, p . 43.
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defended th e  p easan ts  m i l i t a r i l y  during h a r v e s t s ,  a f fo rd in g  them th e
time and s e c u r i ty  to  g a th e r  t h e i r  crops and h ide  them from roaming
r e q u i s i t i o n  u n i t s . B y  the  autumn of 1943, the  UPA was in
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n tro l  o f  the  country  d i s t r i c t s  to  begin  c re a t in g
' l i b e r a t e d  z o n e s ' ,  th e  embryos o f  what i t  b e l ie v e d  to  he a fu tu re
independent s t a t e :
The UPA command i s  faced  with a new ta s k -  
no t only o f  defending th e  lo c a l  p o p u la t io n  
ag a in s t  th e  d e s t r u c t iv e  German a c t io n s ,  bu t  
a lso  o f  o rg a n is in g  those t e r r i t o r i e s  where 
the  occupants have been l iq u id a te d .  This 
s i t u a t i o n  p rov ides  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  fo r  con­
s t r u c t i n g  the  new s t a t e  w ith in  the  e x i s t in g  
s t a t e .  On th e  one hand our m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g th  i s  
being b u i l t  in  th e  co n so lid a ted  f o r e s t  bases ;  
on th e  o th e r ,  we have begun to  o rgan ise  th e  
l i f e  o f  th e  people in  a l l  i t s  a sp e c ts .  A new 
Ukrainian s t a t e  a d m in is t ra t io n  i s  being 
formed, in  whose confines  our n a t io n a l  w ealth  
i s  defended. An a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c to r  i s  being b u i l t  
which takes  charge o f  d i s t r i b u t i n g  the  se iz e d  
p ro p e r ty  o f  the  former s t a t e  apparatus amongst 
the  p e a s a n try ,  and which ensures p roper 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  methods. Home in d u s t r ie s  and 
some fa c to ry  i n d u s t r i e s  have been r e - s t a r t e d .
By June, 1943, the n a t i o n a l i s t s  were s u f f i c i e n t l y  s tro n g  to
launch a th re e  week r a id  in to  Zhytomyr and Kiev o b la s t s ,  where they
13engaged in  f i f t e e n  b a t t l e s  w ith  German u n i t s  and S ov ie t  p a r t i s a n s .
In the  second h a l f  of 1943, a f t e r  encountering  r e s i s t e n c e  from 
S o v ie t  p a r t i s a n s  in  the  above mentioned o b la s ts  and in  Kamyanets- 
P od ilsk , they a ttem pted  to  ex tend  t e r r i t o r y  in  t h e i r  c o n tro l  e a s t  
and f u r th e r  so u th .  As b e fo re ,  the  s t r a te g y  o f th e  g u e r r i l l a s  was to  
avoid la rg e  towns and c o n cen tra t io n s  of enemy fo r c e s ,  bu t to  dominate the
^^P. Volosh and K, V ir ly n iv ,  ' U B oro t’b i  za V olyu--p id  
Praporamy UPA', in  UPA v S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I ,  pp. 250-51.
12 L ebed ',  U kray ins 'ka  P o v s tan s 'k a  Armiya, p . 29.
^^UPA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I I ,  p. 18.
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the  co un trys ide  and c r e a te  l in k s  w ith  the  p e a s a n t ry . By t h i s  time 
an A zerbaizhani d iv is io n  of the  UPA was a c t iv e  in  Volyn a g a in s t  
German a ttem pts  to  re ta k e  l o s t  t e r r i t o r i e s . ^ ^  At th e  same tim e, 
P o lish -U kra in ian  r e l a t i o n s  in  Volyn were worsening, c re a t in g  new 
problems fo r  the  movement. The P o lish  q u es t io n  i s  d e a l t  w ith  in  a 
f u r th e r  s e c t io n .  By October, the  UPA had managed to  make i t s  presence  
f e l t  i n  Kamyanets-PodiIsk and V in n i t s ia ,  two main t a r g e t s  of i t s  
expansion d r iv e ,  bu t  f a i l e d  to  secure  co n tro l  o f  the  t e r r i t o r i e s  
t h e r e .
An e n t i r e l y  new aspec t o f  the n a t i o n a l i s t  movement appeared 
in  1943-“ the  e s tab lish m en t o f  i n i t i a l  con tac ts  w ith  o th e r  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  
and t h e i r  rec ru itm en t to  the  UPA. In June, September and December, 
the  in su rg en ts  launched sep a ra te  propaganda campaigns in  th e  form 
o f  mass l e a f l e t i n g  d i r e c te d  a t  the  various  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  who were 
in  t h e i r  own 'n a t i o n a l '  d iv is io n s  o f  the German army. The aim of 
t h i s  propaganda was to  ex p la in  the  UPA p o s i t io n  on the  War and 
to  urge th e se  s o ld ie r s  to  d e s e r t  and come over to  the  s id e  o f  the  UPA, 
They argued t h a t  r e l i a n c e  on e i t h e r  of the  p r in c ip a l  b e l l i g e r e n t s  
was no t  a c o r re c t  s t r a t e g y  f o r  the  n a t io n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  o f  the  
oppressed peoples who had decided to  e n te r  the  Germans o r Sov ie t  
a rm ie s .
In June, the  head command o f the  UPA re le a s e d  a l e a f l e t  
addressed to  R ussians, c a l l in g  fo r  the  r e c o n s t ru c t io n  o f  E astern  
Europe and Asia on th e  b a s is  of independent n a t io n  s t a t e s  on re sp e c t iv e  
ethnograph ic  t e r r i t o r i e s .  Only f r a t e r n a l  harmonious c o -e x is te n c e .
^ ^ I b id . ,  p .  25.
^^ UHVR B4-3: V i l 'n a  Ukrayina, no. 8, September 1943, p . 6.
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the  pamphlet s t a t e d ,  between such s t a t e s  would h a l t  im p e r i a l i s t  war
and c re a te  a p ro p e r  basis, f o r  p eace fu l  economic p ro g re s s .  'Only
in  th e se  c ircum stances i s  the  r e b i r t h  of the  Russian n a t io n a l  s t a t e
p o s s i b l e . T h e  pamphlet a lso  appealed to  the  Russians to  s t ru g g le
a g a in s t  bo th  ' i n t e r n a l '  a n d 'e x te r n a l '  im peria lism s a l ik e  by jo in in g
the  UPA. In th e  same month, a pamphlet was is su e d  under the  heading
'UPA c a l l  to  Uzbeks, T a ta r s ,  Kazakhs, Turkmen, Tadzhiks, B ashkirs ,
17n a t io n s  o f  the  U ra ls ,  Volga and S ib e r i a ,  n a t io n s  o f  A s i a ' .  They
were urged to  d e s e r t  t h e i r  German d iv is io n s  with arms and jo in  the
UPA. A p r in t e d  appeal went ou t to  Armenians and T a ta rs  in  September
w ith  s im i la r  arguments.
This p a r t i c u l a r  t e x t  begins with a w ell informed t r e a t i s e
on the  h i s t o r i c a l  predicam ent o f  the  T a ta r  n a t io n .  S im ila r  appeals
18were made to  Georgians and B yelo russ ians .
Concrete r e s u l t s  o f  th e se  campaigns showed themselves in  
the  form ation o f  new, non-U krainian d iv is io n s  o f  the  In su rgen t 
Army, and in  th e  o rg a n is a t io n  o f  the  F i r s t  Conference o f  Oppressed 
Peoples o f  Europe and Asia under UPA sponsorship  in  November 1943. 
T h ir ty  n ine  d e leg a te s  from t h i r t e e n  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  took p a r t  in  th e  
conference . R ep resen ta t iv es  inc luded  Czechs, B ashk irs ,  Armenians, 
Georgians and R ussians. The aim o f  the  conference was to  demonstrate 
the  u n i ty  o f  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  in  a coord ina ted  s t ru g g le  a g a in s t  the  German 
occupation and the  Sov ie t  Union in  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  each g roup 's  
independent s ta teh o o d ,
^^UPA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I ,  p .  105-106,
Honcharuk, 'UPA Nosiva Idevi Vyzvolenya i  Druzhby N a ro d iv ',  
in  Ukrayina Pro ty  Moskvy [London, 1965), pp. 158-197. See a lso  UPA v 
S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I ,  p .  103.
1 RUPA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I .  pp. 107-109, 110-12.
^^Nicholas C hubaty j, 'The Ukrainian Underground', Ukrainian 
Q u a r te r ly , no. 2, 1949, pp. 154-166.
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With the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  o f  f ig h t in g  between th e  German army
and UPA bands towards the  end o f  1943, and w ith  th e  i n f i l t r a t i o n  o f
the  w estern  o b la s t s  by Red P a r t i s a n ^ ,  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s
were unable to  defend s u c c e s s fu l ly  a l l  o f the  cen tre s  o f  p o p u la t io n
they had cap tu red  in  the  p a s t .  As a g u e r r i l l a  fo rc e ,  they  were
always moving and could no t continue  to  r e tu r n  to  v i l l a g e s  r e q u i r in g
defense a t  any tim e. To make m a tte rs  worse, the  German command
organ ised  teams o f  co u n te r - - in su rg en cy  exper ts  and ass igned  them to
c le a r in g  th e  Rivno a rea  o f  p a r t i s a n s .  One o f th e se  e x p e r ts ,  Von
dem Bach, was a p r in c ip a l  o rg a n is e r  o f  the  crush ing  o f  the  Warsaw
20g h e t to  u p r i s in g  in  the  sp r ing  of 1944.
To coun ter  th e  d isadvantages of t h e i r  en fo rced  m o b i l i ty ,  UPA
f ig h te r s  began to  e s t a b l i s h  S e l f  Defense Groups (Samooboronni Kushchovi
V id d i ly ) . These groups were made up o f lo c a l  in h a b i ta n t s  of v i l l a g e s
and were t r a in e d  in  armed combat to  defend t h e i r  homes from g ra in
r e q u i s i t i o n  u n i t s  and p o l ic e  teams. The form ation of th e se  groups
in  North Western Ukraine was w idespread. In G a l ic ia ,  where th e  UPA
was no t seen fo r  th e  g r e a te r  p a r t  o f  1943, such u n i t s  were a lready  in
ex is ten c e  to  defend the  p o p u la t io n  a g a in s t  in c re a s in g  Nazi r e p r i s a l s
21and ravaging during  the  German r e t r e a t .
The p o l i t i c a l  aims o f  the  UPA were c l e a r ly  s t a t e d  in  i t s  
d e c la r a t io n  which appeared as a l e a f l e t  in  e a r ly  1943:
What i s  the  UPA f ig h t in g  fo r?
The U krainian In su rgen t Army i s  f ig h t in g  f o r  an 
independent Sovereign U krainian S ta te  and th e  r i g h t  
o f each n a t io n  to  i t s  own l i f e  in  i t s  own, f r e e
20 Lebed ', U kray ins 'ka  P o v s tan s 'k a  Armiya, pp. 102-103. See 
a lso  Warsaw Aflame: The 1939-1945 Years (Los Angeles, 1973) p . 137.
21 Butkovsky, ' O rh an iza ts iy n a  S tru k tu ra  UPA', p . 11, See a lso  
QUN V S v i t l i  Postanov, p , 98.
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independent s t a t e .  The d e s t r u c t io n  o f  
n a t io n a l  su g ju g a t io n  and th e  e x p lo i t a t io n  o f  
n a t io n s  by o th e r  n a t io n s ,  a system o f  f r e e  
peop les  in  t h e i r  own independent s t a t e s —is  the  
only  s o lu t io n  to  the  n a t io n a l  and s o c ia l  q u es t io n s  
o f  the  whole world.
Against im peria lism , th e re fo re  a g a in s t  the  USSR 
and the  German 'New E urope '.
A gainst i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t  and f a s c i s t  n a t io n a l  
s o c i a l i s t  programs and p o l i t i c a l  concep tions .
For the  c r e a t io n  o f  a Ukrainian s t a t e  w ithout 
c a p i t a l i s t s ,  la n d lo rd s ,  bo lshev ik  commissars, NKVD 
agents  and p a r ty  p a r a s i t e s .
N a t io n a l i s a t io n  o f heavy in d u s try  and c o -o p e ra t iv e  
c o n tro l  o f  l i g h t  in d u s t ry .
P a r t i c ip a t io n  o f  workers in  th e  running o f  
f a c t o r i e s ,  fo r  th e  enforcement o f  the  p r in c ip l e  o f  
s k i l l  in  c o n tro l  and n o t  p a r ty  membership.
For an e ig h t  hour day, s t r i c t l y  v o lu n ta ry  overtim e, 
l ik e  a l l  work, w ith  a s e p a ra te  s c a le  o f  wages.
For a j u s t  wage and p r o f i t s h a r i n g . For a wage 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  to  meet the  needs o f  a whole fam ily .
.Dividends ( to  workers) from c o -o p e ra t iv e ly  
c o n t ro l le d  e n te r p r i s e s  and premiums from s t a t e  owned 
ones ,
The r i g h t  to  work, a choice of p ro fe s s io n  and 
p lace  o f  work.
Freedom o f  t ra d e  un ions , d e s t r u c t io n  o f 
Stakhanovism and o th e r  methods o f e x p lo i t in g  labour.
Free a r t i s a n r y ,  th e  r i g h t  to  form g u i ld s  o r  work 
in d iv id u a l ly .
N a tiona l o rg a n is a t io n  o f  la rg e  s c a le  t r a d e ,  
c o -o p e ra t iv e  c o n tro l  o f  p e t ty  t r a d e ;  fo r  f r e e  b aza a rs .
E q u a li ty  o f  women in  a l l  aspec ts  o f  c iv ic  l i f e ,  
access to  a l l  schools  and p ro fe s s io n s .  The r i g h t  to  
p h y s ic a l ly  l i g h t e r  work.
S ta te  care  o f  m a t e r n i t i e s . For the  development 
o f  medical f a c i l i t i e s .
Freedom of the  p r e s s ,  speech, thought, co n v ic t io n  and 
world view. A gainst o f f i c i a l l y  enforced  s o c ia l  
d o c tr in e s  and dogma . . . the  s e p a ra t io n  o f  Church 
and S t a t e ,
For c u l t u r a l  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  o th e r  n a t io n s ,  the  r i g h t  
to  em igra te  as c i t i z e n s  fo r  f u r th e r  educa tion  or 
medical t re a tm en t and f o r  purposes o f  observ ing  the  l i f e  
and c u l tu r a l  achievements o f  o th e r  peo p les .
For the  f u l l  r i g h t s  o f  n a t io n a l  m in o r i t ie s  to  develop 
th e  forms and con ten t o f  t h e i r  own n a t io n a l  c u l tu re s  
f r e e ly .
E q u a l i ty  o f  a l l  c i t i z e n s ,  re g a rd le s s  of 
n a t i o n a l i t y  in  s t a t e  and c i v i l  r ig h t s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
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Equal r ig h t s  in  work, pay and l e i s u r e .
For a f r e e ,  in  form and co n ten t ,  U krain ian  
c u l tu r e ,  fo r  a h e ro ic  s p i r i t ,  h ig h  m ora ls , coimnunity 
s o l i d a r i t y ,  f r ie n d s h ip  and d i s c i p l in e .  22
U.P.A,
By th e  end o f  1943, the  in su rg e n ts  had confirmed in  p r a c t i c e  
some o f t h e i r  programmatic p o s i t io n s  as they are  o u t l in e d  above in  
the  f i r s t  d e c la ra t io n  o f  aims. They had begun an a c t iv e  s t ru g g le  
a g a in s t  both German and Sovie t fo rce s ;  they had demonstrated 
t h e i r  a t t i t u d e  towards o th e r  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  by f ig h t in g  alongside 
of them. This s tood  in  sharp c o n t ra s t  to  the  i n t e g r a l  n a t i o n a l i s t  
focus o f  the  p a s t .  In the  l ib e r a te d  zones, the  UPA attem pted  to  
pu t some o f  i t s  land and s o c ia l  p o l i c i e s  in to  p r a c t i c e .  These inc luded  
the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  land to  the l a n d le s s - - p a r t  o f  t h i s  p r o je c t  had 
i t s  conceptual o r ig in s  in  th e  d iscu ss io n s  of the  ex p ed it io n a ry  fo rces  
in  E as te rn  Ukraine in  1941-42. I t  a lso  inc luded  a c t iv e  m i l i t a r y  
defense o f  the  p e a san try  a g a in s t  the  occupants.
More im portan t s t i l l ,  however was the  f a c t  t h a t  th e  new 
p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t io n s  of the  UPA r e f l e c t e d  a b a s ic  knowledge o f the  
g rievances and demands of workers who l iv e d  under S ov ie t  r u le -  
Stakhanovism, heavy labour fo r  women and the  ban on em ig ra tion . The 
in c lu s io n  of b a s ic  s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  demands r e l a t e d  to  the  s t a tu s  
of the  working p o p u la t io n ,  such as the  demand f o r  f r e e  t ra d e  un ions , 
and those  considered  to  be fundamental democratic r i g h t s  gave t h e i r  
programme f o r  an independent U krain ian  s t a t e  a con ten t p o t e n t i a l l y  
accep tab le  to  broad groups o f  U krainians and o th e r  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  
l iv in g  in  Ukraine. By i t s  p o l i t i c a l  c h a r a c te r ,  the  UPA programme 
r e je c te d  the  f a s c i s t  n o tio n s  o f  the  1929 OUN r e s o lu t io n s .  This tu rn
22 UHVR B 1--3 .1: 'Za shcho B o re t 'sy a  Vyzvol'na Revolyutsiyna 
U kray ins 'ka  P o v s tan s 'k a  Arm iya', 1943.
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to  the  l e f t  in  1943 by the  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement and th e  ra p id  growth 
of i t s  cad res  marks the  h ig h  p o in t  in  i t s  e n t i r e  h i s to r y .
The Composition o f  the  UPA
The n a t io n a l  composition o f  the  UPA may be d iv ided  in to
(a) i t s  core U krainian d iv is io n s ;
(b) n a t io n a l  co n tingen ts  o f  Armenia n s , B y e lo ru ss ian s ,
G eorgians, Crimean T a ta r s ,  A zerbaizhanis  and Uzbeks.
These groups had t h e i r  own s e p a ra te  commands, b u t were under the  genera l
d i s c i p l i n e  and d i r e c t iv e  of the  UPA le ad e rs h ip .  In a l l ,  the  non-
U krainian s e c t io n s  o f  th e  Army c o n s t i tu te d  roughly 10-15% of the
e n t i r e  fo rc e .  Many o f  th e se  r e c r u i t s  were Red Army d e s e r te r s  and
those  cut o f f  from t h e i r  u n i t s ,  and in  s im i la r  c ircum stances , from
23d iv is io n s  o f  the  German army. The c o n tr ib u t io n  o f  Red Army 
o f f i c e r s  who jo in e d  UPA, was no t only a m i l i t a r y  and p h y s ic a l  con­
t r i b u t i o n  as f i g h t e r s ,  bu t  a lso  a p o l i t i c a l  one, a f f e c t in g  s e r io u s ly  
the  l e f t  tu rn  o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement in  1943.^^
M. Lebed' no tes  th a t  many doc tors  in  th e  UPA were Jews who 
had been rescued  from Nazi d e te n t io n  cen tres  o r  were f ree d  from 
d e p o r ta t io n  t r a i n s  :
Most o f  th e  doc tors  in  UPA were Jews whom 
the  UPA rescued  from H i t l e r i t e  l iq u id a t io n  
a c t io n s ,  Jewish doc tors  were t r e a t e d  as f u l l  
c i t i z e n s  o f  Ukraine and as rank ing  o f f i c e r s  
o f  the  U krain ian  army. At t h i s  p o in t  i t  i s  
necessa ry  to  emphasise t h a t  they no t only c a r r i e d  
out t h e i r  im portan t r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and a ided  no t 
only the  in s u rg e n ts ,  b u t a lso  the  whole p o p u la t io n ,  
t r a v e l l i n g  throughout a reas  and o rg an is in g  
f i e l d  and c i t y  c l i n i c s .  They d i d n ' t  q u i t  th e  
ranks in  d i f f i c u l t  s i t u a t i o n s ,  even when they  had 
an o p p o rtu n i ty  to  go over to  th e  Red P a r t i s a n s . 25
2 3Danylo Shumuk, Za Skhidnim Qbriem (B altim ore , 1974), pp. 13-14
^^ loc . c i t . ,
25 Lebed*, Ukrayins'ka P ovstans'ka  Armiya, pp. 35-36.
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Two a r t i c l e s  by Leo Heiman in  the  U krain ian  Q u a r te r ly  sub­
s t a n t i a t e  Lebed 's  re fe re n c e  to  UPA p r a c t i c e  in  r e l a t i o n s  to  the  Jews 
in  Ukraine. In one a r t i c l e  e n t i t l e d  'We Fought f o r  U k ra in e ',  Heiman 
recoun ts  th e  c o -o p e ra t io n  e s ta b l i s h e d  by a g u e r r i l l a  u n i t  made up 
o f su rv iv o rs  o f  the  Kovel g h e t to  massacre in  1942, led  by Z elig  
Broiderman and th e  UPA u n i t s  who en te red  the  a rea .  In  ano ther a r t i c l e  
e n t i t l e d  'They Saved J e w s ',  Heiman responds to  Sov ie t  charges to  
the  e f f e c t  t h a t  th e  UPA was a n t i -S e m i t ic ,  and p rov ides  case evidence 
to  the  c o n tra ry .
The procedure fo r  re c ru i tm e n t  to  the  UPA, a lthough  i t  was 
never fo rm ally  sy s te m a tised ,  demanded more from a p p l ic a n ts  than  had 
p rev ious OUN p o l i c i e s .  A pp lican ts  were re q u ire d  to  dem onstrate  not 
only a w il l in g n e s s  and a b i l i t y  to  f i g h t ,  bu t a lso  to  acqu ire  an 
elem entary  p o l i t i c a l  a p p re c ia t io n  o f  the  aims o f  the  Army. The Army 
r e c r u i t e d  from a l l  s e c to rs  o f  the  p o p u la t io n - - p e a s a n ts , workers and 
the  middle c la s s  ( th e se  l a t t e r  coming mostly from the  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ) ,
Peasan ts  c o n s t i tu t e d  approxim ately s ix ty  p e rc e n t  o f  the  army's 
27rank and f i l e .  They can be d iv ided  in to  th re e  c a te g o r ie s :
(a) poor p easan ts  who were considered  to  be the  most n a t io n a l ly  
conscious e lem ents , e s p e c ia l l y  those  who had spen t some time in
the  towns looking fo r  work. There, they had been exposed to  n a t i o n a l i s t  
and communist propaganda and were competent to  undergo and unders tand  
elem entary  p o l i t i c a l  i n d o c t r in a t io n .  From th e  m i l i t a r y  s ta n d p o in t ,  
they  were e x c e l le n t  f i g h t e r s ;
(b) middle p easan ts  (those  w ith  average ho ld ings)  saw in  th e  UPA
a defense o f  t h e i r  m a te r ia l  i n t e r e s t s .  I t  was th e  s o c i a l  s tra tum  in
Leo Heiman, 'We Fought fo r  U k ra in e ',  U krain ian  Q u a r te r ly ,  
no. 1, 1946, pp. 33-44; and 'They Saved J ew s ',  U kra in ian  Q uarter i y , 
no. 4, 1961, pp. 320-32.
27The s t a t i s t i c s  and d e s c r ip t io n  o f  the  s o c ia l  composition 
of the  UPA are  taken  from S. F. Khmel', U kray ins 'ka  Partyzanka 
(London, 1959), pp. 22-23.
Western Ukraine which had c o n tr ib u te d  the  g r e a te s t  p o r t io n  of 
n a t i o n a l i s t  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  to  the  movement in  the  1930' s .  From i t s  
ranks had come the  most educated and n a t io n a l ly  conscious m i l i t a n t s .
Many of these  were sons o f  r u r a l  c le rg y ,  who, in  m a te r ia l  te rm s, were 
a c e r t a in  a r i s to c r a c y  in  v i l l a g e  l i f e .
(c) th e re  were p r a c t i c a l l y  no r i c h  peasan ts  in  th e  UPA in  G a l ic ia ,  
bu t th e re  were s e v e ra l  in  the  Volyn u n i t s .
S epara te  c a te g o r ie s  are  e s ta b l i s h e d  by Khmel' in  U kray ins 'ka  
Partyzanka f o r  peasan ts  from P od lach ia , who were considered  ex cep tio n a l  
w a r r io r s ,  and those  from Vyrkhovyna in  the  C arpa th ians . The 
Vyrkhovyna UPA s o ld ie r s  were considered  to  be good f i g h t e r s  on 
t h e i r  n a t iv e  t e r r a i n ,  bu t lacked th e  a b i l i t y  to  f i g h t  on the  f l a t  lands 
e a s t  o f  the  C arpath ian  mountains.
K hm el''s  h igh  e s t im a tio n  o f the  Western U krain ian  peasan ts  
as f i g h t e r s  in  the  UPA i s  based more on t h e i r  p h y s ica l  and psycho log ica l  
a t t r i b u t e s  than  on p o l i t i c a l  awareness. For ta sk s  l ik e  propaganda 
and a g i t a t i o n  a t  la rg e  m eetings, th e  rank and f i l e  member, and 
e s p e c ia l ly  the  p e a sa n t ,  was no t competent to  take  i n i t i a t i v e ,  bu t  
r e l i e d  h e a v i ly  upon h is  su p e r io rs  to  hand down a p o l i t i c a l  l in e  t h a t  
he could pass on. The UPA embodied, to  a degree, the  c l a s s i c a l  East 
European phenomenon o f peasan t p o l i t i c s  as the  ' p o l i t i c s  o f  b ru te  
force'; so c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  in  the  re v o l t s  in  19th cen tury  Russia  and 
the  1930's  in  Western Ukraine.
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  no te  t h a t  the  Volyn p e asa n try  who con­
t r i b u t e d  g re a t ly  to  th e  f i r s t  UPA u n i t s  was of a h ig h e r  le v e l  o f  
awareness because o f i t s  ex p er ien ce ,  no t only w ith n a t io n a l ism , bu t 
a lso  w ith  communist p o l i t i c s .  I t  has. o f te n  been p o in te d  out th a t  
'w h ile  G a lic ian s  were feeding  the  Germans, Volynians were a lready  
f ig h t in g  th e m '. This, p e c u l i a r  combination o f  a communist t r a d i t i o n ,  a 
m i l i t a n t  p e a san try  and a weak Nazi a d m in is t ra t io n  in  the  reg ions o f
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Volyn and P o l i a s i a  ex p la in s  th e  emergence of UPA here  and n o t in  
G a l ic ia ,
Workers in  the  UPA c o n s t i tu te d  approxim ately  25% o f  the  Army 
(up to  1944 and th e  r e -o c c u p a t io n ) . They may be d iv ided  i n to  th re e  
c a te g o r ie s  :
(a) those  who were members o f  the  OUN p r i o r  to  the  form ation  o f 
the  UPA;
Cb) those who jo in e d  UPA d i r e c t l y  in  1943;
(c) a f u r th e r  c a te g o r i s a t io n  o f  the  above two groups would d i s t in g u is h  
those who were m arr ied ,  those  m arried  w ith  c h i ld re n ,  and young, un­
m arried  workers. M ar i ta l  s t a t u s  p layed  an im portan t ro le  in  th e  
endurance o f  f i g h t e r s .
Few m arried  workers w ith  ch i ld re n  jo in ed  the  UPA; those  who 
did re tu rn e d  in  t h e i r  g re a t  numbers to  fa c to ry  work a t  th e  end o f 
the  War. As a r u l e ,  o ld e r  members and sym pathisers o f  th e  GUN 
remained in  the  c i t i e s  and were a c t iv e  in  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s '  c i v i l i a n  
network. The g r e a t e r  p a r t  o f  workers in  the  Army were young and 
unm arried -- they  came from tim ber camps, o i l  r ig s  and th e  sm all towns. 
There were few d iv is io n s  in  th e  UPA made up e x c lu s iv e ly  o f  workers.
One example i s  the  Blakytny d iv i s io n .  A f te r  th e  War, t h i s  group 
and s im i la r  ones disbanded, t h e i r  members a ttem pting  to  r e - i n t e g r a t e  
in to  s o c ie ty .
Young workers were considered  to  be b e t t e r  combinations of 
p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  cadre than were p e asa n ts .  While they were some­
what weaker p h y s ic a l ly ,  they  gained s t r e n g th  in  t im e . More im p o rtan t,  
they possessed  the  i n t e l l e c t u a l  c a p a c i t ie s  fo r  p o s i t io n s  in  the  
middle le ad e rsh ip  le v e l s .
^ ^ Ib id .,  p . 28.
100
About 15% o f  th e  UPA was made up o f i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  h igh
school and u n iv e r s i t y  s tu d e n t s .  P a r t  o f  t h i s  group came from the
o ld e r  p ro f e s s io n a l  cadre o f  the  OUN-B. High school and u n iv e r s i ty
s tu d en ts  a ttem pted  to  jo in  th e  UPA en masse in  1943 when a genera l
c a l l  f o r  r e c r u i t s  was pu t ou t. They were a t t r a c t e d  by
the  romanticism o f  g u e r r i l l a  w arfare  and were q u i te  ig n o ran t  o f  i t s
harsh  r e a l i t i e s .  High school s tu d en ts  were considered  u n su i ta b le  fo r
membership f o r  reasons of p h y s ica l  underdevelopment and the long p e r io d
of time i t  took f o r  them to  become a cc l im a tised  to  l iv in g  o u td o o rs .
Often s tu d en ts  aged fo u r tee n  p re sen ted  themselves f o r  rec ru i tm en t a f t e r
running away from home. Both h igh school and u n iv e r s i ty  s tu d en ts
were i l l - t r e a t e d  o r  r e j e c te d  by e s ta b l i s h e d  u n i t s  o f  th e  UPA a f t e r
they  a r r iv e d  from the  c e n t r a l  t r a in in g  sch o o ls .  Many p e r s i s t e d  and
29ev e n tu a l ly  took p a r t  in  b a t t l e s .  U n iv e rs i ty  s tu d en ts  found i t
eq u a l ly  d i f f i c u l t  to  ga in  acceptance in  th e  la rg e ly  p easan t  u n i t s ,
b u t  had b e t t e r  luck in t e g r a t i n g  them selves. They l e a m t  th e  sc ience  of
g u e r r i l l a  w arfa re  e a s i l y  and o f te n  a t t a in e d  command p o s i t io n s .
By the  end o f  1943, when the  Army was a t  the  h e ig h t  o f  i t s
m i l i t a r y  power, th e re  were p o s s ib ly  40,000 n a t i o n a l i s t s  under arms
30in  Western Ukraine. The fo rce  was d iv ided  in to  re g io n a l  s t r u c tu r e s  
and had an e la b o ra te  system o f  communications, p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  
in s t ru c t io n ,m e d ic a l  f a c i l i t i e s ,  e t c .  The th re e  b a s ic  t e r r i t o r i a l  
su b d iv is io n s  were:
UPA N orth, encompassing a c t iv e  groups in  Zhytomyr and Volyn;
29 I b i d . ,  pp. 31-32.
30Myroslav Prokop, ’D vadtsyatpyati Rokovyny UPA', S u c h a sn is t ' , 
no. 10 (82), October 1967, p .  92. A somewhat l a r g e r  and unsub­
s t a n t i a t e d  f ig u re  i s  given in  Enrique Martinez Codo, 'G u e r r i l l a  Warfare 
in  U k ra in e ',  U kra in ian  Review, no. 3, 1961.
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UPA S ou th .--V inn its ia  and Kamyanets-Podilsk; UPA West in  th e  o b la s ts  o f
31Lviv, T e m o p i l ,  S ta n is la v  and the  Lerako reg ion .
In c o n t r a s t  to  th e  Sov ie t  p a r t i s a n  movement, th e  n a t i o n a l i s t  
army was no t su p p lied  w ith  p ro v is io n s ,  arms or o th e r  n e c e s s i t i e s  by 
a s t a t e  power. One may a p p re c ia te  th e  o v e rr id in g  importance o f  i t s  
r e l a t io n s h ip  w ith  the  populace in  C en tra l  and Western Ukraine in  
th e  e f f o r t  simply to  su rv iv e  and continue  th e  f i g h t .  The a b i l i t y  
o f  pockets  o f  in su rg e n ts  to  f ig h t  in  Western Ukraine fo r  s e v e ra l  years  
a f t e r  the  c o n so l id a t io n  o f  the  S ov ie t  government over th e se  t e r r i t o r i e s  
in d ic a te s  the  d u r a b i l i t y  o f  the  r e la t io n s h ip  t h a t  was developed in  
th ese  y e a r s .
D iv is ion  G a l ic ia
Apart from the  advance o f  Sov ie t  fo rc e s ,  two is su e s  in  1943 
s e r io u s ly  a f f e c te d  th e  course o f th e  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement--the 
form ation of th e  SS D iv is ion  G a l ic ia  and th e  d e l ib e r a t io n s  a t  the  
T hird  E xtra-O rd inary  Congress o f  OUN-B fo rc e s .
The German command abandoned th e  id ea  t h a t  only German 
s o ld ie r s  could win th e  War in  th e  East when the  f r o n t  was moving 
deeper in to  Ukraine in  1943. Two Latvian and one E ston ian  d iv is io n s  
were be ing  t r a in e d  to  shore up th e  f ro n t  a lread y  when the  d ec is io n  
was made to  u t i l i s e  Ukrainians in  G a l ic ia .  At f i r s t  the  Germans 
regarded  th e  form ation o f  th e  D iv is ion  as too obvious a p o l i t i c a l  com­
promise w ith  c e r t a in  n a t i o n a l i s t  a s p i r a t i o n s .  During e a r ly  
d e l ib e ra t io n s  in  th e  German command, th e  id e a  was opposed by R ibbentrop ,
31B utkovs'ky, 'O rh an iza ts iy n a  S tru k tu ra  UPA', p . 5. See a lso  
Codo, 'G u e r r i l l a  W arfa re ' ,  p . 209.
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then M in is te r  o f  E x te rn a l A ffa i r s  o f  the  Third  Reich, by Rosenburg,
E rich  Koch of Reichkommissariat Ukraine, M artin Bonnann and H einrich
32Hiiranler. Himmler l a t e r  changed h i s  mind.
The p la n  fo r  D iv is ion  G a l ic ia  came from O tto  Wechter,
governor o f  G a l ic ia  as p a r t  of a p lan  no t only to  s t r e n g th e n  the
f r o n t ,  bu t  a lso  to  secure  more co -o p e ra t io n  from Western U kra in ians.
The id e a  of a D iv is ion  th a t  would be seen by the  U krain ian  popu la tion
as i t s  own, could become, Wechter argued, a s t ro n g  focus around
33which the  c i v i l i a n  p ro d u c tio n  e f f o r t  could a lso  be encouraged. For
t h e i r  p a r t ,  members o f the  'w e lfa re  and a id '  s o c ie ty ,  th e  U krainian
C en tra l  Committee under Kubiovyc h e a r t i l y  supported  th e  p la n ,  fo r
them a r e a l i s a t i o n  of the  h i s t o r i c a l  and naive  b e l i e f  o f  Ukrainian
co nserva tive  n a t i o n a l i s t s  t h a t  a l l  t h a t  was lack ing  in  th e  s t ru g g le
fo r  independence was a s tro n g  army. The Ukrainian C en tra l  Committee
was in  an e x c e l le n t  p o s i t io n  to  ensure a su c c e ss fu l  r e c r u i t i n g
campaign because i t  ac ted  as th e  s e m i - o f f i c i a l  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  of
Ukrainians in  G a l ic ia  v is  a v is  the  German a d m in is t r a t io n .  Thus i t
had connections w ith th e  government apparatus and a recogn ised
a u th o r i ty  be fo re  U kra in ians .
The announcement c a l l in g  fo r  the  form ation o f  the  D iv is ion
was made on May 4 by Kubiovyc:
The moment we have a l l  been w aiting  f o r ,  
when th e  U krain ian  people w i l l  again g e t  the  
chance to  f i g h t  t h e i r  g r e a te s t  enemy--Bolshevism, 
has a r r iv e d .  The Leader o f  the  Great German 
S ta te  has agreed to  th e  convocation o f  a s e p a ra te  
U krain ian  v o lu n ta ry  m i l i t a r y  form ation under 
th e  name SS-Sharpshooter D iv is ion  G a l i c i a . 34
32H eike, U kray ins 'ka  Dyviziya 'Halychyna' , p .  15.
^^ loc. c i t .
Appeal o f  V. Kubiovyc, head o f  the  U krain ian  C en tra l  Committee 
to  G a lic ian  U krainians in  Heike, U kray ins 'ka  Dyviziya 'Halychyna' ,  
p . 225.
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To make th e  appeal more a t t r a c t i v e ,  persons in tended  fo r  work
35in  Germany were allowed to  jo in  the D iv is ion  as an a l t e r n a t i v e .
In the  course o f  d is c u s s io n s ,  Kubiovyc had demanded, amongst o th e r  
th in g s ,  th e  r e le a s e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p r i s o n e r s ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r  OUN-B members 
i n  r e tu r n  fo r  h i s  Committee's co -o p e ra t io n  in  th e  v en tu re .  This 
demand was no t met.
In June 1943, 80,000 persons ap p lied  fo r  r e c ru i tm e n t ,  o f  
whom 50,000 were accepted  f o r  t r a in in g .  Ninety p e rc e n t  o f  those  who 
jo in ed  were between e ig h teen  and t h i r t y  years  o f  age. The middle 
and lower o f f i c e r  ranks were composed o f  former members o f  o f f i c e r  
corps o f  the  U krain ian  G a lic ian  Army and the  U krain ian  N a tiona l Army 
( P e t l i u r a 's  fo rce )  from the  F i r s t  World War, and former o f f i c e r s  
of th e  P o l ish  and Red A r m i e s . T h e  D iv is ion  G a l ic i a  did no t see 
a c t io n  u n t i l  June 1944 a t  Brody, G a l ic ia  when th e  major Sovie t 
o f fen s iv e  on Lviv was underway.
Both th e  communist underground in  Western Ukraine and the 
OUN-B p re ss  a t ta ck e d  th e  U krain ian  C en tra l  Committee, denouncing i t s  
a c t io n s .  S ov ie t  l e a f l e t e e r s  in  Western Ukraine d i s t r i b u t e d  l i t e r a t u r e  
a t ta c k in g  Kubiovyc and s e v e ra l  p r i e s t s  who were i n f l u e n t i a l  in  th e  
campaign which encouraged h igh  school youth to r e g i s t e r  f o r  c a l l - u p .
The communist newspaper, Chervonyy Prapor in  the  Rivno a re a  d ec la red  
t h a t  the  form ation o f  th e  D iv is io n  as an o s te n s ib le  'U k ra in ian '
37fo rce  was simply a t r i c k  by th e  Germans to  b o l s t e r  the  f a i l i n g  f r o n t .  
The OUN-B le ad e rsh ip  unambiguously pu t forward i t s  p o s i t io n  in  the
35L ebed ',  U kray ins 'ka  P o v s tan s 'k a  Armiya, pp. 47-48.
^^Heike, U kray ins 'ka  Dyviziya 'Halychyna ' ,  p .  24.
3 7 N im e ts 'k o -fa sh y s ts 'k y y  Rezhym, pp. 94, 110.
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Byuleten:
We condemn a l l  th e  t r a i t o r s  o f  the  U krain ian  
people  and i t s  l i b e r a t i o n  s t ru g g le  who become 
lackeys o f  the  occupants and help  them to  oppress 
Ukraine, a l l  those  s id e l in e  p o l i t i c a l  s p e c u la to r s  
and ’ l e a d e r s ' ,  p a id  adv iso rs  o f  the  German occupation  
under th e  g u ise  o f  v a r io u s  committees, e d i to r s  
o f  German newspapers in  th e  Ukrainian language,
. . . Without a U krain ian  s t a t e  o r  government, th e re  
cannot be a U krainian army. The Germans are  
p lann ing  ano ther e x p lo i t a t io n  o f  the  p h y s ic a l  
s t r e n g th  of the  peop le ;  i f  i t  continues our 
response can only be a n ega tive  one.
The German a c t .  . . has ano ther s id e  to  i t .  I t  a lso
attem pts  to  draw a l in e  between the  G a lic ian s  and 
'N a d n ip ry a n ts i ' (Ukrainians in  C en tra l  
U k ra in e ) . This i s  a compromise o f  th e  very  id e a  of 
U krain ian  s ta teh o o d .
. . .  We h a v e n ' t  th e  s l i g h t e s t  doubt t h a t  what i s  
forming h ere  i s  n o t  a U krain ian  n a t io n a l  army, 
b u t  a German c o lo n ia l  d i v i s i o n . 38
M, Lebed' claims th a t  the  Germans had g re a t  d i f f i c u l t y  in  r e c r u i t i n g
Western U krainians to  th e  D iv is io n , and th a t  s ix  hundred r e c r u i t s
39escaped with arms a f t e r  th re e  months o f  t r a i n i n g ,  Heike, who was 
a lead ing  o f f i c e r  in  th e  D iv is io n  re p o r ts  massive numbers of a p p l ic a t io n s  
in  h is  book U krainian D iv is ion  G a l i c i a . The l a t t e r  v e rs io n  i s  probably 
more a cc u ra te .  L e b e d ’ ’s apparent in t e n t  in  und e res t im atin g  the  
enthusiasm in  Western Ukraine fo r  th e  D iv is ion  i s  to  j u s t i f y  the  
p a ss iv e  a t t i t u d e  o f  th e  Bandera group towards th e  rec ru itm en t 
campaign. Although they opposed i t  in  p r i n t ,  they d id  l i t t l e  to  
a c t iv e ly  d e te r  G a lic ian  youth from jo in in g .  When i t  became 
apparen t t h a t  the  form ation o f  th e  D iv is ion  was assu red  by th e  popu la r  
response in  G a l ic ia ,  the  OUN-B lead e rsh ip  in s t r u c t e d  some o f i t s  
members to  e n te r  in  o rd e r  to  ensure  t h a t  the  command would no t allow
^^UHVR B5-1: Vi&nyk, no. 9 , 1943, pp. 1-2.
39 Lebed', Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya, pp. 47-48
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the  s o ld ie r s  to  he used on a Western f r o n t ,  hut only a g a in s t  the  
40Red Army. The o r ig i n a l  n e g o t ia t io n s  had produced t a c i t  agreement 
between th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  invo lved  [mainly Mel'nyk su p p o r te rs )  and 
th e  Germans t h a t  such a D iv is ion  would only f i g h t  S ov ie t  fo rces
The e f f o r t s  o f  the  U krain ian  C en tra l  Committee were backed up 
by M el 'nyk 's  group throughout the  n e g o t ia t io n s  and during  the  r e c r u i t ­
ment p e r io d .  This is su e  h ig h l ig h ts  th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between the  
Melnyk and Bandera camp a t  t h i s  p o in t  in  the  War.
The T hird  E xtra-O rd inary  Congress 
o f  th e  OUN-B. "
This Congress has been p o p u la r ly  r e f e r r e d  to  as th e  th re sh o ld  o f  a 
new p o l i t i c a l  p e r io d  in  th e  O rg a n is a t io n 's  h i s to r y .  Although the 
programme adopted by the members wrote in to  the  o f f i c i a l  h i s to r y  of 
the  OUN-B th e  new o r i e n ta t io n  o f  democracy and s o c i a l  p ro g re s s iv e n e ss ,  
i t s  r e a l  beginnings are  to  be found a lready  in  th e  UPA in  February, 
1943. The e x te n t  to  which the  c i v i l i a n  network o f  c e l l s  o f  th e  
Bandera o rg a n is a t io n  understood  t h i s  new p o l i t i c s  and attem pted  to
p u t  i t  i n to  p r a c t i c e  remains open to  q u es t io n .
An im portan t element in  the  d e l ib e ra t io n s  o f  August 1943 
was concerned w ith drawing up a ba lance  sh ee t  o f  th e  p a s t  two years 
o f  OUN a c t i v i t y .  T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  congresses and conferences 
had been s e l f - c o n g r a tu la to r y  in  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  At the  Third  E x tra -
Ordinary Congress, a p u b l ic  s ta tem en t drawn up by the  de lega te s
conceded t h a t  th e re  had been ' d i f f i c u l t i e s '  i n  an a lys ing  and choosing 
a c o r r e c t  s t r a t e g i c  course in  1941-42--an obvious re fe re n c e  to  the
^^ lo c .  c i t .
^^In terv iew  w ith  D aria  Rebet, February 1975 in  Munich.
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c lose  c o l la b o ra t io n  w ith  Germany, m isc a lc u la t io n  in  Lviv in  June , 1941,
e tc .  A mild c r i t i c i s m  o f ' e r r o r s ’ made in  th e  p a s t  was t a c t f u l
enough to  avoid s p e c i f i c  re fe re n c e  to  Bandera 's  le ad e rsh ip  up to  h i s
a r r e s t  and imprisonment and the  Cracow Gathering which had s e t  the
course f o r  the  beginning of the  War. By 1943, Bandera 's  s t a t u r e  in
Western Ukraine had grown to  h e ro ic  p ro p o r t io n s ,  more as a r e s u l t
o f  the  propaganda c a r r ie d  out by the  n a t i o n a l i s t  wing which supported
him than  of the  a c tu a l  deeds o r  wisdom of Bandera h im se lf .
In a s se s s in g  th e  reasons fo r  the  popu la r  sen tim en t in  Ukraine
favouring  th e  r e tu r n  o f  S ov ie t  power a f t e r  an i n i t i a l  o r i e n ta t io n
towards Nazi Germany in  1941, the  Congress s t a t e d  t h a t :
the  weaker element o f  our peop le , f e a r f u l  o f
the  r e tu r n  o f  Bolshevism, saw t h e i r  s a lv a t io n  in
German might; ano ther s e c t io n  o f  s o c ie ty ,  b ea ten
by the  German c o lo n ia l  bo o t,  chose in  t h e i r
minds the  l e s s e r  e v i l .  That i s ,  they awaited
the  r e tu r n  o f  the  B olsheviks. î^ e n  in  U kraine, as
in  o th e r  co u n tr ie s  o f  E astern  Europe, a
p a r t  o f  the  people  o r ie n te d  and today continue  to
o r i e n t  towards the  B olsheviks , i t  i s  in  the  f i r s t
p la ce  th e  f r u i t s  and lessons^drawn from exper ienc ing
the  German c o lo n ia l  system.
The new p o l i t i c a l  programme c a l l e d  fo r  an independen t, 
dem ocratic  U krain ian  s t a t e ,  f o r  a p ro g re s s iv e  s o c ia l  programme, 
in c lu d in g  o p p o s it io n  to  the  c o l l e c t iv e  farm system o r  a r e tu rn  to  
la rg e  land ownership by the  a r i s to c r a c y  and f o r  th e  e x p ro p r ia t io n  
o f  e x i s t in g  la rg e  e s t a t e s  w ithou t f in a n c ia l  compensation to  the  
owners. The programme s t a t e d  t h a t  co -o p e ra t iv e  farming was accep tab le  
i f  the  peasan ts  f r e e ly  chose i t .  I t  a lso  d ec la red  support fo r  w orkers ' 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  economic management o f  f a c to r i e s  and the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  i t s  p ro d u c ts ,  f o r  an e ig h t  hour day and f u l l  freedom of independent 
t r a d e  union a c t i v i t y .  In th e  new s t a t e ,  heavy in d u s t ry ,  banks.
^^ OUN V S v i t l i  Postanov, p .  91.
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t r a n s p o r t  and underground m inera l resources, were to  be n a t io n a l i s e d  
and l i g h t  in d u s t ry  would he run by co -o p e ra t iv es  or m unicipal 
a u t h o r i t i e s . ^ ^  Freedom o f  speech , th e  p r e s s ,  r e l i g i o n  and f u l l  
r i g h t s  fo r  n a t io n a l  m in o r i t i e s —these  r e s o lu t io n s ,  l ik e  the  ones 
l i s t e d  above a l l  r e f l e c t e d  the  b a s ic  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t io n s  o f  th e  UPA,
In opposing Nazi German r u le ,  th e  Third  E x tra-O rd inary
Congress voiced  i t s  u n co n d it io n a l  o p p o s it io n  to  the  Vlasov movement
and the  Union o f Russian o f f i c e r s ,  both  f ro n ts  o f  th e  German p r o je c t  
44in  the E as t .
On the  one hand, the  Congress showed th a t  the  OUN-B, l ik e  
the  UPA had broken d e f i n i t e l y  w ith  Nazi Germany. On the  o th e r  hand, 
the  world view o f the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  was s t i l l  weighed down by i t s  
h e r i t a g e  o f  i d e a l i s t ,  i r r a t i o n a l i s t  ideo logy . In s t ru g g l in g  to  gain  
a c l e a r  unders tand ing  o f  the  s o c ia l  q u es t io n  in  Ukraine, the  OUN could 
no t bu t subsume i t  in  i t s  n a t i o n - s t a t e  concept. Rather than  c re a te  
a harmony between th e  s o c ia l  and n a t io n a l  demands o f  the  movement, the  
in t ro d u c t io n  o f  m a t e r i a l i s t  elements in to  the i d e a l i s t  schema served  
only to  c re a te  confusion  and ten s io n s  in  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t  a n a ly s i s .
For example, th e  OUN b e l ie v ed  t h a t  the  b e s t  way to  secu re  in te r n a t io n a l  
peace and coopera tion  was to  allow each nation, i t s  own s t a t e .  This 
s im p l i s t i c  s o lu t io n ,  an a r i th m e t ic  ex tens ion  o f i t s  s o lu t io n  to  
th e  U krainian q u e s t io n  could no t re so lv e  the  c o n t r a d ic t io n  between 
the  s t ru g g le  f o r  nationhood by an oppressed people  and th e  OUN's 
acceptance o f  the  r i g h t  fo r  powerful n a t io n  s t a t e s  (Germany!) whose 
i n t e r e s t s  were counterposed to  the  former, to  e x i s t .  S im i la r ly ,  the
4 3 lb id . ,  pp. 105-112. 
"^^loc. c i t .
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i n j e c t i o n  o f  a n t i - c a p i t a l i s t  demands, such as n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  
heavy in d u s t r i e s  w ith  w orkers ' p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  management and the  
e x p ro p r ia t io n  o f  la rg e  landowners c o n f l ic te d  w ith  the  id e a  of the  
'whole n a t i o n ' ,  c a p i t a l i s t s  in c lu d ed , having a p lace  in  an indepen­
dent Ukraine, The n a tio n a l ism  of the  OUN-B in  th e  l a t t e r  h a l f  of 
1943 became an u n s tab le  p e r s p e c t iv e  o f  the  world and s o c ie ty ,  the  
i n t r u s io n  of m a t e r i a l i s t  concepts o f  the  n a t io n a l  s t ru g g le  c o n f l ic t in g  
w ith  the  i d e a l i s t  p h i lo so p h ic a l  foundations o f  the  movement. I t  
could only be re so lv ed  by a r e tu rn  to  the  no tions  o f  the p a s t - -  
something which Dontsov was p a s s io n a te ly  arguing f o r  a t  the  time 
from North America-or by tak ing  th e  l e f t  tu rn ,  program m atica lly  and 
p r a c t i c a l l y  to  i t s  lo g ic a l  conc lu s ion . The UPA ideologues  chose the  
l a t t e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  a f t e r  th e  end o f  the  War and a ttem pted  to  develop 
a re v o lu t io n a ry  concept o f  the  n a t io n a l  s t ru g g le  as one i n t r i n s i c a l l y  
t i e d  to  th e  c la s s  s t ru g g le  in  the  S ov ie t Union.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE IN UKRAINE
The S ovie t re -o c cu p a t io n  o f  Ukraine invo lved  th re e  i n t e r r e l a t e d  
p ro cesses :  the  e n t ry  of p a r t i s a n s  in to  Right-Bank Ukraine ahead of
the  German-Soviet f r o n t ,  the  Red Army d rive  th roughout 1943 and 
in to  Western Ukraine in  1944 and the e s tab lish m en t o f  th e  Sov ie t  
a d m in is t ra t iv e  appara tus  in  l a t e  1944 and throughout th e  fo llow ing 
y e a r .  In t h i s  re -o c cu p a tio n  th e  main o b je c t iv e  was to  d r iv e  the  
German armies out o f  Ukraine and to  r e - a s s e r t  p o l i t i c a l  c o n tro l  over 
the  t e r r i t o r i e s .  The n a t i o n a l i s t  movement in  Western Ukraine was 
a secondary concern f o r  the  m i l i t a r y  aspec t of t h i s  d r iv e ,  except in  
th e  case o f  D iv is ion  G a l ic ia  as p a r t  o f  the  German army, bu t a 
prim ary concern o f  th e  incoming o f f i c i a l s  o f  th e  s t a t e  apparatus and 
the  p o l ic e  system. A f te r  th e  e x i t  o f  th e  German arm ies, the  
g u e r r i l l a  movement o f  th e  UPA became an im portan t f a c t o r ,  re q u ir in g  
the  combined e f f o r t s  o f  th e  NKVD, a g i ta t io n  teams of the  Communist 
P a rty  and those  re sp o n s ib le  fo r  c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n ,  to  crush i t .
By th e  end o f  1942 th e  S ov ie t  p a r t i s a n  e f f o r t  was fo rm idab le--
w ell  over 100,000 p a r t i s a n s  were en trenched in  enemy t e r r i t o r y ;  by 
the  end o f  1943, th e  movement had grown seven t im e s .^  This was the  
r e s u l t  o f  the  conscious deployment o f  manpower by th e  Sov ie t  m i l i t a r y
^Armstrong, e d . ,  S o v ie t  P a r t i s a n s . pp. 35-36.
110
command in to  th e  movement and the  a b i l i t y  of e x i s t in g  p a r t i s a n  groups 
to  r e c r u i t  from th.e lo c a l  populace in  Ukraine as th e  Nazi r e t r e a t  
became g e n e ra l is e d .  In November and December 1942, Red P a r t i s a n s  
under th e  le ad e rsh ip  of Kovpak, Saburov and Fedorov who had been 
up t i l l  then a c t iv e  on the  l e f t  bank o f the  Dnieper were in s t r u c te d  
to  p e n e t r a te  the  w estern  o b la s t s .  By January 1943, twenty n ine  con­
s o l id a te d  bands and e ig h ty  th re e  b r igades  t o t a l l i n g  over 40,000
p a r t i s a n s  were s u c c e s s fu l ly  en trenched  on the  r i g h t  bank o f the  
2Dnieper.
Rivno o b la s t  became a p r in c ip a l  base fo r  th e se  groups. In 
March, th e  S ov ie t  bands were in  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n tro l  o f  th e  f o r e s t  
a reas here  to  ho ld  a conference of 120 de leg a te s  o f  v a rious  
B yelorussian  and Ukrainian groups o p e ra ting  in  th e  a re a  and n o rth
3
of Rivno in  the  P r ip e t  Marshes. At f i r s t  s ig h t  t h i s  s ta tem en t 
by Klokov and Kucher, two S ovie t h i s to r i a n s  w r i t in g  in  U k ray in s 'k y y 
Is torychnyy Zhum al in  1970, appears to  c o n t ra d ic t  our p rev ious 
exam ination of UPA a c t i v i t y  in  Volyn in  March 1943 (on pages 88, 89} 
Klokov and Kucher f u r th e r  contend t h a t  the  p a r t i s a n  le a d e r  Fedorov 
was ab le  to  e s t a b l i s h  a m in i- in su rg en t  r e p u b l ic ,  a p a r t i s a n  k r a i  
here  in  th e  summer o f  1943. At the  same time Saburov and Malykov 
c re a te d  s im i la r  bases to  the  south  in  Zhytomyr and Kiev o b la s t s . ^  I t  
i s  no t p o s s ib le ,  given the  absence of ex ten s iv e  m a te r ia l s  on th i s  
s u b je c t  to  determine th e  a c tu a l  s t r e n g th  of the  the  UPA versus th e
2V, I .  Kucher, 'R o l '  Partyzanskykh Krayiv i  Zon u Rosvytky 
Narodnoyi B o ro t 'by -na  U k ra y in i ' ,  Ukrayins ' kyy Is to rychnyy  Z h u m a l , 
1973, no. 5, p .  19.
I .  Klokov and V. I .  Kucher, 'P a r ty z a n s 'k i  Krayi t a  Zony 
na  Tymchasovo Okupovaniy Vorohom T e re to r iy i  SRSR u 1941-1944 r . r . ' ,  
Ukrayins.' kyy Is to rychnyy  Z hurnal, 1970, no. 7, p . 6.
^ lo c .  c i t .
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Red P a r t i s a n s  in  March o f  1943 in  Rivno and th e re fo re  co n s id e r  one v e rs io n  
o f  th ese  even ts  more c re d ib le  than  ano ther .  I t  i s  however q u i te  
p o s s ib le  t h a t ,  given th e  e x ten s iv en ess  o f  the  f o r e s t  and marsh a reas  
around th e  U krainian B yeloruss ian  bo rder  where the  c o n f l i c t  between the 
two p a r t i s a n  fo rces  was tak in g  p la c e ,  t h a t  bo th  the  UPA and the  Sov ie t  
groups considered  them selves in  c o n tro l  of the  a re a  because they  bo th  
e s ta b l i s h e d  t h e i r  in su rg en t  m in i- re p u b l ic s .  Most l i k e l y  these  re p u b l ic s  
c o -e x is te d  fo r  a s h o r t  tim e, probab ly  u n t i l  the  sp r in g  when each s id e  
was able to  make long marches ag a in .  Apart from th e  p o l i t i c a l  s i g n i f i ­
cance th a t  n a t i o n a l i s t  and S ov ie t  p a r t i s a n s  a t ta ch e d  to  these  encamp­
ments l a t e r  in  t h e i r  l i t e r a t u r e  and memoirs, the  main fe a tu re  o f  these  
camps was q u i te  simply com fortable and p ro te c te d  s h e l t e r s  f o r  the  
p a r t i s a n s  u n t i l  the  sp r in g  came and th e re  was no snow to  id e n t i f y  the  
t ra c k s  o f  moving groups.
The main fu n c t io n  o f  the  Sovie t p a r t i s a n s  was sabotage of 
German communications and harrassm ent o f  army u n i t s  where th e  small 
s i z e  o f  the  l a t t e r  p e rm it te d  such a c t io n .  In c re a s in g ly ,  however, they  
were fo rced  to  deal w ith  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s .  The n a t i o n a l i s t  t h r e a t  in  
North Western Ukraine was tw o-fo ld . I t  was an o b s ta c le  to  a c lean  
Sovie t sweep across  Western Ukraine a g a in s t  the  German arm ies. The 
Sovie t fo rces  d id  no t want to  f i g h t  a rea rguard  a c t io n  o r  d iv e rs io n a ry  
b a t t l e s  w ith  n a t i o n a l i s t  groups w hile  d r iv in g  out the  occupant 
powers. Second, th e  UPA's success in  r e c r u i t i n g  from th e  lo c a l  
p o p u la t io n  and from c e r t a in  German army u n i t s  in to  an anti-German 
m i l i t a r y  e f f o r t  p laced  i t  on a s im i la r  fo o tin g  w ith  th e  Red P a r t i s a n s  as 
a defender o f  the  Western Ukrainian populace . I t  th e re fo re  th re a ten e d  
S ovie t propaganda e f f o r t s  c a r r ie d  out by the  communist underground, 
who, up to  t h i s  p o in t ,  had been able to  c h a r a c te r i s e  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  
movement as an agent of Nazi ru le  in  Ukraine.
While t h i s  c h a r a c te r i s a t i o n  ap p lied  s t i l l  to  the  M el'nyk
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group, i t  d id  n o t  in  r e l a t i o n  to  the  UPA. Undoubtedly one o f  the  
main reasons fo r  the  in c u rs io n s  o f  Sovie t p a r t i s a n s  i n to  North 
Western Ukraine w ell be fo re  the  m i l i t a r y  advance was to  p reven t 
th e  development o f  a n a t i o n a l i s t  g u e r r i l l a  war a g a in s t  the  Germans 
[and i t s  t i e s  w ith  th e  lo c a l  popu la tion )  t h a t  was a t  th e  same time 
a n t i - S o v ie t .^
Fedorov 's  p a r t i s a n s  c a r r ie d  out over f i f t y  b a t t l e s  with
the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  in  the  l a t t e r  h a l f  o f  1943. The Rivno o b la s t
p a r t i s a n  command is su ed  a s tand ing  o rder t h a t  th e  UPA groups be
a tta ck ed  and des tro y ed  in  the  a rea .  By th e  end o f 1943, as a r e s u l t  o f
the  Red P a r t i s a n s '  a t t e n t io n  to  t h i s  problem, t h i r t y  n a t i o n a l i s t
bases in  N orthern Rivno were wiped o u t .^  At the  same tim e, the
communist underground launched an ex tens ive  propaganda campaign
d i r e c te d  a t  the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  u rg ing  them to  give up and come over
7to  the  Red P a r t i s a n  b r ig a d e s .  The UPA responded w ith  i t s  own 
appeals to  th e  p o p u la t io n  and th e  p a r t i s a n s  them selves, arguing 
th a t  th e  two b e l l i g e r e n t  powers were eq u a lly  repugnant to  i t s  - 
id e a l s  and t h a t  th e  Red P a r t i s a n s  should jo in  i t  and f i g h t  'bo th
g
Moscow and B er lin .
The f a c t  th a t  th e  UPA was engaged in  an anti-German s t ru g g le  
d id  no t f a i l  to  have an im portan t e f f e c t  upon c e r t a in  S ov ie t  p a r t i s a n
Yona L iron , ' I Was a S ov ie t  Counter Insurgency E x p e r t ' ,  
Ukrainian Q u a r te r ly , no. 4, 1963, p . 325. See a lso  Crankshaw, e d . ,  
Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 190-191
^Kyzya, Narodni Mesnyky, pp. 138-140,
n
'L ys tivky  P id p i ly a  t a  P artyzan iv  do Naselenya Tymchasovo 
Okupovanoyi T e re to r iy i  Ukrayiny ' ,  Ukrayins 'kyy Is to rychnyy  Zhurnal, 
1965, no. 6. See a lso  M. P. Makar*a]| 'Kompartiya Zakhidnoyx Ukrayiny v 
B o ro t 'b i  za I n t e r n a t s i o n a l 'ne  Zhurtonanya Trudyashchykh ', U krayins 'kyy 
Is to rychnyy  Z h u m a l , 1968, no. 10, p .  91; and Lystivky Partiynoho  
P id p i ly a , p p . 114-15, 121-24, 166-67, 264-65.
^UPA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I ,  p. 122-24.
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commands in  Western U kraine. The lo g ic a l  procedure in  th e  minds
of these  commanders was, a t  l e a s t ,  to  agree to  n e u t r a l i t y  terms w ith
the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  o r  even o rgan ise  a coopera tive  a t ta c k  upon the
occupant fo r c e s .  While t h i s  appeared lo g ic a l  to  p a r t i s a n  le a d e rs ,
th e  U krainian  s t a f f  o f  th e  p a r t i s a n  movement thought o the rw ise .
K irichenko, a major genera l  who served  on the  m i l i t a r y  councils
of va rious  f r o n ts  during  th e  war and was a c lo se  a s s o c ia te  o f
Khrushchev, noted  in  a speech to  the  c e n t r a l  command o f  the  p a r t i s a n
movement in  Ukraine in  Ju ly  1943:
Quite  r e c e n t ly  some commanders o f  p a r t i s a n  b r ig ad es  
took an in c o r r e c t  p o s i t io n  v is  a v is  
n a t i o n a l i s t  fo rm ations . In s tead  of a broadening 
o f  the  S ov ie t  p a r t i s a n  movement and unequivocal 
exposure of th e  U krainian bourgeois 
n a t i o n a l i s t  b r ig a d e s ,  they  began n e g o t ia t io n s ,  
and even made 'n e u t r a l i t y  agreements ' w ith 
them. Other commanders, while f ig h t in g  th e  f a s c i s t  
occupants , a lso  c a r r ie d  on a war with the  U krain ian  
n a t i o n a l i s t  b r ig a d e s ,  thus s id e t ra c k in g  from 
th e  main t a s k - d e s t r u c t io n  of the  f a s c i s t  
re v e n g e rs .9
Kirichenko then s t a t e d  th a t  Red P a r t i s a n s  should  only 
engage th e  n a t i o n a l i s t  form ations when a t ta c k e d ,  bu t should con­
t i n u a l l y  expose th e  le ad e rsh ip  o f  th e se  groups as German ag en ts ,  
unders tand ing  t h a t  th e  rank and f i l e  s o ld ie r s  had been t r i c k e d  in to  
jo in in g  th e  UPAI^^
There was a c l e a r  r e l a t io n s h ip  between th e  s t r e n g th  o f  the  
p a r t i s a n  movement in  d i f f e r e n t  a reas  o f Western Ukraine in  1943 
and the  success o f  the  communist underground. The communists were 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  a c t iv e ,  fo r  example in  Volyn in  1943 and c o l la b o ra te d  
c lo se ly  w ith  th e  p a r t i s a n s  t h e r e . I n  o th e r  a re a s ,  even those
g
Strokach , Nash Pozyvnyy, p .  313. 
10 .lo c .  c i t .
11 Kyzya, Narodni Mesnyky, p. 76
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where the  t r a d i t i o n  o f  t h e i r  p o l i t i c s  had been s t ro n g  b e fo re  th e
Second World War, such as the  C arpath ian  reg io n ,  th e  underground
was d i s c r e e t  and emerged only  when the  Sovie t armies e n te red  
12i t s  t e r r i t o r y .
An excep tion  to  t h i s  ru le  was Lviv. Being the  l a r g e s t  c i ty
in  Western U kraine, the  German a u th o r i ty  and a s t ro n g  n a t i o n a l i s t
movement could n o t uncover a l l  the  communists who l iv e d  th e r e .
Undoubtedly, th e  le ad e rsh ip  o f  the  Communist P a r ty  co n cen tra ted
a la rg e  amount o f  resou rces  and manpower upon Lviv in  o rd e r  to  ensure
the  e x is te n c e  o f  th e  underground and i t s  propaganda work ag a in s t
the  occupation , th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s .  D iv is ion  G a l i c i a , e t c .  By October
1942, the  communists in  Lviv, made up of U kra in ian , P o lish  and
Russian m i l i t a n t s ,  were ab le  to  launch ex ten s iv e  propaganda
campaigns in  th e  U krain ian  and P o lish  languages . They were the  only
source o f  in fo rm ation  in  1943 t h a t  c o n s i s te n t ly  prov ided  news about
13the  f r o n t  and p a r t i s a n  a c t i v i t y  in  o th e r  p a r t s  of Western Ukraine.
Kovpak, who was a c t iv e  in  the  Volyn reg io n  in  e a r ly  1943 led
h is  b r igades  through Western Ukraine from Ju ly  to  August in to  the
C arpath ian  mountains. Although Kovpak f a i l e d  to  d e s tro y  th e  main
t a r g e t  o f  h is  r a i d ,  the  o i l  r e f i n e r i e s  in  Drohobych, and h is
b r ig ad es  were decimated in  the  course o f  t h e i r  march, he d id
14succeed in  o rg an is in g  se v e ra l  new p a r t i s a n  groups. The march 
through e ig h teen  o b la s t s  was more im p o rtan t,  however, f o r  i t s  e f f e c t  
upon th e  morale of th e  communist underground because i t  was one of 
the  most daring  p a r t i s a n  p e n e tr a t io n s  in to  German occupied t e r r i t o r y .
12Armstrong, e d . ,  Sov ie t  P a r t i s a n s ,  p .  61,
^^V. D. V arahina and H. 8, Vakulenko, ’P i d p i l 'n a  P resa  
Narodnoyi Gvardiyi 1942-43 r . r . ' ,  Ukrayins 'kyy Is to rychnyy  Z h u m al, 
1966, no. 6, pp. 96-99.
Kyzya, 'P ro  Taktyku P arty  zans 'koy i B o r o t 'b y ' ,  Ukrayins * kyy 
Is torychnyy Zhurnal, 1971, no. 8, pp. 27-28.
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TKe s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  BCovpak's r a id  should be understood  in  the  con tex t 
o f  the  o v e ra l l  o b je c t iv e  o f  the  communist underground and p a r t i s a n  
movement: to  r e p r e s e n t ,  a l b e i t  in  a p a r t i a l  way, S o v ie t  a u th o r i ty
and the reby  d iscourage  th e  pro-German populace from a s s i s t i n g  in  the  
Nazi war e f f o r t .
The Red Army o ffen s iv e  through the  w estern  o b la s ts  took 
p lace  on fou r  f r o n t s .  The main a t ta c k  was in  a so u th -w e s te r ly  
d i r e c t io n  from Kiev a g a in s t  massed German form ations 'S o u th ' and 'A' 
These two form ations numbered 1,760,000 s o ld i e r s .  The S ov ie t fo rce  
was over 2,300,000 s t r o n g . B e t w e e n  December 1943 and February 
1944 th e  Red Army re c ap tu red  Zhytomyr and Kiev o b la s t s  and p a r t s  
o f  Rivno and V in n i t s ia  o b la s t s .  These o b la s ts  were th e  c lo s e s t  to  
the Dnieper r i v e r  in  C en tra l  Ukraine. During th i s  p a r t  of the  
o f f e n s iv e ,  UFA u n i t s  k i l l e d  M. P. Batunin, commander o f  th e  F i r s t  
U krainian F r o n t . A l t h o u g h  th e re  i s  some disagreem ent in  so u rces ,  
the  da te  appears to  have been February 29. In the  so u th ,  Oddessa 
o b la s t  and Mikolayev were re cap tu red  in  March and th e  S ov ie t  f ro n t  
moving across  th e  c e n t r a l  b e l t  o f  Ukraine had e n te red  Kamyanets- 
Pod ilsk  o b la s t .
From A p ril  to  th e  end o f  the  y e a r ,  th e  German command threw 
a l l  p o s s ib le  fo rces  a g a in s t  the  S ov ie t  o f fen s iv e  in  o rder  to  gain
tim e. I t s  reason f o r  doing so was to  allow the German war p ro ­
d u c tion  e f f o r t  in  Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland a maximum
^^0, V. Moseyev, 'Vyzvolenya Pravoberezhnoyi Ukrayiny v id
N im ets*ko.-fashysta 'kykh Zahrabnykiv '^ U krayins 'kyy Is to rychnyy  
Z hurnal, 1969, no. 4, p . 43.
^^UPA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I I ,  p . 38.
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oppo rtu n i ty  to  a id  the  w estern  f r o n t  where American and B r i t i s h  fo rces
had launched a new o f f e n s iv e .  This slowed the  S ov ie t advance con- 
17s id e r a b ly .
The Ukrainian Supreme L ib e ra t io n  
Council
In  the  w in te r  o f  1943-44, the  UPA command had i n i t i a t e d  d i s ­
cussions w ith  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f  o th e r  U krainians p o l i t i c a l  
o rg a n isa t io n s  ( i . e .  n a t i o n a l i s t  o rg a n is a t io n s )  in  an a ttem pt to
18co n s tru c t  a p o l i t i c a l  c en tre  made up o f  a l l  independence p a r t i e s .
I t s  fu n c t io n  was to  be tw o - fo ld - - to  d i r e c t  th e  armed n a t i o n a l i s t  
s t ru g g le  in s id e  th e  country and to  be i t s  r e p re s e n ta t iv e  abroad.
There appear to  have been th re e  b a s ic  reasons why such a 
body was planned a t  th i s  s p e c i f i c  p o in t  in  the  war. The main reason 
was t h a t  the  scope o f  UPA m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t i e s  had become so broad 
t e r r i t o r i a l l y  (having a lso  moved in to  G a l ic ia  in  1944) t h a t  the  
in su rg e n ts  could n o t ,  a t  the  same time be re sp o n s ib le  f o r  im portan t 
d e c is io n s ,  n a t io n a l  in  scope. The cond itions  o f  g u e r r i l l a  w arfare  
simply made such a c t i v i t y  im poss ib le .  At th e  same tim e, the  p e r io d  
of deep consp iracy  was f a s t  approaching and a d u p l ic a t io n  of func tions  
fo r  th e  command which would n e c e s s a r i ly  link  i t  up w ith  in d iv id u a ls  
and groups o u ts id e  o f  the  UPA network made i t  dangerous fo r  i t s  
s e c u r i t y .  Second, th e  i n i t i a t i v e  fo r  e s t a b l i s h in g  a m u l t i -p a r ty  
r e p re s e n ta t io n  was judged as being  most favourab le  f o r  the  OUN-B and 
th e  UPA because they dominated the  p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  t e r r a i n .
170. V, Moseyev, 'Vyzvolenya Zakhidnykh O blastey  U krayins ' koyi 
RSR’ , U kray ins 'kyy  Is to rychnyy  Z hurnal, 1969, no. 7, pp. 132-33.
1 AUHVR A4-1: Taras Chuprynka, 'Do Genezy UHVR’ .
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The Mel'nyk f a c t i o n ,  having d i s c r e d i t e d  i t s e l f  in  the  f i r s t  years  
o f  the  war was n o t even p lann ing  to  take  up g u e r r i l l a  a c t i v i t y  
when the  Germans l e f t  Ukraine, A ll  o th e r  o rg a n is a t io n s  being 
m inim ally  i n f l u e n t i a l ,  the  OUN-B fo rces  could sweep them in to  t h e i r  
p r o je c t s  by p re s s in g  f o r  such an a l l - p a r t i e s  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  body. 
Th ird , and perhaps most im p o rtan t ,  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  recogn ised  the  
n e c e s s i ty  fo r  an a u t h o r i t a t i v e  r e p re s e n ta t io n  abroad to  b r in g  i t s  
in f lu en c e  to  b e a r  on post-War peace s e t t l e m e n t s .
P as t  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  bodies o f  Ukrainian n a t i o n a l i s t  p o l i t i c a l
groups had fa red  b a d ly - - th e  Ukrainian P eo p le 's  Republic  had been
e x i le d  in  th e  West s in ce  1921 and did  n o t ca r ry  any d ip lom atic
weight in  1944. In Western Ukraine during th e  occupa tion , many
le g a l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  or r a th e r  t h e i r  remnants, had worked w ith
the U krain ian  C en tra l  Committee and supported th e  Mel'nyk f a c t io n .
This body served  l i t t l e  purpose fo r  in d ep en d is t  p o l i t i c s  and had no
fu tu re  aboard. Not wishing to  f in d  i t s e l f  t i e d  to  the  German s u i t
in  the  post-War d is c u s s io n s ,  and t h i s  was a concre te  p o s s i b i l i t y
through the  Vlasov group which was under Nazi pa tronage  and f o r
which Pavlo Shandruk, a h igh ranking o f f i c e r  of D iv is io n  G a l ic ia
19was being  groomed, th e  OUN-B r e a l i s e d  the  n e c e s s i ty  o f  an e n t i r e l y  
new body.
The i n i t i a t i v e  committee e s ta b l i s h e d  by th e  UPA a t  the  end 
of 1943 a ttem pted  to  f in d  a b a s is  o f  agreement between i t s e l f ,  the  
OUN-B network and th e  remnants o f  UNDO, the  Front o f  N ational 
S o l i d a r i ty  (F ront N a ts io n a l 'n o h o  Yednosty, a group o f  UVO d is s id e n ts
19,Pavlo Shandruk, Arms o f Valour [New York, 1959), pp. 196- 
208, 219-22.
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who d id  n o t  jo in  the  OUN in  1929], the  m onarchist H e t 'm an ites  and
o th e r  sm a l le r  fo rm ations . Although the  m onarch ists  were somewhat
d i s t a n t  from the  p o l i t i c s  of the  n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  they  were im portant
to  in c lude  because th ey  re p re se n te d  a la rge  p a r t  o f  the  o ld e r ,
p a t r i o t i c  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a .  The OUN-M was in v i te d  to  th e se  d is c u s s io n s ,
bu t d id  n o t  a t te n d .
The f i r s t  g enera l  meeting of the  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  groups who
had n e g o t ia te d  in to  the  sp r in g  o f 1944 convened in  J u ly  and named
the  r e p re s e n ta t iv e  body the  U krain ian  Supreme L ib e ra t io n  Council
20(U kray in 'ska  Holovna Vyzvol'na Rada-UHVR]. The UPA command
recognised  the  UHVR as i t s  p o l i t i c a l  lead e rsh ip  (a  l a r g e ly  symbolic
rec o g n i t io n )  both  in s id e  Ukraine and in  i n t e r n a t io n a l  r e p r e s e n ta t io n s .
The OUN-B was in  firm  c o n tro l  o f  the  body and th e re fo re  the  UPA act
o f re c o g n i t io n  was more l ik e  s e l f  re c o g n i t io n ,  as f a r  as p o l i t i c s
was concerned, than anything e l s e .
The common b a s is  of a l l  g roups ' membership was t h e i r  agreement
w ith  th e  demand f o r  an independent Ukrainian s t a t e .  While th i s
demand was q u i te  accep tab le  to  a l l ,  the  programme of th e  UHVR, which
gave concrete  con ten t to  t h i s  r a th e r  vague s lo g an , must c e r t a in ly
have been le s s  p a la t a b le  f o r  some p a r t i c ip a n t s :  i t  c a l l e d  fo r
o p pos it ion  to  both  S ov ie t  and German occupations; th e  re v o lu t io n a ry
armed road was the  only r e a l i s t i c  method fo r  ga in ing  independence;
democracy was a b a s ic  o p e ra t iv e  p r in c ip l e  in  a l l  UHVR a c t i v i t i e s  and
21d ec is io n s  and in  the  fu tu re  independent s t a t e .  The s e c t io n s  
dea lin g  w ith  s o c ia l  and i n d u s t r i a l  p o l ic y ,  n a t io n a l  m in o r i t i e s ,  c i v i l  
l i b e r t i e s ,  e t c . ,  c lo s e ly  resembled the  UPA programme and the  dec is io n s
^^UHVR A4-1.
^^UHVR V S v i t l i  Postanov, p p . 58-59.
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22o f  the  August, 1943 E x tra-O rd inary  Congress.
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  imagine how the  U krain ian  m onarchists  
who were a n t i -d e m o c ra t ic  and b e l ie v e d  in  a r i g i d  c la s s  system con­
t r o l l e d  by the  H e t’man's th rone  could have accepted t h i s  programme in  
any o th e r  way than  by formal g e s tu re .  The Front of N a tiona l S o l i d a r i ty  
as w ell was n e i t h e r  imbued w ith  dem ocratic  n o tio n s  nor w ith  a p ro g re s s iv e  
s o c ia l  awareness. These is su e s  were, most l i k e l y ,  swept away out of 
s ig h t  in  o rd e r  to  achieve formal u n i ty  of the  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t i e s .
Numerous documents t e s t i f y  to  the  a c t i v i t y  o f  the  UHVR in  
the  s t ru g g le  o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement a g a in s t  S ov ie t  co n so l id a t io n  
up to  1951. I t s  ro le  was c lo se ly  t i e d  to  the  UPA i n i t i a t i v e s  a g a in s t
the  1946 and 1947 e l e c t io n s ,  during  the  d e p o r ta t io n s  o f  populace
23from Western Ukraine, on the  occasion  of c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n ,  e t c .
In fo re ig n  r e p r e s e n ta t io n s ,  th e  Foreign D elegation
(Zakordonne Prydstavnytstvo-UHVR) headed by L ebed ', who l e f t  Ukraine
a f t e r  th e  War p re sen ted  documents a t  the  peace n e g o t ia t io n s  in  I t a l y
in  1944 and a t  the  P a r is  t a lk s  in  September 1946.^^ Of i n t e r e s t  in
25the  1944 memorandum i s  the  new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  given to  th e  ro le  of 
the  OUN in  the  1930's  and during  th e  War s t r e s s in g  th e  o s te n s ib ly  
dem ocratic  f e a tu re s  o f  i t s  programme and o p p o s it io n  to  the  Nazi 
occupation  from June, 1941. References to  the  le g a l  dem ocratic  
p a r t i e s  in  prewar Poland, th e  document a s s e r t s ,  proves th e  c o n s i s te n t ly  
p ro g res s iv e  n a tu re  o f the  whole n a t i o n a l i s t  movement, t h a t  democracy 
and no t to ta l i s m  o r  fascism  was th e  guiding id eas  o f  U krainian 
h i s t o r y . A s  much as su c h .a  s ta tem en t ap p lie s  to  th e  g r e a te r
^ ^ I b id . ,  pp. 11-13.
23See Chapter F ive.
^^'Memoriya UNR i  UHVR, P a r i s ,  September 1, 1946' in  UHVR v
S v i t l i  Postanov, p . 30.
^^UHVR A-7: ' Ukrayina i  Suchasna V iyna ',  1944. 
^ ^ I b i d . , p .  6.
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p a r t  o f  t h i s  n a t i o n ' s  h i s t o r y ,  i t  i s  q u i te  in a p p l ic a b le  to  th e  OUN 
from 1929 to  1943.
The P o l i sh  Question
The d e t e r io r a t i o n  of r e l a t io n s  between the  Poles and Ukrainians
in  1943 was the  i n d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f U krainian p o l ic e  u n i t s  in  Volyn
and P o l i s s i a  going over to  the  UPA in s u rg e n ts .  The German
occupation  had u t i l i s e d  U krainians in  the  c i v i l i a n  p o l ic e  in  o rder
to  m ain ta in  an amicable r e l a t io n s h ip  w ith  the  m a jo r i ty  of the  pop u la t io n
and to  s e t  th e  indigenous P o l ish  p o p u la t io n  a g a in s t  the  m a jo r i ty .
Tensions between the  two n a t i o n a l i t i e s  had remained h ig h . A t r o c i t i e s
by n a t i o n a l i s t  U krainian groups a g a in s t  the  P o les ,  in c lu d in g  the
a c t io n s  taken  by th e  Sluzhba Bezpeky, the  s e c u r i ty  p o l ic e  o f the  OUN-B
27brought them to  a b o i l in g  p o in t .  When the  U krain ian  p o l ic e  u n i ts  
d e se r te d  to  the  UPA, the  German a u th o r i t i e s  rep laced  them w ith  a
28P o lish  fo rc e ,  which in  tu rn  began to  rep re ss  the  U krain ian  p o p u la t io n .
The P o l ish  p o l i t i c a l  underground was drawn in to  the  c o n f l i c t .
One c u r r e n t ,  re p re se n te d  by th e  Armija Ludowa (P eo p le 's  Army) was made 
up la rg e ly  o f communists and was d i r e c te d  by the  e x i l e  communists 
led by B e i ru t ,  then r e s id in g  in  Moscow. The le ad e rsh ip  of Armija 
Ludowa only re tu rn e d  to  Poland in  1944. The o th e r  c u r r e n t ,  d i r e c te d  
by the  pre-1939 P o lish  government in  e x i l e ,  which re s id e d  in  London 
throughout the  War, was Armija Krajowa (Home Army), The Armija 
Krajowa (AK) was opposed to  the  communists and favoured a r e tu r n  of 
the  o ld  regime. The mass sen tim ent in  Poland appeared to  favour i t s
2 7Shumuk, Za Skhidnim Obriem, p . 51.
^^UHVR BI-3; M, Zakhidny, 'Chy Politychnyy Rozum Peremozhe',
B yule ten , no. 11, 1943.
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29r e tu r n  as w e l l .  While th e  P o l i s h  communist movement was s ec u re ly  
t i e d  to  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  S ov ie t  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  and would abide by 
i t s  d e c is io n s  concerning the  fu tu re  o f  Western U kraine, P o lish  
co n se rv a tiv e  and anti-communist fo rces  continued to  make t e r r i t o r i a l  
claims on Western Ukraine. The fo llow ing  ex ce rp ts  from the  news­
paper Wielka p o ls k a , r e p re s e n t in g  t h i s  t re n d ,  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e i r  
p e rc e p t io n  o f  the  U krainian q u es t io n :
Quite r e c e n t ly ,  the  U krain ian  q u es t io n  has 
been p u t  forward v ig o ro u s ly ,  because the  
Germans, who in  th e  l a s t  cen tury  ’d isco v e red ' 
the  Ukrainian people f o r  t h e i r  own aims are  
today again  c re a t in g  a U krainian peop le .
In s h o r t ,  t h i s  i s  a German f i c t i o n  plus 
s e v e ra l  dozen U krainian a c t i v i s t s  r a i s e d  and 
re a red  in  German s c h o o l s .30
I f  th e  U krain ian  problem e x i s t s  today a t  a l l - - t h e n  
i t  i s  in  the  f i r s t  in s ta n c e  the  r e s u l t  o f  the  
P o le s .  Here, in  s o -c a l le d  E as te rn  Poland, 
foundations are  being  b u i l t  ( re fe ren ce  to  th e  
n a t i o n a l i s t  e f f o r t s - - a u th o r )  to  uphold the  
U krain ian  peop le . But no t in  Kiev or Kharkiv.
Why?--because th e  Russians w i l l  no t allow i t . 31
We s tan d  on the  p o s i t io n  th a t  the  e a s te rn  lands-  
R zeczp o sp o li ta—were and remain e x c lu s iv e ly  
P o l ish  lan d s ,  to  which no-one except us has any 
r i g h t - - n e i t h e r  th e  Bolsheviks nor the  U kra in ians .
We w i l l  d ism antle  any s e p a r a t i s t  Ukrainian 
l i f e ,  we w i l l  c lose  down any popu lar  or co­
o p e ra t iv e  o rg a n is a t io n s  and f r a t e r n i t i e s ,  we w i l l  
d ism antle  th e  se p a ra te  U krainian school sy s tem .32
The a t t i t u d e s  o f  n a t io n a l  h o s t i l i t y  between th e  two peo p les ,
in g ra in e d  by a long h i s to r y  o f P o lish  ru le  in  Western Ukraine and
r e - in f o rc e d  by the  b i t t e r l y  a n t i - P o l i s h  sen tim ents  o f  the  U krainian
n a t i o n a l i s t s  s in ce  th e  1920's  made i t  p r a c t i c a l l y  im possib le  to
e s t a b l i s h  any p o pu la r  combined r e s i s t e n c e  a g a in s t  the  occupation .
R ather the  groups were s k i l f u l l y  s e t  ag a in s t  each o th e r ,  a cy n ica l
29P. Doc. 94. 
^%HVR B2-1. 
^^ loc. c i t .  
^^ loc . c i t .
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e
a p p l ic a t io n  o f  Rosenburg 's concept o f  Eigenleben by Koch. The
Sov ie t p a r t i s a n s ,  see ing  t h a t  th e  arming o f  P o l i sh  bands by the
Germans was a t a c t i c  to  d i s t r a c t  the populace from the  main oppressive
fo rce  in  Western U k ra in e -- th e  Nazis--denounced th e  mutual
n a t i o n a l i s t  r e p r i s a l s  in  l i t e r a t u r e  d i s t r i b u t e d  throughout the  a rea
33in  both  languages. The Rivno newspaper Chervonyy P rap o r , which
was being  is su e d  in  U krain ian  a lso  began to  appear in  P o l i s h . B y
t h i s  tim e th e  S ov ie t  p a r t i s a n s  had begun to  r e c r u i t  Poles to  t h e i r
movement and to  e s t a b l i s h  s e p a ra te  u n i t s  f o r  them. They were le ss
su cc e ss fu l  w ith  the  U krain ian  p o p u la t io n  because th e  Ukrainians
were beginn ing  to  tu rn  to  the  UPA, a t  the  same time viewing the
Red P a r t i s a n s  as f o r e ig n e r s .  The S ov ie t advance in to  th e  Western
o b la s t s ,  in  co n fro n tin g  the  n a t io n a l  war going on, tended to  s t r e s s
the  a t r o c i t i e s  c a r r ie d  out by U kra in ians , o f ten  a t t r i b u t i n g  them 
35to  th e  UPA. A r e c e n t  a r t i c l e  by a h i s t o r i a n  of the  p e r io d  
pub lished  in  S ovie t Ukraine has provided a more ba lanced  view o f  the  
c o n f l i c t  in  examining the  ac t io n s  taken by both  s id e s .
The p o l i t i c a l  consciousness o f  the  rank and f i l e  OUN-B member 
in  Volyn (and elsewhere) i s  b e t t e r  understood in  th e  l i g h t  o f  these  
e v en ts .  The d e sc r ip t io n s  provided  by Danylo Shumuk in  h is  
rem iniscences o f  th e  OUN and UPA, o f  th e  ac t io n s  o f  th e  Sluzhba 
Bezpeky a g a in s t  the  P o lish  p o p u la t io n  tend to  in d ic a te  th a t  the  l e f t  tu rn  
o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement a g a in s t  the  Germans was n e i th e r  accompanied 
by a c le a r  unders tand ing  on the  p a r t  o f  the  rank and f i l e  o f  the  OUN-B 
of i t s  f u l l  im p lic a t io n s  nor by a change in  a t t i t u d e  towards the
^^Lystivky Partiynoho  P id p i ly a , pp. 89, 176.
^^Kyzya, Narodni iMesnyky, pp. 99-100.
35Makara 'Kompartiya Zakhidnoyi U kray iny ',  p . 91. See a lso  
Kyzya, Narodni Mesnyky, p .  99; and Lystivky Partiynoho  P id p i ly a , p . 176
^^B. Volchev, 'Do P o li ty k y  P o l 's 'k o h o  Em ihrants 'koho Uryadu 
V London! v Ukrayins'komu P y ta n i ' ,  U krayins 'kyy Is to rychnyy  Zhurnal, 
1969, no. 6, pp. 122-25,
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P o l ish  p o p u la t io n  in  Western Ukraine, The P o l i sh  non-communist and
anti-communist underground was no le s s  h o s t i l e  towards the
U krainians and continued to  is su e  warnings o f  r e p r i s a l s  to  the
37n a t i o n a l i s t s  and r e g u la r ly  c a r r ie d  them out. The only excep tion  
to  t h i s  case ,  on the  p a r t  o f  U krain ian  fo rc e s ,  was th e  UPA u n i t s  
whose propaganda s t r e s s e d  th e  need f o r  p o l i t i c a l  u n i ty  of the  two 
peoples  a g a in s t  th e  Germans and the  Sovie t Union. The UPA, n e v e r th e ­
le ss  is su e d  warnings o f  r e p r i s a l  a g a in s t  the  numerous roving  bands, 
which were no t p o l i t i c a l  form ations and the  p o l i t i c a l  P o l ish  under­
ground which engaged in  a t r o c i t i e s  and c o n s i s t e n t ly  c a r r ie d  out
38i t s  th r e a t s  in  a most severe  manner. These a c t io n s  were considered  
by th e  UPA to  be a n ecessa ry  defense of the  U krain ian  populace .
They did  n o t ,  however, q u e l l  the  te n s io n s .
In the  i n i t i a l  p e r io d  o f renewed c o n f l i c t ,  the  UPA found 
no common language w ith  the  P o lish  underground and th e  n a t io n a l  
war continued  unabated throughout 1943 and in to  1944. I t  was only 
in  the  l a s t  yea r  o f  th e  war, when the  AK found i t s e l f  cut o f f  from 
the  p ro sp ec t  o f  having i t s  government in  power, t h a t  n e g o t ia t io n s  
between th e  two s id es  began.
The UPA in  1944
A c a rd in a l  ru le  of g u e r r i l l a  w arfare  i s  th e  avoidance o f  
la rg e  troop  c o n c e n tra t io n s ;  engagement with r e g u la r  army u n i t s  only 
takes  p lace  when i t  i s  unavoidable or under cond itions  o f  d e c is iv e  
advantage to  the  g u e r r i l l a  fo rce :  ambush, harassm ent of the  rea rg u ard
^^UHVR B4-4: V i l 'n a  Ukrayina no. 8, September 1943.
Spomyny Chotovoho UPA Ostroverkha (Munich, 1953), pp. 18,
33, 44.
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of a moving column, in  mountainous t e r r a i n ,  e t c .  The UPA, r a t h e r
than a t ta c k in g  the  Red Army form ations which were moving through
Western Ukraine, chose to  appeal to  the  s o ld ie r s  in  a p o l i t i c a l
way. I t  launched a propaganda campaign aimed a t  s p l i t t i n g  conscious
p o l i t i c a l  elements away from the  main o f fen s iv e  and r e c r u i t i n g  them
to  i t s  own u n i t s .  The fo llow ing l e a f l e t  i s  an e x c e l le n t  i l l u s t r a t i o n
o f  t h i s  campaign, and p rov ides  an in s ig h t  in to  the  Army's a t t i t u d e
towards th e  S ov ie t  Union a t  t h i s  p o in t  in  i t s  s t r u g g le .  The
campaign a lso  served  to  coun ter  the  o f f i c i a l  S ov ie t propoganda t h a t
the  whole n a t i o n a l i s t  movement was pro-German:
S o ld ie rs  and Commanders o f  the  Red Army, V ic to rs  over 
H i t l e r i t e  Germany:
At the  co s t  o f  unheard o f  s a c r i f i c e s ,  a t  th e  c o s t  o f  
m i l l io n s  o f  l iv e s  o f  your s o ld ie r  comrades, a t  the  
c o s t  o f  your own b lood , you have destroyed  one of the  
g r e a t e s t  p r is o n s  of people in  the  w o r ld - H i t l e r i t e  
Germany. Because of your p ro g ress iv e  love o f  freedom 
and h a t re d  f o r  a l l  su b ju g a t io n  and ty ranny , t h i s  
infamous fo rce  has d isappeared  from the  face of the  
e a r th ,  u sher ing  in  a p ro g re s s iv e  epoch. A ll th e  
freedom lov ing  people  o f  the  world thank you today 
f o r  t h i s ,  and fo r  t h i s  fu tu re  genera tions  w i l l  
remember you w ith  g r a t i tu d e .
Comrade S o ld ie rs  and Commanders I
Are th e  h ig h e s t  sac red  id e a l s  o f  f r e e  n a t io n s  and 
f re e  peoples being  c e le b ra te d  today amongst you 
when H i t l e r  and h i s  gang no longer e x i s t  in  
Europe? Is  th e re  no d iv i s io n  o f e x p lo i te r s  and 
e x p lo i te d ,  r u le r s  and ru le d  any more? Is the  
e x p lo i t a t io n  o f the  t o i l i n g  masses something o f  the  
p a s t  today? Have th e  s o c ia l  p a r a s i t e s ,  those  accorded 
p r iv i l e g e  by th e  r u l in g  a u th o r i t i e s  d isappeared  from 
amongst us in  t h i s  new l i f e ?
A bso lu te ly  n o t .  The peoples o f  Europe and the  USSR 
today are  being  destroyed  by ano ther p r i s o n  o f  n a t io n s .
This p r i s o n  i s  the  S t a l i n i s t - i m p e r i a l i s t  USSR.
Hundreds o f  m i l l io n s  o f  people today groan under 
th e  yoke o f y e t  an o th er  bloody d i c t a t o r —the  
d i c t a t o r  S t a l i n .  Hundreds o f  m il l io n s  are  now 
d e l iv e re d  to  the  savage e x p lo i t a t io n  o f  new 
p a r a s i t e s - - t h e  S t a l i n i s t  r u l in g  c l iq u e .
What e x a c t ly  has changed a f t e r  the  d e fe a t  o f  H i t l e r ?
A fte r  H i t l e r ' s  dow nfall ,  the  d i c t a t o r  and tk e  
im p e r i a l i s t s  have 'changed’ . Do we want an exchange o f 
o p p re s so rs ,  o r th e  d e s t r u c t io n  o f  a l l  opp ress ion  
and opp resso rs  a l to g e th e r?  Only an enemy o f  the  
peop le , o f  th e  working masses w i l l  say t h a t  you 
s t ru g g le d  f o r  a change o f  o p p resso rs .  Whoever i s  a 
t r u e  son o f h i s  p eop le , who has th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  
the  t o i l e r s  a t  h e a r t ,  s t ru g g le s  fo r  the  d e s t r u c t io n  o f  
a l l  o p p re ss io n ,  a l l  oppressors  f o r  a l l  tim e.
S o ld ie rs  and Commanders o f  the  Red Army.
When you r e tu r n  to  your homes and face even g r e a te r  
ha rdsh ip  than  you l e f t  be fo re  t h i s  war, when you 
meet your f a th e r s ,  mothers and c h i ld re n  hungry and 
t a t t e r e d ,  when you see how they are  hunch-backed and 
humbled from th e  u n b e liev eab le  labours o f  th e  
c o l l e c t i v e  forms and th e  f a c t o r i e s ,  and when you 
c o n cu rren t ly  meet w ith  w e l l -d re s se d ,  w e ll  fe d ,  s e l f -  
s a t i s f i e d  p a r ty  members, s e c r e t a r i e s  and commissars, 
when you meet again  w ith  the  same barbarous  
t e r r o r  o f  th e  S t a l i n i s t  NKVD, when b e fo re  you s tands  
the  image of th e  co n ce n tra t io n  camp, Solovky, 
e x e c u t io n s—then remember th a t  your s t ru g g le  fo r  
j u s t i c e  in  our lands i s  no t f in i s h e d .  You w i l l  a t t a i n  
such goals only when you des tro y  the  d i c t a t o r i a l ,  
t e r r o r i s t  and e x p lo i t in g  regime of the  g r e a t e s t  
enemy of the  p e o p le - S ta l in  and h i s  c l iq u e .  Only 
th en ,  may we c e le b ra te  j u s t i c e ,  only then w i l l  
we s t re n g th e n  the  conquests of the Great October 
R evolu tion . Otherwise S t a l i n  w i l l  e x p lo i t  h is  
v ic to ry  over H i t l e r  a g a in s t  you fo r  even g r e a te r  
su b ju g a t io n .  For in  b ind ing  your arms today , he 
p rep a res  you f o r  your death .
Comrade S o ld ie rs '.  Comrade Commanders'.
Forward to  th e  s t ru g g le  a g a in s t  the  g r e a t e s t  
enemy o f  the  p e o p le - - th e  bloody d i c t a t o r  S t a l i n .
To the  s t ru g g le  f o r  th e  r e c o n s t ru c t io n  o f  the  USSR on 
a t r u l y  dem ocratic  and j u s t  b a s i s .  To th e  s t ru g g le  
f o r  th e  v ic to ry  o f  th e  ideas  o f  j u s t i c e  and freedom 
fo r  people  and fo r  n a t i o n s . 39
In o th e r  l e a f l e t s  addressed to  Red Army s o l d i e r s ,  th e  UPA 
c a l le d  upon them to  d e s e r t  and jo in  i t s  movement. This campaign 
was most prominent in  th e  f i r s t  s ix  months o f  1944 as th e  Red Army
3 9 Document in  the  a u th o r 's  p o sse ss io n .
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40moved towards G a l ic ia  and the  cap tu re  o f  Lviv.
The r e s u l t s  o f  the  campaign cannot be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  
judged. N a t io n a l i s t  sources do no t prov ide  f ig u re s  f o r  th e  com­
p o s i t io n  o f th e  Army in  1944. The memoirs o f  one UPA u n i t ,  p u b lished  
in  the  West in  the  1950's  show th a t  a small number o f  Red Army 
s o ld ie r s  jo in ed  th e  UPA in  1944. The reason fo r  t h e i r  jo in in g  i s  
s t a t e d ,  however, as be ing  d e se r t io n  from th e  Red Army because the  
o f f i c e r s  were d r iv in g  the  s o ld ie r s  r u th l e s s l y  a g a in s t  the  Germans 
and the  UPA. O f f ic e r s  who were NKVD members appear to  have been those 
most r e sp o n s ib le  f o r  such p r a c t i c e s . D a n y l o  Shumuk no tes  in  h is  
memoirs the  case o f  approxim ately  f i f t e e n  Red Army o f f i c e r s  jo in in g  
the  UPA--this group, however jo in e d  in  th e  course o f  the  Red Army 
r e t r e a t  in  1941-42.^^ Lebed's h i s to r y  o f  the  UPA in c lu d es  r e p r in t s  
o f  l e a f l e t s  in  Russian and U krainian addressed to  Red Army s o ld ie r s  in  
which th e  UPA urged them to  d e s e r t .
N a t io n a l i s t  sources a lso  p o in t  out th a t  th e  Red Army con­
t in u o u s ly  r e c r u i t e d  lo c a l  men to  i t s  d iv is io n s  as i t  advanced in to  
Western Ukraine. Recruitment was in  some cases c a r r i e d  out with 
fo rc e ,  b u t  many c i t y  and r u r a l  people jo ined  volun tarily . '^ '^
In  th e  l a t t e r  h a l f  o f  1943, the  UPA had r e c r u i t e d  ra p id ly  
to  i t s  ranks b r in g in g  i t s  num erical s t re n g th  up to  approxim ately  
40,000 in su rg e n ts  under a r ms . Thi s  in f lu x  in  such a s h o r t  p e r io d  o f 
time d id  n o t allow i t  the  time nor the  assignment o f  s u f f i c i e n t  
p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  i n s t r u c to r s  to  t r a i n  the  new members and
^^UPA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I ,  p p . 113-16, 120-24. 
4 1 lb id . ,  p . 397.
^^Shumuk, Za Skhidnim Obriem, pp. 13-14.
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*UPA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I ,  p .  409.
Lebed ', U kray ins 'ka  P o v s tan s 'k a  Armiya, pp. 118-21.
44.
^^Myroslav Prokop, ’D vadtsyatpyati Rokovyny UPA', p .  92.
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i n t e g r a te  them as t e s t e d  f i g h t e r s  in  i t s  u n i t s .  The OUN-B network
in  th e  towns and c i t i e s  had gone underground in  August 1943, many
o f i t s  members leav ing  t h e i r  lo c a t io n s  and jo in in g  up w ith  the
46r u r a l  bases  o f  the  UPA. Although th ese  were seasoned a c t i v i s t s ,  
they a lso  had to  be in te g r a te d  in to  the  Army and o f te n  given a more 
complete p o l i t i c a l  ed u ca tio n .  The numerical s i z e  of 40,000, t h e r e ­
fore  concealed c e r t a in  weaknesses in  th e  cohesion o f  the  UPA a t  
th e  beginning  o f 1944. These weaknesses and the  changing cond itions  
in  which th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  were to  f i g h t  in  1944 s ig n a l le d  th e  
beginning  o f  th e  d e c lin e  of the  movement.
The lack o f cohesion o f  the  UPA as a f ig h t in g  fo rce  showed 
i t s e l f  p r im a r i ly  in  1944 in  th e  breakdown o f  a c e n t r a l i s e d  command 
and th e  r e tu r n  o f  in c re a s in g  numbers o f  in su rg e n ts  to  t h e i r  homes.
The biography o f  one UPA member O stroverkha, pu b lish ed  in  Germany 
in  1947 r e c a l l s  the  p ro g re s s iv e  d i s in t e g r a t i o n  o f  in d iv id u a l  u n i t s  
and the  loss  o f  co n tac t  w ith  o th e r  groups and th e  c e n t r a l  command 
in  l a t e  1944 as the  UPA was being pushed in to  the  C arp a th ian s ,  caught 
between the  German and Sov ie t  l i n e s . B y  mid 1944, th e  UPA 
had a lread y  dwindled to  approxim ately 25,000 members and proceeded to
dim inish  even more r a p id ly  as S o v ie t  a u th o r i t i e s  took c o n tro l  o f  
48Western Ukraine.
In th e  w in te r  o f  1943-44, the  UPA fo rces  in  Volyn were faced 
w ith  having to  deal w ith  th re e  types o f  opponents. Small fo rces  o f  
r e g u la r  Red Army d iv is io n s  and s p e c ia l  NKVD detachments which were 
ass igned  to  'mop-up' o p e ra t io n s  behind S ovie t l in e s  a ttem pted  to  .
^ ^ I b id . ,  p .  99.
Spomyny Chotovoho O stroverkha. pp. 23-28.
4  8 Prokop, 'D v ad tsy a tp y a ti  Rokovyny UPA', p . 92.
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blocade them in  th e  f o r e s t  a re a s .  The P o l i sh  p a r t i s a n  movement was 
engaged in  co n t in u a l  a ttacks, upon the  UPA, the  AK and o th e r  non­
communist p a r t i s a n s  o p e ra t in g  out o f  P o lish  v i l l a g e s  and towns in
th e  a r e a s ,  and the  P o l i s h  communist movement working w ith  the  Red 
49P a r t i s a n s .  UPA-West fo rce s  in  G a l ic ia  were a lso  f ig h t in g  Red
P a r t i s a n  detachments which had flooded th e  a rea  and were en trenched
around th e  towns o f  Zolochiv , Lviv, Berezhany.^^
On March 28, 1944 P o lish -U k ra in ian  ten s io n s  reached a new
le v e l  in  th e  Volyn and P o l i s s i a  areas when UPA fo rces  destroyed
the  v i l l a g e  o f  O s t r ih  w ith  a l l  500 in h a b i ta n ts  as a r e p r i s a l  a g a in s t
a t r o c i t i e s  c a r r ie d  out by P o l ish  p a r t i s a n s  who opera ted  out o f  th e  
51v i l l a g e .  This in c id e n t  became symbolic fo r  P o l ish  communist and
anti-communist g u e r r i l l a s  in  Western Ukraine of the  in t r a n s ig e n c e  o f
th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  and c o n tr ib u te d  to  f u r th e r  e s c a la t i o n s .  Po lish
in h a b i ta n t s  of the  a rea  began to  f le e  towards Lublin a f t e r  th e  UPA
issu ed  in s t r u c t io n s  t h a t  they leave . At th e  same time th e  f i r s t
o f  s e v e ra l  la rg e  blockades o f  UPA f o r e s t  s tro n g -h o ld s  was o rgan ised
by the  S ov ie t  fo rces  h e re .  On A p ril  10, 2,000 troops  under NKVD
o f f i c e r  le ad e rsh ip  blockaded th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  in  K ostopil and
Kremyanets (bordering  T ernop il  and Rivno o b la s ts )  where they had
52succeeded in  d r iv in g  them in to  massed f o r e s t  a re a s .  At t h i s  t im e, the  
UPA detachments in  the  Rivno reg ion  were i n s t r u c t e d  to  move n o rth  
toward the  P o l ish  b o rd e r .  In June, 1944, UPA-West fo rce s  a lso  began 
to  move towards th e  P o l i sh  b o rd e r  in  o rder  to  p r o te c t  U krainian
49Spomyny Chotovoho O stroverkha , p . 18, 
^^UPA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I I ,  p . 44. 
S ^ Ib id . ,  p . 39.
S ^ lb id . ,  pp. 45-50 .
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53v i l l a g e s  a g a in s t  German a t ta c k s  and P o l i sh  r e p r i s a l s .
The d e fe a t  o f  th e  German armies e a s t  of Lviv ( in  which b a t t l e s
the  SS D iv is ion  G a l ic ia  took p a r t  a t  Brody) moved th e  cen tre  of
\
f ig h t in g  o f  bo th  German-Soviet armies and U krain ian  n a t i o n a l i s t -  
S ovie t fo rces  in to  w estern  G a l ic ia  and th e  C arpath ian  mountains. 
S ta n is la v  became an im portan t c en tre  of the  c o n f l i c t  between the  UPA 
and th e  Red P a r t i s a n s .  Around S ta n is la v ,  la rg e  rec ru i tm e n t  campaigns 
by the  Red Army provoked the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  in to  a t ta c k in g  small 
r e g u la r  Sov ie t  u n i t s .  Red P a r t i s a n s  and a g e n e ra l is e d  e f f o r t  by the  
e x i s t in g  OUN-B network to  e l im in a te  as many communists as p o s s ib le  
who were again  becoming a c t i v e .  In  l a t e  J u ly ,  th e  UPA c a r r ie d  
out la rg e  ra id s  a g a in s t  Sov ie t  p a r t i s a n s  o p e ra t in g  around the  towns of 
S tan is lav --R osokakh , Zavadka and Rykiv,^'^
In  th e  C arpath ian  m ountains, b a t t l e s  w ith  r e t r e a t i n g  
German fo rces  gave way to  encounters  with the  Red P a r t i s a n s  s en t  in to  
the  a rea  in  September. When th e  P a r t i s a n s  f a i l e d  to  win any 
s i g n i f i c a n t  b a t t l e s  w ith the  n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  s p e c ia l  NKVD u n i t s  were 
brought in to  the  Kosmach a rea  in  October. They, to o ,  were s u c c e s s fu l ly  
r e p e l le d  by th e  UPA. S im ila r  NKVD blockades tak in g  p lace  in  G a l ic ia  
( P i d h a i t s i ,  T ernop il  and n e a r  S ta n is la v )  and in  the  n o r th ­
w este rn  reg ions  were, however in c re a s in g ly  s u c c e s s f u l .
Alexander D a ll in  notes  in  h is  book German Rule in  R u ss ia , 
t h a t  in  September, 1944, the  UPA 'was again  p repared  to  work a g a in s t  
th e  Red Army in  s te p  w ith  the  Wehrmacht, which, on i t s  p a r t ,  was w i l l in g  
to  supply i t  w ith  arms and goods in  o rder to  m ain ta in  a small 'second
5 3Spomyny Chotovoho O stroverkha , p . 33. 
^^UPA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I I ,  p p . 61-62. 
^ ^ I b id . ,  pp. 74, 82-84.
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f r o n t '  behind S o v ie t  l i n e s D a l l i n  supports  t h i s  co n ten t io n
57w ith  one re fe re n c e  to  German war a rc h iv e s .  The in fo rm atio n
a v a i la b le  to  t h i s  s tu d y  does no t  confirm D a l l i n ' s  a n a ly s i s .
L e a f le t s  d i s t r i b u t e d  by Sovie t p a r t i s a n s  and th e  communist
underground during  th e  re -o c cu p a tio n  o f Western U kraine, while
a t ta c k in g  the  OUN as Nazi c o l l a b o r a to r s ,  took a d i f f e r e n t  a t t i t u d e  to
5 8the  UPA in s u rg e n ts .  In the  l a t t e r  case , S ov ie t p a r t i s a n  groups 
urged UPA members to  jo in  t h e i r  ranks in  a common s t ru g g le  a g a in s t
59th e  Germans and assu red  them th a t  they  would be t r e a t e d  'a s  b r o t h e r s ' .  
These l e a f l e t s  a lso  took up a p o l i t i c a l  debate w ith th e  UPA, a 
p r a c t i c e  re se rv ed  by the  p a r t i s a n s  to  groups they f e l t  could be 
in f lu en c ed .  Such a p r a c t i c e  was not p re v a le n t  in  l e a f l e t s  d i s t r i b u t e d  
to  n a t i o n a l i s t  fo rce s  working fo r  the  Nazi a d m in is t ra t io n  in  
Western Ukraine.
Although the  UPA was an enemy o f  the  S ov ie t  p a r t i s a n  move­
ment and th e  communist underground, th e  l a t t e r  were q u i te  capable 
o f  d i s t in g u is h in g  between the  n a t io n a lism  of the  OUN-M, the  OUN-B 
and th e  UPA, whose o p p o s it io n  to  the  occupation was c o n s i s te n t  from 
i t s  in c e p t io n  as an o rgan ised  p o l i t i c a l  form ation in  February 1943,
The w i l l in g n e s s  o f  some Red P a r t i s a n  leaders  to  make n e u t r a l i t y  
accords with th e  UPA, as we have mentioned above, supports  the  
p o s i t io n  t h a t  th e  communists in  Ukraine, both p a r t i s a n s  and c i v i l i a n  
underground, saw an e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between th e  UPA and o th e r
^ ^ D a ll in ,  German Rule in  R uss ia , p . 621.
^ ^ I b id . ,  p .  622. The re fe re n c e  in  RMfdbO. to  RFSS (Reich 
M in is try  f o r  th e  Occupied E as te rn  T e r r i t o r i e s .  Rosenberg M in is t ry  to  
H ein rich  Himmler), September 4, 1944.
r  Q
Lystivky Partiynoho  P id p i ly a , pp. 114-15.
so
I b i d . ,  pp. 166-67.
G ^ lb id .,  pp. 121-24, 150.
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n a t i o n a l i s t  groups to  be i t s  o p p o s it io n  to  the  Nazi occupation .
The co n sis ten cy  o f  the  UPA command on t h i s  q u es t io n  i s  dem onstrated 
by the  f a c t  t h a t  on March 7, 1944, i t  ordered  th e  ex ecu tio n  of 
two UPA u n i t  le ad e rs  fo r  merely having c a r r ie d  out d is c u ss io n s  w ith  
German o f f i c i a l s .
D a l l i n ' s  th e s i s  of a c o n s i s te n t  u n i ty  between a l l  n a t i o n a l i s t  
a c t i v i t y  and German war aims, even in  the  p e r io d  o f  the  Nazi 
r e t r e a t ,  i s  c o n tra d ic te d  no t only by the  above mentioned sources,, 
bu t by o th e rs  as w e l l .  Khrushchev comments in  h i s  memoirs t h a t  'when 
Bandera r e a l i s e d  t h a t  the  H i t l e r i t e s  d i d n ' t  in te n d  to  keep t h e i r  
promise to  sponsor an independent U kraine, he tu rn ed  h i s  u n i t s  
a g a in s t  them . . . .  During the  second h a l f  of th e  war he fought 
a g a in s t  both us and th e  G e r m a n s D a l l i n  apparen tly  does no t 
recogn ise  the  complex e v o lu tio n  o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement 
a f t e r  1943 when he w r i te s  t h a t  ' t h e  UPA and UHVR remained b i t t e r l y  
n a t i o n a l i s t - f i g h t i n g  communist and h o s t i l e  Ukrainian groups, Poles 
R ussians, Jews and Rumanians'. He does n o t ,  however, in c lu d e  the 
Nazis in  h is  l i s t  o f  a l le g e d  UPA enemies. O f f i c i a l  Nazi p ro ­
clam ations in  occupied U krain ian  t e r r i t o r i e s  a ttem pted  to  p o r t r a y  
the  UPA as communist, p o in t in g  out th a t  i t  was a n t i - N a z i . S o v i  
h i s to r i a n s  them selves , th e  l e a s t  sym pathetic  to  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  
r e a d i ly  admit t h a t  the  UPA fought the  German occupation  in  Ukrain 
and was i n i t i a l l y  formed in  February 1943 fo r  t h i s  very p u rp o se .
p . 45.
^^L ebed ', U k ray in s 'k a  P o v s tan s 'k a  Armiya, p .  73.
Crankshaw, e d . ,  Khrushchev Remembers, p . 123,
^^D a ll in ,  German Rule in  R u ss ia , p .  621.
^^Lebed’ , U kray ins 'ka  P o v s tan s 'k a  Armiya, pp. 101-103. 
^^See U kray ins 'ka  RSR, p .  388; and Kyzya, Narodni Mesnyky,
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There i s  l i t t l e  evidence to  support th e  c laim  th a t  the  UPA 
fought Jews. We have prov ided  sources to  the  c o n tra ry  in  Chapter 
I I I .  I f  they  fought Rumanians, then  these  were Rumanian d iv is io n s  
o f  th e  German army s ta t io n e d  in  Ukraine. In f a c t ,  th e  UPA, 
as we have shown, a ttem pted  to  r e c r u i t  t h i s  and o th e r  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  
from German d iv is io n s  by ca r ry in g  out p o l i t i c a l  propaganda amongst 
th e  s o ld i e r s .  D a l l in  c re a te s  a m istaken im pression  th a t  the  UPA was 
merely an appendage o f f a n a t i c a l  n a t i o n a l i s t s  t i e d  to  the  German 
war e f f o r t  which spen t much of i t s  time k i l l i n g  o th e r  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  
in  Ukraine and a s s i s t i n g  in  the  German r e t r e a t .  This view does no t 
d i s t in g u is h  between the  d i f f e r e n t  n a t i o n a l i s t  c u r re n ts  a c t iv e  in  1943 
and 1944 (some which worked hand in  hand w ith th e  Germans) and 
denies  the  e x p l i c i t l y  p o l i t i c a l  c h a ra c te r  o f  the  Army.
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  imagine a g u e r r i l l a  army whose p o l i t i c a l  
p e rs p e c t iv e s  were thoroughly  c o n s is te n t  and whose a c t io n s  were e n t i r e l y  
uniform a t  each p o in t  in  th e  war. D a l l in ,  who i s  a recognised  
a u th o r i ty  on th e  co n d it io n s  o f  German ru le  in  th e  USSR would 
c e r t a in l y  agree t h a t  such co nsis tency  was im possib le  in  the  given 
c ircum stances . A r a p id ly  changing war s i t u a t i o n  even ru le d  out the  
k ind o f  c o o rd in a t io n  p o s s ib le  fo r  a c o n s p i r a to r i a l  o rg a n is a t io n  in  
times o f  s o c ia l  peace . I f  i s o l a t e d  c o n tra d ic to ry  p o l i c i e s  were pu t 
in to  e f f e c t  by UPA u n i t s  during  th e  German r e t r e a t ,  then  they 
do n o t  convincing ly  dem onstrate  th a t  the  UPA supported  th e  Wehrmacht 
or o th e r  Nazi fo rc e s .
This p a r t i c u l a r  a sp ec t  o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement's ro le  
in  th e  war i s  bu t one i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  th e  widely d iv e rg en t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  
c u r r e n t ly  a v a i l a b le .  More extreme form ulations  than  th e  ones we 
have d iscu ssed ,  such as those  which claim th a t  th e  UPA fought only
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S ov ie t  fo rce s  and was always a ' la c k e y  o f  G e r m a n y ' o r  to  
the  e f f e c t  t h a t  'd u r in g  th e  e n t i r e  th re e  y ears  o f  German m is ru le  
in  U kraine, th e  Nazis f a i l e d  to  f in d  one U krain ian  q u i s l i n g '  a re  
u s u a l ly  p o l i t i c a l l y  m otivated  and serve  l i t t l e  in  th e  sea rch  fo r  
an o b je c t iv e  and complex unders tand ing  o f th e  s u b je c t  a t  hand. The 
abundance o f  such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  and the  lack o f  o r ig in a l  
source m a te r ia ls  in  many a reas  o f  the  su b je c t  n e c e s s a r i ly  p lace  a 
l im i t  on th e  depth o f  a n a ly s is  c u r re n t ly  p o s s ib le .
In  th e  autumn o f 1944 th e  UPA was approaching the  two y ear  
mark o f  a c t i v i t y  and was a lread y  in  se r io u s  d e c l in e .  The autumn 
d e f o l i a t i o n  o f  f o r e s t s  and the  outbreak o f typhus amongst the  
g u e r r i l l a  u n i t s  which were cut o f f  from adequate food and medical 
su p p lie s  had c o n tr ib u te d  to  f u r th e r  lo s se s .  The s iz e  of blockades 
a g a in s t  them grew. No c e n t r a l  command appeared to  be o p e ra t in g  and 
d i s c i p l in e  in  th e  ranks was d i f f i c u l t  to  m a in ta in . D esertions  
in c re a se d  as th e  rank and f i l e  in su rg e n ts  r e a l i s e d  th e  hope lessness  of 
th e  s i t u a t i o n .  In  1943, th e  UPA had e s ta b l i s h e d  i t s  s trongho lds  in  
P o l i s s i a  and Volyn on the  former s i t e s  o f  Kovpak's and o th e r  p a r t i s a n s '  
fo rc e s .  The UPA s i t e s  in  the  w in te r  o f  1944-45 were now in  the  
C arpath ian  mountains and in  Southern Poland a t  th e  extreme w estern  
borders  of th e  coun try . The UPA in su rg e n t  ' r e p u b l i c '  i n  th e  Hutsul 
reg ion  n ear  Bereziv and Zhebye su rv ived  the w in te r  and exac ted  a t o l l  
o f  th re e  hundred S ovie t troops  who had t r i e d  to  cap tu re  the  temporary 
s t r o n g h o l d . T o  the  e a s t ,  the  su rv iv in g  g u e r r i l l a  u n i t s  fa re d  
worse and th e  numbers o f  dead n a t i o n a l i s t s  began to  outweigh the 
S ovie t count.
^^K oval ',  I s t o r i y a  Pamyatayeî ,  pp. 14, 17.
^ ^ E d i to r i a l ,  U krain ian  Q u a r te r ly ,  no. 1, 1944-45, p . 5. 
^^UPA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I I ,  p . 87.
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CHAPTER V 
CONSOLIDATION OF SOVIET AUTHORITY
The d e fe a t  o f  Germany in  th e  USSR ended th e  a c t iv e  r e s i s te n c e  
o f  a l l  n a t i o n a l i s t  fo rce s  which had depended on h e r  p resen ce .  The 
UPA and th e  su rv iv in g  OUN-B network were the  only groups which 
remained. The UPA wanted to  continue a war with S ov ie t  a u th o r i ty ;  
the  m a jo r i ty  o f  th e  Western U krain ian  p o p u la t io n  d id  n o t .  In s p i t e  
o f  ev ery th ing  d isag ree a b le  about the  new a u th o r i ty ,  i t  co incided  w ith 
the  end o f  the  German occupation  and the  suppress ion  o f  n a t io n a l  
h o s t i l i t i e s  between the  Poles and the  U kra in ians. But t h i s  d id  no t 
mean t h a t  th e  UPA was w ithout a base of support amongst the Western 
Ukrainian p e a s a n try .  Nor d id  th e  c o n so l id a t io n  o f  S ov ie t  power in  
Western Ukraine mean an end to  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  g u e r r i l l a  war 
which had moved in to  Southern Po land-the  Lemko, Kholm and Peremysl 
a r e a s .
The main ta sk  o f  the  incoming o f f i c i a l s  from S o v ie t  Ukraine 
was to  r e c o n s t r u c t  the  Communist P a rty  th e re  and to  beg in  to  r e b u i ld  
th e  w arto rn  economy w ith  the  a s s is te n c e  of S ov ie t  a g r i c u l t u r a l  and 
i n d u s t r i a l  s p e c i a l i s t s .  S ovie t h i s to r i a n s  e s t im a te  t h a t  th e re  were 
a l i t t l e  over seven thousand communists l e f t  in  Western Ukraine a t  
the  end o f  the  war, approxim ately  one f i f t h  of the  f ig u r e  in  1940.^
A, B. Tkach.uk, 'D iy a l ’n l s f  Komunistychnoyi P a r t i y i  
Ukrayiny po Ideyno-politychnomu Vykhovanyu Robitnychoho Klasu 
Zakhidnykh O blastey  ÜRSR 1944-1950 r . r . ' ,  U krayins 'kyy Is torychnyy 
Zhurnal, 1970, no. 10, p . 99.
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TKe s tre n g th en in g  of the  c i t y  p o l i t i c a l  appara tu s  and th e  economic
i n s t i t u t i o n s  spanned over the  f i r s t  Five Year P lan . By March. 1,
1945, 12,000 p a r ty  members ass igned  to  p o l i t i c a l  work were brought
in  from th e  Communist P a r ty  (Bolsheviks] of Ukraine. By January
1, 1946 the  number of a g i t a t i o n  c o l l e c t iv e s  of th e  p a r ty  had grown
to  13,000, t o t a l l i n g  over 216,000 workers. These c o l l e c t i v e s  were
2
made up of lo c a l  and imported cad re . The sh ee r  weight o f  such a 
p o l i t i c a l  apparatus  in  a p o p u la t io n  o f  approxim ately  s ix  m i l l io n  is  
one in d ic a t io n  of the  odds a g a in s t  the  UPA a t  t h i s  tim e. By mid-1946 
over 85,000 o rg a n ise rs  and economic s p e c i a l i s t s  were in  Western 
Ukraine working on th e  re c o n s t ru c t io n  of the  economy. The m a jo r i ty
3
o f th i s  number were communists.
The main fu n c tio n  o f  the  id e o lo g ic a l  appara tus  was to  p ro ­
v ide  support f o r  two ongoing p ro je c ts  in  Western U k ra in e -- th e  con­
t in u in g  m i l i t a r y  o p e ra t io n  a g a in s t  the  UPA and the  c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n  
o f  a g r i c u l tu r e .  The n a t i o n a l i s t  h i s to r ia n ^  A, Panasenko who was 
in  Western Ukraine a t  th e  time p o in ts  out th a t  the  two themes 
o f  a g i t a t io n  were:
(a] th e  h i s t o r i c  t i e s  of f r ie n d sh ip  between the  Russian 
and U krain ian  p eop le , m an ifes t  in  t h e i r  common 
v ic to ry  over fascism ;
(b) th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t  bands were agents 
o f  Nazi Germany.4
In th e  c i t i e s ,  n a t i o n a l i s t  a c t i v i t y  had d im inished to  the
p o in t  t h a t  i t s  p resence  was f e l t  only in  i s o l a t e d  t e r r o r i s t  a t ta c k s
and sabotage of NKVD i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Often these  were c a r r ie d  out by
2
P. A. Borkovs’ky, 'S tvorenya  i  Vykhovanya Partiynumu 
Orhanizatsiyamy Zakhidnykh O blastey URSR Masovo Aktyvu Trudyashchykh 
1944-1950 r . r . ,  U kray ins 'kyy  Is torychnyy Zhuimal, 1973, no. 4, p . 96.
^ lo c .  c i t .
^UHVR A-6: A. Panasenko, 'B o ro t 'b a  U krayins 'koho Narodu z
2oyu B o l 'sh ev y ts 'k o y u  Okupatsiyeyu' .
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r u ra l -b a s e d  g u e r r i l l a  g roups.^  In the  co u n try s id e ,  n a t io n a l i s m 's  
t r a d i t i o n a l  s tro n g h o ld ,  o p p o s it io n  to  S ovie t a u th o r i ty  and to  
c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n  remained a t  a h ig h  p o in t  and prov ided  th e  UPA w ith  
a base fo r  continued  work. This b a se ,  however, depended upon 
s t a l l i n g  c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n  fo r  as long as p o s s ib le .  In  an o rgan ised  
a g r i c u l tu r a l  economy, w ith  s t r i c t  accounting of food, a d m in is t ra t iv e  
c o n tro l  over a l l  land and the  movement of labour, a ru r a l - b a s e d  
g u e r r i l l a  fo rce  could no t  o b ta in  i t s  b a s ic  n e c e s s i t i e s - - f o o d ,  s h e l t e r  
and in fo rm atio n . The n a t i o n a l i s t s  had no w e l l -d e f in e d  s t r a t e g y  fo r  
p o l i t i c a l  work under the  new c o n d i t io n s .
The f i r s t  e f f o r t s  by the  government in  the  coun try s ide  were 
aimed a t  b reak ing  the  s o c ia l  cohesion of the peasan ts  by a t ta c k in g  
the  two most im portan t i n s t i t u t i o n s  around which they  o rgan ised  
th em se lv es -- th e  church and the  UPA, In March 1946, an a ttem pt was 
made to  le sse n  the  ch u rch 's  in f lu en c e  by invoking a union between 
the  Russian Orthodox Church, which was p a r t i a l l y  a s t a t e  c o n tro l le d  
i n s t i t u t i o n ,  and th e  G reek-C atho lic  (Byzantine r i t e )  church to  
which many p easan ts  belonged.
O pposition  from the  U krainian Greek C a th o l ic  c le rg y  a t  a 
s taged  synod on March 8-10 a t  which 281 p r i e s t s  re fu se d  to  jo in  the 
new 'u n io n '  led  to  w idespread rep re ss io n s  a g a in s t  th e  Church. The 
m a jo r i ty  o f  p r i e s t s  and b ishops a t  t h i s  g a th e r in g  in  S t .  George's 
church in  Lviv, numbering over 1,000 consented to  u n ify  th e  Greek 
C a th o lic  and Russian Orthodox chu rches . ^ At th e  same tim e, the  
a u th o r i t i e s  were sc reen in g  film s o f  UPA in su rg e n ts  g iv ing  themselves
^UPA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I I ,  p .  112. 
^ I b i d . ,  p . 338.
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up in  an a ttem pt to  show th a t  the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  had responded 
favourab ly  to  the  numerous appeals  by Khrushchev and o th e r  s t a t e  
le a d e r s .  The UPA responded by bombing f ilm  h a l l s  o r  lo c a l  p o l ic e  
o f f ic e s  on evenings when these  f ilm s were being shown,^ Whether 
the  film s of n a t i o n a l i s t s  su rren d e r in g  were a u th e n t ic  cannot be 
determ ined; one n a t i o n a l i s t  h i s t o r i a n  has conceded, however, t h a t  the  
appeal made on May 18, 1945 immediately a f t e r  Germany's formal
o
su rren d e r  was more su c c e ss fu l  than  prev ious o n es .
The UPA u n i t s ,  conside rab ly  shrunken in  s iz e  by mid 1945, 
avoided th e  e s c a la t i n g  S ov ie t  p re s su re s  in  Western Ukraine by 
launching propaganda ra id s  in to  o th e r  t e r r i t o r i e s .  At t h i s  tim e, 
although borders  were being s e t t l e d  with ne ighbouring  s t a t e s ,  bo rder 
co n tro ls  had no t been p ro p e r ly  e s ta b l i s h e d .  In the  sp r in g  o f  1945, 
g u e r r i l l a  u n i t s  launched an eastw ard r a id  in to  P o l i s s i a ,  Zhytomyr 
and Kiev o b la s t s .  Another headed in to  Poland, w hile  the  G a l ic ia -  
based in su rg e n ts  continued  to  r a id  from t h e i r  f o r e s t  enclaves 
i n to  the  f l a t l a n d s  in  an e f f o r t  to  counter the  growing propaganda 
campaign against them amongst th e  p e a sa n try .  Two summers ra id s  in  
1945 and 1946 in to  S lovak ia  by th e  UPA-West group were in p o r ta n t  
excurs ions  f o r  the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  a ttem pting  to  e x p la in  t h e i r  case to  
o th e r  pop u la tio n s  in  E as te rn  Europe. The second S lovak ia  r a id  
went as f a r  as Kosice and Presov be fo re  r e tu rn in g  back across th e  
b o rd e r  in to  Western Ukraine. In th e  course o f  the  1945 t r e k ,  the  
n a t i o n a l i s t s  encountered  Slovak army u n i t s  which wanted to  jo in  them; 
they were no t adm itted  to  the  UPA, according to  the  r e p o r t  o f  the
^ I b i d . ,  p .  103.
^Yaroslav B il in sk y ,  The Second Sovie t R epublic . The Ukraine 
A fte r  World War (New J e r s e y ,  1964), pp. 11, 127, 132.
^UPA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I I ,  p. 95.
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Slovak ia  r a i d ,  b u t were urged to  form t h e i r  own groups and f ig h t  
a g a in s t  the  government in  Prague.
The UPA in  Poland in  1945-46 
and th e  AK
The i s s u e  o f  the  P o l i sh -S o v ie t  bo rder  was f i r s t  d iscussed  a t  
the  Y a lta  Conference on February 4-11, 1945. B r i t a in ,  th e  United 
S ta te s  and the  USSR were re p re se n te d  here  by C h u rc h i l l ,  Roosevelt and 
S t a l i n .  There were no P o lish  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  in  a t ten d an ce ,  e i t h e r  
from the  London government in  e x i l e  or from B ie r u t 's  Committee of 
N a tiona l Union. The London government wanted a r e s o lu t io n  of the  
bo rd e r  t h a t  would inc lude  Lviv and the  Drohobych o i l  b a s in  in  Poland; 
th e  B r i t i s h  and American d e leg a tio n s  made r e p re s e n ta t io n s  to  t h i s  
e f f e c t ,  bu t d id  n o t p re ss  th e  p o in t .  Both Roosevelt and C h u rch il l  
recogn ised  t h a t  S t a l i n  had the  p re ro g a t iv e  in  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n - - t h e  Red 
Army had l ib e r a te d  th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  in  q u es t io n .  Another f a c to r  to  
th e  d isadvantage  of the  London government was th e  predominance of 
Ukrainians in  th e  areas under d iscu ss io n .  The Curzon l in e  was 
agreed upon between the  leaders  upon S t a l i n ' s  req u e s t  as the  
t e r r i t o r i a l  b o rd e r ,  and Western Ukraine became p a r t  o f  Sov ie t  Ukraine.
With in te r n a t io n a l  d ip lom a tic  re c o g n i t io n ,  B ie r u t ' s  Committee 
in  Poland was favoured to  become th e  o f f i c i a l  government. The London 
government, in  s p i t e  of co n s id e rab le  popu lar support in s id e  Poland, 
d is so lv e d  i t s  underground, th e  AK, in  February a f t e r  th e  Y a lta
^%PA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I ,  p . 218.
^^Roman Oliynyk, ' U kray ins ' ke Pytannya na Kryms'kL, 
K o n fe ren ts iy i  1945 ', S u c h a s n is t ' ,  no. 5 (53), May 1965, pp. 92-96.
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12d is c u s s io n s .  On A p ril  21, 1945, the  Sovie t Union and B ie r u t ' s
communists s igned a p ac t  of mutual a s s i s ta n c e  in  m i l i t a r y  and
economic a f f a i r s .  The m i l i t a r y  a s s i s ta n c e  agreement was c l e a r l y
aimed a t  p re p a r in g  f o r  a j o i n t  e f f o r t  a g a in s t  P o l i sh  and U krainian
in su rg e n ts  s t i l l  a c t iv e  in  Southern Poland. A P o l i sh  Government
13of N a tiona l Unity  was proclaim ed on June 23, 1945, In th e  same month,
th re e  P o l ish  in f a n t r y  d iv is io n s  were s e n t  a f t e r  th e  UPA groups w ithout
14any apparent su ccess .
One day a f t e r  th e  p roc lam ation  of the  Government o f  N ational 
Unity , a conference was c a l le d  by the  D irec to r  o f  the  Bureau o f  the  
Praesidium of M in is t e r s ,  Dr. Zhumak in  Warsaw to  d iscu ss  the  i s su e  
of the  U krain ian  p o p u la t io n  'beyond the  Curzon l i n e '  ( i . e .  on the  
P o l ish  s i d e ) . The conference was a ttended  by government r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  
and U krain ian  community le a d e rs .  . According to  an UPA r e p o r t  in  the  
a u th o r 's  p o sse ss io n  ( the  UPA ap p aren tly  had a member p re s e n t  a t  
the  meeting in  ano ther  capac ity )  the  Ukrainian r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  and 
government o f f i c i a l s  d iscu ssed  the  t e r r i t o r i e s  in  Southern Poland 
and the  i n s t a b i l i t y  th e re  which th rea ten ed  the  e s tab l ish m e n t  of p u b l ic  
o rd e r .  The government s id e  expressed  the  opinion t h a t  a l l  'p ro g re s s iv e '  
Ukrainians had gone to  S ov ie t  Ukraine a t  th e  end o f  1944 a f t e r  the  
Sovie t v ic to r y .  Those remaining were, according to  them, ' r e a c t i o n a r i e s '  
Fearing the  ' a r i s a l  o f  a new P iedm ont',  the government f e l t  t h a t  
remaining U krain ian  v i l l a g e s  should  be deported . The Ukrainian 
re p re s e n ta t iv e s  argued th a t  the  communities in  the  Peremysl, Kholm 
and Lemko reg ions  had been th e re  fo r  many y e a rs ,  t h a t  th e  people
12 Vaclav L. Benes and G. J .  Pounds, Poland (London, 1970),
p. 251.
130. H a leck i,  A H is to ry  o f  Poland (London, 1955), p. 323. 
14B il in s k y ,  Second S o v ie t  R epublic, p . 113,
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considered  them selves to  he P o l i s h  c i t i z e n s  w i th  the  r i g h t  to  f u l l
p r o te c t io n  o f  th e  law. Furtherm ore, th e y  demanded re c o g n i t io n  of
r e l i g io u s  freedoms, U krain ian  language schoo ls ,  r e - c r e a t i o n  o f  old
co o p era t iv es  and th e  c o n s t ru c t io n  o f  new ones, p o l i t i c a l  amnesty
fo r  those  imprisoned a t  the  end o f  the  War, th e  r i g h t  to  t h e i r  own
p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty  and compensation fo r  lands which had a l re ad y  been 
15taken  from them.
Apparently  the  U krain ian  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  f e l t  themselves in  a
p o s i t io n  to  demand n o t only  t h a t  t h e i r  popu la t io n  remain in  Poland,
bu t a lso  to  put forward a l l  o f the  req u es ts  l i s t e d  above. I t  was
c le a r  to  the  P o l i sh  government t h a t  t h e i r  confidence d id  n o t  stem
from o f f i c i a l  o r u n o f f i c i a l  backing by the  S ov ie t  U kra in ian  government,
bu t from the  in t r a n s ig e n c e  of th e  U krain ian  p o p u la t io n  in  Poland
and th e  a u th o r i ty  o f  th e  UFA in  Southern Poland. At t h i s  time i t  i s
es t im ated  by Blum, a B rig a d ie r  General o f  the  P o l ish  army th a t  the  UFA
had seventeen  p la toons  on P o l ish  t e r r i t o r y  numbering s ix  thousand
in s u rg e n ts .  These p la to o n s  were n o t only f ig h t in g  a g a in s t  the  P o lish
m i l i t i a  b u t had o rgan ised  th e  a rea  a d m in is t r a t iv e ly  and were even
c o l le c t in g  taxes  fo r  th e  UFA from the  U krainian p o p u la t io n  th e re .
The danger t h a t  t h i s  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  p re sen ted  to  the  P o lish  government
i s  ev id en t  in  Blum's r e p o r t :
The UFA bands d iso rg a n ise d  the  normal course 
o f  l i f e  in  d i s t r i c t s  which c o n s t i tu te d  t h e i r  
a rea  o f  a c t i v i t y .  Thus, fo r  example, in  
1945 p u b l ic  a d m in is t ra t io n  in  the  province  o f  
Rzeszow was com pletely a t  a s t a n d s t i l l :  can tona l
o f f ic e s  were working in  only two communities, in  
some v i l l a g e s ,  a u th o r i t i e s  were formed fo r  
times only to  be l iq u id a te d  each time by the  UFA
^^P. Doc. 82.
^^B ilinsky , Second Sov ie t  Republic, p . 113.
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p la to o n s .  Only 10-12 p e rcen t  of the  tax  
in  k ind were c o l le c te d  in  t h a t  p rov ince . The 
bands destroyed  and l iq u id a te d  the  m a jo r i ty  
o f the  C i t i z e n s '  M i l i t i a  o u tp o s t s .17
In the  l a t t e r  h a l f  of 1945, the  e x i s t in g  AK u n i t s  in  Southern 
Poland which had no t disbanded a t  th e  London government's  req u e s t  
in  February en te red  in to  n e g o t ia t io n s  w ith  UFA u n i t s .  For both  groups, 
th ese  n e g o t ia t io n s  were borne o f n e c e s s i ty .  In Western Ukraine th e  
S ov ie t  government was c o n so l id a t in g  i t s  power, the reby  suppress ing  
the  UFA'S t r a d i t i o n a l  p easan t  base ;  in  Poland th e  AK was w ithou t a 
government to  f ig h t  f o r .  There was l i t t l e  p o l i t i c a l  u n i ty  between 
the  P o l ish  and U krain ian  n a t i o n a l i s t s .
A co n sid e rab le  number o f  AK groups in  Southern Poland were 
s t i l l  a c t iv e .  They had o r ig i n a l ly  expected t h a t ,  given th e  mass 
sen tim en t in  Poland favouring  the  government in  e x i l e ,  i t s  
su p p o rte rs  would be able to  i n f i l t r a t e  the  communist appara tus  and 
through an e v o lu t io n a ry  p rocess  ga in  s t a t e  power. The AK fo rces  
were, however, a t  a d isadvantage  by 1945 because they  had no t opposed 
the  incoming Red Army in  1944 on the  i n s t r u c t io n s  o f  th e  e x i le  govern­
ment and now the  p resence  o f  th e  Red Army in  Poland prov ided  B ieru t 
w ith  a power base to  coun ter  th e  mass sen tim en t.  They were faced 
w ith  the  p ro sp ec t  o f  opposing a pro-Moscow government which was a lready  
c o n so l id a t in g  i t s  c o n tro l  over the  country through the  s t a t e  ap para tu s . 
In a d d i t io n ,  th e  AK was a c t i v e ly  opposed to  the  UFA; i t  d id  no t 
recogn ise  th e  r i g h t s  o f  the  m ino r ity  in  Southern Poland, and the  
leg it im acy  o f  UFA ac tio n s  even l e s s .  The only common b a s is  fo r  
p o s s ib le  n e g o t ia t io n s  a t  t h i s  time was bo th  g roups ' o p p o s i t io n  to  the
17 Ignacy Blum, 'U zd ia i Wojska Folskiego w Walce o o trw alen ie  
Wladzy Ludowej; Walki z Bandami UFA', Wojskowy Przeg lqd  H is to ryczny , 
Vol. IV, no. 1, January-March 1959, p . 12.
^®P. Doc. 1.
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S ov ie t  Union. This commonality appears to  have s t im u la te d  th e  f i r s t
c o n tac ts  between the  two fo rc e s .  At the  same tim e, because th e  UFA
had been a c t iv e  in  the  f o r c ib le  expu ls ion  of Foies  from the  Volyn
and F o l i s s i a  areas and continued  to  d is ru p t  government a ttem pts
in  Southern Poland to  deport th e  U krainians to  the  e a s t ,  and
because the  AK i t s e l f  had been a c t iv e  in  the  campaign to  ' r e - s e t t l e '
th e  U krainian  p easan ts  l iv in g  in  the  Kholm and Lemko re g io n s ,  the
n e g o t ia t io n s  were marked n e i th e r  by mutual t r u s t  nor by any s i g n i f i -  
19cant agreem ents ,
In th e  course o f  these  n e g o t ia t io n s  the  AK le ad e rsh ip  and the  
UHVR did  no t meet. Leaders o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  u n i t s  met t h e i r  coun te r­
p a r t s .  From th e  documents in  th e  a u th o r 's  p o s se s s io n ,  i t  appears
20t h a t  th e  f i r s t  c o n tac t  was only in  October, 1945. The main su b jec ts
o f  t h i s  d is c u s s io n  were exchanges o f in fo rm ation  concerning the
p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  in  Poland, a ttem pts  to  gain  c o -o p e ra t io n  in  a
common f ig h t  a g a in s t  the  communist a d m in is t ra t io n  on both s id es  of the
bo rder  and p lans  to  exchange p o l i t i c a l  l i t e r a t u r e .  In th e  i n i t i a l
m eetings, UFA re p re s e n ta t iv e s  req u es ted  l i s t s  o f  P o l ish  communist
21p a r ty  members and o f  S ov ie t sym pathisers  from the  AK.
In an u n o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i ty ,  lo c a l  AK leaders  expressed  
support fo r  th e  goal o f  an independent U krainian s t a t e ,  bu t d id  no t 
appear to  be w ell informed about the  n a t i o n a l i s t s '  long s tand ing  
p roposa l f o r  a common f r o n t  o f  E ast European a n t i - S o v ie t  groups 
a g a in s t  the  USSR. They n e v e r th e le s s  expressed  i n t e r e s t  upon hear ing  
t h i s  id e a .  At a meeting between re p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f  the  two s id es  in  
December, AK members informed the  UFA th a t  t h e i r  h igh  command was
V. Volchev, 'Do F o li ty k y  F o l 's 'k o h o  U ryadu ',  p . 123. See 
a lso  Spomyny Chotovoho O stroverkha , p . 38; and F . Doc. 70, F . Doc. 86, 
F . Doc. 99.
20^ F. Doc. 93.
^^F. Doc. 95.
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d iv ided  on th e  U krain ian  q u e s t io n ,  most o f  its , members p r e f e r r in g
to  d iscu ss  th e  i s su e  of UFA claim s to  t e r r i t o r i e s  e a s t  o f  th e  Curzon
22l in e  be fo re  co ns ide ring  the  b roader q u es t io n  o f  s ta teh o o d .
The most p re s s in g  problem ev iden t in  th e  d is c u s s io n s  recorded
in  the  UFA r e p o r t s  was th e  is su e  of the  U krainian p ea sa n try  in  Foland.
This had led  to  antagonisms between the  UFA and th e  AK in  1944 when
th e  former had c a r r i e d  out widespread campaigns in  Southern Foland
d e s tro y in g  homesteads which deported  Ukrainians had abandoned and
opposing new c o lo n is a t io n  a ttem pts  by Poles in  the  Lemko and Kholm 
23a re a s .  Although the  UFA had is su e d  in s t r u c t io n s  to  i t s  members 
a lready  in  August, 1944 no t to  provoke a t ta c k s  upon p e ac e fu l  peasan ts  
by lo o t in g  and k i l l i n g  F o l ish  re s id e n ts  o f  the  a reas^^  (such ac tions  
by UFA are  adm itted  in  th e se  documents) the  sh ee r  le v e l  of h o s t i l i t i e s  
between the  F o l ish  and Ukrainian popu la tions  and the  armed groups 
on each s id e  had made AK-UFA c o n f l i c t s  in e v i t a b le .  In  the  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f 
1945, when th e  AK was considerab ly  weakened and th e  UFA in  Western 
Ukraine had r e - in f o r c e d  i t s  Poland-based u n i t s  from i t s  Volyn and 
G a lic ian  s t ro n g h o ld s ,  the  UFA f e l t  s trong  enough to  begin  to  n e g o t ia te  
th e  AK's n o n - in te rv e n t io n  in to  the  r e - s e t t le m e n t  i s s u e .  No d e c is io n s ,  
however, were reached in  th e  recorded  d is c u s s io n s .
The D efeat o f  th e  N a t io n a l i s t  Movement
The OUN-B d e c la r a t io n  is su e d  a t  the  end o f the  Second World 
War had p u t forward an o r i e n t a t i o n  of continued o p p o s it io n  to  Sov ie t  
ru le  and the  tra n s fo rm a tio n  o f  th e  e x i s t in g  s t r u c tu r e s  o f  the o rg a n is a t io n
22 F. Doc. 1.
^^F. Doc. 54. 
24
F. Doc. 76.
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in to  deeply c o n s p i r a to r i a l  c e l l  networks. S t r e s s  was given to  the
new s o c ia l  con ten t of the  n a t i o n a l i s t  programme--the demand f o r  a
25'c l a s s l e s s  s o c i e t y ' .  On th e  in te r n a t io n a l  l e v e l ,  th e  OUN-B
p o in te d  to  th e  i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between B r i ta in  and the
S ovie t Union which i t  b e l ie v e d  would s h o r t ly  provoke a Third  World
War.^^ (The AK had th e  same p o s i t io n  on the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s i t u a t i o n  
27in  1945). As b e fo re ,  the  theme o f  a n a t io n a l  war o f  l i b e r a t io n  in  
the  con tex t o f  an i n t e r n a t io n a l  war re -appeared  in  the  OUN's 
p e r s p e c t iv e s .
On th e  s t r a t e g i c  l e v e l ,  the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  o u t l in e d  th re e  com­
ponents i n  t h e i r  post-W ar approach;
(a) th e  e l im in a t io n  of p e t ty  c o n f l i c t s  w ith in  the  
o rg a n is a t io n  and w ith o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  groups 
(the  AK?) and the  need to  c re a te  a common
f r o n t  o f  East European a n t i -S o v ie t  groups;
(b) the  co n t in u a t io n  o f  armed s t ru g g le  by the
UFA;
(c) th e  p re p a ra t io n  of cadre fo r  long-term  
c o n s p i r a to r i a l  work.
None o f  th e se  aims, except the  f i r s t  in  a minimal way with
the  AK, m a te r ia l i s e d .  There i s  l i t t l e  evidence to  show t h a t  the
n a t i o n a l i s t  movement su rv ived  as an o rgan ised  fo rce  beyond 1948,
a f t e r  th e  l a s t  campaigns a g a in s t  the  UFA.
In February , 1946, th e  UHVR and the  n a t i o n a l i s t  g u e r r i l l a s
launched a f i e r c e  campaign of propaganda m i l i t a r y  a c t io n s  on the
2 8eve o f g en era l  e l e c t io n s  to  the  Supreme S o v ie t .  The campaign was 
rep ea ted  again  th e  next y e a r  during  the  e l e c t io n  p e r io d  f o r  th e  Council
^^OUN V S v i t l i  Postanov, p p .  121-43.
^^UFA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I ,  pp. 127, 196. 
27'F .  Doc. 1.
2 8UFA V S v i t l i  Dokumentiv, I ,  pp. 153-59.
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o£ N a t i o n a l i t i e s .  Moat o f  the  UPA In cu rs io n s  were i n to  sm all towns 
and v i l l a g e s  in  Western Ukraine, t h e i r  groups being  f a r  sm a l le r  than  
those  which fought in  a c t io n s  in  1944 in  Western Ukraine o r  in  1945 
in  Southern Poland.
The d ec is iv e  e x p ed it io n  a g a in s t  the  UPA took p lace  in  1947.
In su ccess iv e  waves o f  d e p o r ta t io n s ,  the  Sovie t government moved
29
la rg e  numbers o f  Western U krain ian  peasan ts  e a s t  to  S ib e r i a ;  the  
P o l ish  government depopulated  th e  Lemko, Peremysl and Kholm regions 
and r e - s e t t l e d  approxim ately  200,000 Ukrainians in  O lstyn  and S t e t t i n  
on th e  B a l t i c  c o a s t .  Following the  removal o f  t h i s  mass base of the  
UPA, the  m i l i t a r y  campaign began. Acting upon a t r i p a r t i t e  ag ree ­
ment s igned  by the  USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, combined armies
blockaded th e  b o rd e r  t e r r i t o r i e s  o f  the th re e  s t a t e s  in  May 1947, and
30proceeded to  e l im in a te  su rv iv in g  U krainian g u e r r i l l a s .  (P o lish
d is s id e n t  groups a lso  were a t a r g e t  in  P o la n d ) . Blum e s t im a te s  th a t
the  combined lo s se s  o f  U krain ian  and P o lish  g u e r r i l l a s  were 7,500 dead
and 2,000 wounded. The U krain ian  losses  here  appear to  have been the
overwhelming m a jo r i ty ,  because only 145 of the  41,000 who su rrendered
to  the  P o l ish  government fo rces  were UPA members. Losses on the
government s id e  in  the  1947 campaign were 1,300 r e g u la r  P o lish  army
s o ld ie r s  3,000 i n t e r n a l  s e c u r i ty  t ro o p s ,  4,500 members o f  the  Po lish
Workers' P a rty ;  3,000 re g u la r  s o ld ie r s  and i n t e r n a l  s e c u r i ty
personnel were wounded. To th e  UPA lo s s ,  1,500 can be added from the
31June, 1945 campaign by the  above mentioned in f a n t r y  d iv i s io n s .
S ov ie t sources have no t p rov ided  any d e s c r ip t io n  o r  f ig u re s  f o r  t h i s
^^UHVR V S v i t l i  Postanov, pp. 245-58.
N icholas Chubaty, 'The UPA F igh ts  the  Kremlin*, Ukrainian 
Q u a r te r ly , no. 3, 1947, p . 359.
31 B ll in s k y ,  Second S o v ie t  R epublic, p. 114.
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same a c t io n  ta k in g  p la ce  on Western U krain ian  t e r r i t o r y .  The
losses  on b o th  s id e s  in  Western Ukraine may be a p p re c ia te d  from
Khrushchev's comments in  h is  memoirs th a t  " a f t e r  the  war, we lo s t
thousands o f  men in  a b i t t e r  s t ru g g le  between th e  U krain ian  n a t i o n a l i s t s
32and the  fo rce s  o f  S ov ie t  power".
At t h i s  p o in t  the  h i s to r y  o f  the n a t i o n a l i s t  movement ends.
A ll  documentation o f armed o r  o th e r  ac tions  a f t e r  t h i s  p e r io d  
r e f e r s  to  th e  p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  no t as UPA or OUN members, b u t simply 
as ' i n s u r g e n t s ' ,  i n d ic a t in g  th e  d i s in te g r a t io n  o f  the  o rg a n is a t io n a l  
s t r u c t u r e .
3 2 Crankshaw, e d . ,  Khrushchev Remembers, p . 123.
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CONCLUSION
N ationalism  as an ideo logy  o f  a p o l i t i c a l  movement does 
no t appear to  be the  s t a b l e  phenomenon^from the h i s t o r i c  p o in t  of 
view. This i s  c l e a r ,  n o t  only in  th e  case o f  the  OUN and th e  UPA 
whose a c t i v i t y  we have examined in  t h i s  paper ,  bu t  a l s o  in  numerous 
o th e r  c ases .  The Québécois movement o f  the  1920' s  which had as i t s  
heroes M ussolin i and S a laza r  i s  no t the  same as the  n a t i o n a l i s t  
movement th e re  today; the  movement in  B r i t ta n y  which supported  
Vichy and th e  Nazi occupation  during the  Second World War i s  
q u a l i t a t i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t  from the  Breton n a t i o n a l i s t s  who support the  
Communist P a r ty  o f  France and o th e r  l e f t  wing fo rces  today . The 
sec t io n s  o f  the  I r i s h  Republican Army who were p rep a red  to  work 
w ith  Germany during  the  Second World War cannot be considered  the 
source of th e  c u r re n t  p o l i t i c s  o f  e i t h e r  wing o f the  IRA today. The 
OUN and the  UPA cannot be equated  with the  c u rre n t  d i s s id e n t  movement 
in  Ukraine today although the  l a t t e r  i s  a lso  imbued w ith  a n a t i o n a l i s t  
s p i r i t .  Even w ith in  the  h i s t o r i c  boundaries o f  the  movement we 
have examined, the  'n a t io n a l i s m ' of the  movement does n o t appear to  
have been i t s  c e n t r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  except in  id e o lo g ic a l  and 
proclam atory  s ta t e m e n ts .
The fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  should  be examined in  o rd e r  
to  unders tand  th e  r o le  o f  th e  Ukrainian n a t i o n a l i s t  movement in  the  
h i s t o r i c a l  p rocess  are  th e  s o c ia l  con ten t o f  i t s  programme and the  
impact o f  i t s  a c t i v i t y  upon c la s s  a lignm ent, bo th  n a t io n a l ly  and 
in t e r n a t i o n a l l y .  An exam ination o f the  OUN's and UPA's programmatic 
response to  th e  s o c ia l  predicam ent o f  the  U krain ian  people  and o f
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the s o c ia l  fo rc e s  who were a c t iv e  in  th e  movement i t s e l f  re v e a ls  th e  
underly ing  f a c to r s  which determined t h e i r  h i s t o r i c a l  r o l e .
In the  1930' s  the  programme of the  OUN favoured th e  Western 
U krain ian  middle c la s s  a t  the  expense of the mass o f peasan ts  and 
workers. I t  c a l l e d  f o r  a c o r p o r a t i s t  a u th o r i t a r i a n  s t a t e  as the  
s o lu t io n  to  th e  p l i g h t  of th e  Western U krainian middle c l a s s .  This 
appears to  be the  o v e rr id in g  theme in  s p i t e  of the  OUN's declamatory 
s tan ce  f o r  'n a t io n a l  l i b e r a t i o n . ' The middle c la s s  c h a r a c te r  o f  i t s  
membership, and to  a f a r  g r e a t e r  degree, the  middle c la s s  lead e rsh ip  
o f  the  movement expressed  th i s  programmatic f a c e t  in  an o th er  way.
At th e  same tim e , th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s '  p r a c t i c e - a t t a c k s  on th e  P o lish  
s t a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  o f f i c i a l s  and landowning a r i s to c r a c y  in  Western 
Ukraine gave i t  the  image o f  a s e p a r a t i s t  and v an g u ard is t  fo rc e ,  
responding d i r e c t l y  to  th e  P o lish  government's and upper c l a s s '  
suppress ion  o f  the  U krainian p e a sa n try .  The s e p a r a t i s t  c h a ra c te r  o f  
th e  OUN's p o l i t i c s  in  p r a c t i c e  did no t enable i t  to  c a r ry  out a 
t r u l y  f a s c i s t  approach to  the  s o c ia l  c r i s i s  in  Poland because i t  
demanded th e  movement's o p p o s i t io n  to  o th e r  p a r t s  o f  the  middle c la ss  
which were no t U krain ian . I t s  a t ta c k s  on the  CPWU and the  w orkers ' 
o rg a n isa t io n s  were c o n s is te n t  w ith  the  c l a s s i c  p r a c t i c e  of f a s c i s t  
o rg a n isa t io n s  o f  th e  p e r io d .  As much as n a t i o n a l i s t s  may today p ro ­
t e s t  t h a t  th ese  i n s t i t u t i o n s  were c o n tro l le d  by S t a l i n i s t s ,  they 
were a t  th e  same tim e im portant defenders o f  the  l iv in g  s tandards  
and p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  o f  the  Western U krainian working c la s s .
When Germany went to  war w ith  the  Sovie t Union, both  the  
Mel'nyk and Bandera fa c t io n s  chose to  a l l y  w ith  th e  former power.
They th e reb y  fo llow ed th e  d i c t a t e s  o f  t h e i r  anti-communism and the 
t r a d i t i o n  o f  t h e i r  movement In  the  1930' s ;  t h i s  d e c is io n  had l i t t l e  
to  do w ith  the  s o c ia l  and n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t s  of the  U krain ian  peop le , 
again  in  s p i t e  of th e  abundance of n a t i o n a l i s t  d e c la ra t io n s  to  th a t
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e f f e c t .  Here th e  c la s s  c h a ra c te r  of the  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement [and 
opportunism) re v ea led  i t s e l f  in  the  OUN's choice on th e  
i n t e r n a t io n a l  l e v e l .
The fo rm ation  o f the  UPA, according to  our method o f i n v e s t i ­
g a t io n  was a s i g n i f i c a n t  b reak  w ith  th e  p a s t  p e r io d  because the  
UPA chose to  s id e  w ith  the  mass movement a g a in s t  the  Nazi occupation 
and to  take up the  s o c ia l  demands of th e  workers and p e a s a n ts .
While the  UPA's o p p o s it io n  to  S ov ie t  a u th o r i ty  d id  n o t  stem from 
a l e f t  wing c r i t i q u e  o f  t h a t  a u th o r i ty ,  bu t one which considered  the  
USSR to  be q u i te  s im i la r  to  the  f a s c i s t  model, the  a n t i -S o v ie t  
c h a ra c te r  o f  the  Army in  p o l i t i c s  and p r a c t ic e  cannot be viewed as 
being  s im i la r  to  the  anti-communism o f the  OUN in  the  1930' s .  On the  
le v e l  o f  a n a ly s i s ,  t h i s  o p p o s it io n  to  the  Sov ie t  s t a t e  in  th e  p o s t -  
War p e r io d  did  become a l e f t  wing c r i t iq u e  o f  the  b u re a u c ra t ic  ru le  
th e re .  This s u b je c t  f a l l s  o u ts id e  th e  h i s t o r i c a l  p e r io d  o f  examination 
in  the  p re s e n t  paper; i t  i s  im portan t to  note however, t h a t  th e  
development of th e  UPA in  the  p o s t  war p e r io d  c a r r ie d  the  l e f t  tu rn  of 
1943 towards i t s  lo g ic a l  c o n c lu s io n s - -a  m a t e r i a l i s t  a n a ly s is  and 
a programme c a l l i n g  f o r  an independent c l a s s l e s s  Ukraine, a s t a t e  
d em o cra tica l ly  c o n t ro l le d  by the  working c la s s e s .
Throughout i t s  h i s t o r y ,  th e  na t io n a lism  o f  the  movement ac ted  
as a veneer fo r  more fundamental c la ss  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  i t s  
programme and s o c ia l  com position. These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  provide 
th e  measure fo r  examining the  OUN and the  UPA in  a way more p re c is e  
than the  more ephemeral and su b je c t iv e  fa c e ts  o f  i t s  'o u t e r  s h e l l ' :  
i t s  ' n a t i o n a l i s m ' . How i s  i t  p o s s ib le  to  unders tand  th e  d i f f e re n c e  
between th e  OUN o f  the  193Q's and the  UPA w ithout re fe re n ce  to  the  
s o c ia l  co n ten t  o f  the  1929 programme and th e  1943 s ta tem en t o f  UPA 
aims, and to  the  middle c la s s  composition of the  OUN in  one p e r io d  
and th e  mass base o f  the  UPA in  1943-44? An a ttem pt to  d is c e rn  the
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r e l a t io n s h ip  o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  o rg a n isa t io n s  to  th e  populace be fo re  
and during  the  War by answering such q u es t io n s  as Armstrong p u t forward 
in  h is  s tudy  U krain ian  N ationalism  (How s trong  was n a t io n a l ism  
amongst the  E as te rn  U krain ians?) f a i l s  to  analyse v i s i b l e  and 
o b je c t iv e  c a te g o r ie s .  Rather i t  dwells a t  th e  s u b je c t iv e  le v e l .
The f a i l u r e  o f  the  movement to  achieve i t s  aims during the  
War o r to  con tinue  as a s e r io u s  p o l i t i c a l  opponent to  the  S ovie t regime 
a f t e r  1945 cannot be a t t r i b u t e d  s o le ly  to  i t s  pow erlessness in  the  
face o f  two s t a t e s ,  t h e i r  armies and re so u rce s .  There are  numerous 
examples o f  popu la r  movements (Vietnam i s  a re c en t  example) which 
overcame such odds. The reasons fo r  the  n a t i o n a l i s t s ’ f a i l u r e  must 
be sought e lsew here.
The OUN did  no t develop a s i g n i f i c a n t  p o p u la r  base in  
Western or Sov ie t  Ukraine b e fo re  1943 because i t  was an 'independence ' 
movement in  name only . The a s s o c ia t io n  o f the  OUN-M and OUN-B 
w ith the Wehrmacht, th e  c i v i l i a n  ad m in is tra t io n s  o f occupancy ru le  and 
w ith  the  form ation  of the  N a c h t ig a l l , Roland and th e  G a l ic ia  D iv is ion  
made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e i r  s t r a t e g y  was no t one of b u i ld in g  a popu lar  
movement to  s t ru g g le  fo r  independence, b u t one sec u r in g  concessions of 
autonomy from the  Nazi a u th o r i t i e s  in  r e tu r n  f o r  t h e i r  co -o p e ra t io n  
and remaining su b o rd in a te  to  t h e i r  d i c t a t e .
I t  was no t u n t i l  1943 when Germany was lo s in g  the  War th a t  
the  UPA emerged as an anti-German and a n t i -S o v ie t  phenomenon. The 
OUN-B fo rces  in  G a l ic i a ,  the  s trongho ld  of the  o rg a n is a t io n ,  
opposed German ru le  in  1943 on p ap er ,  bu t in  p r a c t i c e  only in  August 
o f  th a t  y ea r  a f t e r  the  Third  E x tra-O rd inary  C ongress . In both 
cases , and moreso fo r  the OUN-B than fo r  the  UPA, p re p a ra t io n  fo r  
the  imminent r e tu r n  o f  Sov ie t  a u th o r i t i e s  was an o v e r r id in g  con­
s id e r a t i o n  which fo rced  th e  tu rn  o f the  movement a t  t h i s  tim e. I f  
the  n a t i o n a l i s t  h i s t o r i a n s  claim th a t  th e  OUN-B opposed Nazi Germany
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as w ell as th e  S ov ie t  Union, then  we may ask— 'Why only  in  1943 and
no t in  1941? '.  The tim ing o f  the  n a t i o n a l i s t  tu rn  was im portan t.
They d id  n o t chose to  oppose Nazi Germany, moreover, bu t were
fo rced  to  do so because the  mass o f  workers and p easan ts  in  Ukraine
had f a r  o u ts t r ip p e d  them in  being the  f i r s t  opponents to  Nazi r u le .
Yona L iron , a former coun ter  insurgency e x p e r t  o f  the  NKVD
expressed  t h i s  c r i t i c i s m  in  the  U krainian Q u arte r ly  in  1963:
A grave p o l i t i c a l  m istake was to allow Sovie t 
propaganda to  a s s o c ia te  the  Ukrainian 
n a t i o n a l i s t  movement w ith  Nazi Germany, As soon 
as i t  became c le a r  a f t e r  the  1943 Kursk-Orel 
b a t t l e  t h a t  the  Germans had lo s t  the  war in  the  
E a s t ,  the  UPA ought to  have ordered a l l  
U krainians se rv ing  in  German o rgan ised  m i l i t a r y  
form ations o r a u x i l i a r y  p o l ic e  to  k i l l  t h e i r  
Nazi o f f i c e r s ,  s e iz e  t h e i r  arms and f le e  to  
th e  woods. This was no t d o n e . l
But even in  1943, such a r a d ic a l  tu rn  as L iron suggests  would
no t have compensated adequate ly  fo r  the  p r a c t i c e  o f  p rev ious  y e a rs .  
Although the  Red P a r t i s a n s  re p re se n te d  a government t h a t  was ha ted  
by many U k ra in ians , t h e i r  p o s i t io n  on the  Nazi occupation  was con­
s i s t e n t  throughout the  War. This f a c t  alone c o n tr ib u te d  to  much o f t h e i r  
growth in  1942 and 1943. Even a f t e r  1943 th e re  was a lack of 
c l a r i t y  in  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s '  s t r a te g y  and p o l i t i c s .  While the  UPA 
fought Nazi p o l ic e  and army u n i t s  in  Western Ukraine, j  ^lot
execute  U krain ian  c o l la b o ra to r s  se rv in g  in  the  occupant a d m in is t ra t io n .  
Many o f  th e se  c o l la b o ra to r s  were OUN members. The l in k s  between
the  OUN-B and th e  UPA made such p r a c t i c e  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  th e  g u e r r i l l a s .
The Red P a r t i s a n s  k i l l e d  c o l la b o ra to r s  re g a rd le ss  o f  t h e i r  
n a t i o n a l i t y  [and p robab ly , o r ig in a l  a f f i l i a t i o n ) .
p. 332.
^Yona L iron ' I  Was a S ov ie t Counter Insurgency E x p e r t ' ,
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Other in c o n s i s te n c ie s  o f  the  UPA's s t r a t e g y  were h ig h l ig h te d  
in  i t s  l in k s  with o th e r  E ast European movements!-the .A.K. and C roa tian
n a t i o n a l i s t s .  The only  common denominator between th e se  groups and 
the  UPA was t h e i r  o p p o s it io n  to  the  S ovie t Union. But the  A.K. and 
th e  C rea tion  movement were b i t t e r l y  anti-com m unist. The UPA chose 
to  submerge th e  p ro g re s s iv e  a spec ts  o f  i t s  programme in  favour o f  an 
a l l i a n c e  based on a n t i -S o v ie t i sm .
At the  ro o t  of th ese  c o n tra d ic t io n s  lay  the  i n a b i l i t y  o f  
the  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement to  break w ith i t s  p a s t .  Although the  
programme o f the  UPA addressed  i t s e l f  to  the  s o c ia l  demands of 
the  U krain ian  masses and recogn ised  th e  importance o f  a popu la r  
movement which was t r u l y  independent in  programme and p r a c t i c e ,  i t  
remained unable to  f in d  a h ear ing  w ith in  the  working c la s s  and had 
no s t r a t e g y  f o r  reach ing  th e se  s o c ia l  la y e r s .  The r e l i a n c e  o f  
the  movement upon the  Western Ukrainian p easan try  from 1929 to  i t s  
d e fe a t  in  1947 proved to  be i t s  dow nfall. The p o l i t i c a l  changes th a t  
were made in  1943 were too  sm all and too l a t e .
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